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“There is grea t ange r in our Country caused in  
part by inaccura te, and even fraudule nt, report-
ing of the news. The Fake News Media, the true 
Enemy of the People, must stop the open & 
obvious hostility & report the news accura tel y & 
fairly. That will do much to put out the flame… 
…of Anger and Outrage a nd we will then be 
able to bring all sides toge ther in Peace and 
Harmony. Fake News Must End! ” 
Donald Trump 1 
 
Intr odu ction  
In  the past five years , during which  this dissertation was composed , populism has provabl y 
gaine d  momentum. The results of dif feren t n atio na l elec tions , for example,  held within 
those 11 Western Democrac ie s  studied  in this thesis , illustrate  historic a l victories of popu-
list politic ia ns, partie s and movements (cf., Aalberg, Esser, Reinema nn, Strömbä ck, & de 
Vreese, 2017; van Kessel, 2015). In 2014, populist partie s rece ive d strong support in the 
genera l elections of Sweden (Sweden Democra ts: 12.86%; +7.16%) and Bulga ria (Citize ns 
for Europea n Devel opment of Bulga ria : 32.67%; +2.13%) and in  the 2015 genera l elec-
tions , populist partie s  in Switzerland (Swiss People’s Party: 29.4%; +2.8%), Poland (Law 
a nd Justice: 37.6%; +7.7%) and the United Kingdom (UK Indepe ndenc e Party: 12.6%; 
+9.5%) each reache d record result s . 2016 came with the elec tion of Donald Trump as the 
preside nt of the United  States and the UK Brexi t referendum , which was supported by 
51.89% of voters. In 2017 populist politicia ns and their parties rece ive d remarkabl e support  
in t he Netherla nds  (Party for Freedom : 13.06%; +2.98%), Germany  (Alterna tive for Ger-
many: 12.6%; +7.9%) , Austria (Freedom Party of Austria : 25.97%; +5.46%) and Franc e  
(National  Front : 13.2%; -0.40%). And in 2018 the Swede n Democ rats increased their vote 
share by yet another 4.67% , while  in Italy the Five Star Movement  was electe d by 32.68% 
of voters (+7.12%) and subseque ntly, reached out to form a government coalition with the 
right -wing party Northern League . 
                                                 
1 Two subsequent tweets from Donald Trump’s personal Twitter account (@realDonaldTrump) on 
October 29 th , 2018. All punctuation and capitalization in original.   
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Wherever it thrive s, popu lism has been identifie d to challe nge  constituent  eleme nts of lib-
eral democ racy  – a form of government  that has, among schol a rs, intelle ctuals, and politi-
cians , longtime been considered the standa rd of politic a l legitimacy foresee n to preva il for 
the decades to come. But the  rise of populist forces raises deep conc erns with regard to the 
prosperity of consolida ted libe ral democ raci es (Foa & Mounk, 2016; Plattner, 2015). The 
potentia l for conflic t lies  in the very nature of p opulism itsel f. The pheno menon has been 
identifie d as a thin -centered ideolog y that is comprised of very few but also  clea r  ideas 
about the gestal t of polit ic s and society  (Mudde, 2004). In brief, p opulism is  held  to be  
anti -elitist, peopl e -centrists, and widely anti -plural ist in that it place s  the will of a homoge-
neous peopl e above  everything  else , including minority rights and  the rule of law . In this 
respec t , some a uthors identify p opulism’s worst possible outcome is  the  tyranny of the 
masses  (Hawkins, 2009). Thus, although  populism enters  the  public deba te with the prom-
ise  to overcome  the limitations  of libe ral democ rac y  (Canova n, 1999) , more often than not 
it subve rts  centra l  features  of libe ral democ ratic systems  (Waisbord, 2018).  
One of these centra l features  of libe ral democ rac y are  the free media  that stand in the 
midst of this crisi s . Next to the politic a l elite, populist forces willfully  attack established 
media institutions and blame them to be lying to the peopl e . In countries in which popu-
lism is in power, the media are quick ly exposed to  (subtle to often also blatant) measu res of  
politic a l repression (e .g., Poland; cf., Stanley, 2016 ) and in countries in which populism is 
on the rise, the media face repetitive accusa tions that poten tial ly erode  public trust  over 
time  (e.g., Germany ; cf. Fawzi, Obermai er, & Reinemann, 2017 ). When taking into account 
the important role that media play within democrac ie s, these populist atta ck s against the  
media appea r  nothing but  disturbing . While the debate  about which spec ific function (or 
functions) the media  should  fulfill  in democ rac ies is  ongoi ng  among philosophers and 
communic a tion schol a rs (Nielsen, 2017) it is widely uncon tested that robust and largel y 
trusted media institution s  form a necessa ry condi tion for democ rac ie s to persist (Carey, 
1999; Strömbä ck, 2005) . The journal istic dissem ina tion of information about daily politic al 
affairs  informs public knowle dge and public opinion in that it provides common facts 
based on which deba tes, opinion formation, and not least, voting are enabled. Put more 
broadly, media help set the condi tions for  a shared space  or horizon  that , in theory,  bring s  
about societa l integ ration  (Maletzke, 1980; McQuail, 1992) . If media are rep ressed or not 
trusted by large segments  of the popula tion they are eventua lly preve nted from fulfilling 
this very public servic e . Subseque ntly, s ocietie s were  enda nge red to pola rize  and ultima tely,  
democ rac ie s could  begin to sway . Hence, i f the media are at risk, democ racy  will be, too . 
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To evalua te in how far the upsurge of populism can be linked to a societa l pola riza tion as 
well as to the erosion of democ rac ie s  and  spec ifically, to the crisis of confidenc e in  many 
public institutions such as the news media, is without a doubt one of the most important 
tasks currently put into the hands of socia l scientists. This  cumula tive  dissert a tion provides 
inve stiga tions that aim to c ontribute to this resea rch.  
Specifica lly , the present projec t applie s an indiv idua l level perspec tive in order to inve sti-
gate the manifestation of populism within the citizenry. This does not refer so much to  an 
inve stiga tion of  the extent  to which populism might have perva ded civil society but rather , 
to an  inve stiga tion of what could be called a p opul ist belief system . According to Philip Con-
verse ( 2006) a belie f system  is defined as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which 
the eleme nts are bound toge ther by some form of constraint or functiona l interdepe nd-
ence” (p. 3) and as a “set of systematic differences in attitudes, perce ptions, or beha vior 
patterns” (p. 65). T he main aim of this disser tation i s to seek for evide nce of such mating 
attitudes, r eality perce ptions and beha vior  within the mass public  tha t  can, via one way or 
the other, be linked to the populist ideolog y . Thereb y , the indiv idua l support for the popu-
list ideolog y itsel f is envisione d to represent  the populist belie f system ’s core  from which  
other attitudes, perce p tions , and behavior a l inclina tions can  emana te.  
As belie f systems can have quite  large scope s and diffic ult to trace bounda ries this disserta-
tion will follow upon only one spec ific traje ctory within the populist belie f system to wit, a 
path  partic ula rly interesting in light of the crisi s of confidenc e in the mass media referred to 
above . Regarding the importa nt role that media play in libe ral democ ra cies the thesis sets a 
partic ula r  focus on media rela ted perce ptions and beha vior , although , of course, many oth-
er dimensions  could be just as interesting and simila rly important. The main resea rch ques-
tion of this dissertation thus reads:  
How are the populist ideology and its specific relationship to the news media  
reflected on the citizen level?  
I am referring to a particula r set of  indiv idua l attitudes, perce ptions and behav ior . In that 
order, this dissertation  will focus first on the conc ept of p op ul ist attitu d es  that has in prio r 
resea rch been identifie d as the representa tion or support of populi sm on the indiv idua l 
level. In this thesis , populist attitudes will be understood  as the populist belief systems’ 
core . Next, m oving out of the populist belie f systems center  I will focus on  populism’s 
rela tionship to  th e news media . In essenc e, t his enc loses an investiga tion of the rela tion ship 
between populist attitudes and individuals’ m edia percepti ons . A s according to communica tion 
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sci enc e theory  media perce ptions are  strongl y interlinke d with how indiv idua ls perce ive 
public opinion , relationships betwee n populist attitude s  and p ublic opin ion perceptions  will  also 
be examined. Moreove r, this dissertation aims to examine the news preferences  of citize ns  with 
populist attitudes . With this, also a beha viora l dim en sion of the populist belie f system is 
captured. Together, t hese  different rela tionships will be empirica lly investiga ted in multiple 
countries using  large scale surve y resea rch.  
Ideally, t hese inve stiga tions help to map the popul ist ideolog y and its media -rela ted reper-
cussions  on the  indiv idua l  level.  To this point, t he resea rch outline d is mainly one for rela-
tionships  that persist bet wee n different atti tudes, perce ptions and behavior a l inclina tions . 
However, t he mecha nisms that cause the se links are well worth inve stiga ting  as well. To 
offer considera tions rega r ding  the proce sses that could expla in the assumed rela tions , this 
thesis devel ops a socia l identity approa ch to popul ist attitu d es . This approac h combine s two 
broad e r  theoretica l notions. The first path that I will follow  in order  to expla in for the pat-
terns in question is the one of communic a t ion effects. T he second one will spea k to psy-
chologi ca l mecha nisms as described by the socia l identity theory. For reasons to be  out-
line d later, these two can  jointly help to understand the establishment of the populist belie f 
system  within the mass public .  
An analy sis as such is of utmost importanc e in order to fathom the pheno menon of popu-
lism itsel f , to asses s its actua l impact  on the welfare of today’s democratic societies and not 
lastly, to inform the sear ch for answers and soluti ons  to preva ilin g societa l problems . If 
citize ns with populist attit udes were shown to  no longe r tr ust the news and if this rela ted  to 
how they perceive public opinion and moreover, if populist attitudes were shown to relate 
to a unique news choice, different  indic a tors indic a ting  societa l polariza tion were identifie d , 
which could directly be led  back  to populism.   
C hapter 1 expands  further upon the releva nce of the present resea rch ende a vor . It does so, 
in introduci ng  the wider resea rch  context  within which the present study is loca ted and by 
pointing out resea rch gaps  within this conte xt . Furthermore, t he chapter introduce s in 
more  deta il the notion  of politic a l belief systems  that can serve as a guiding princi ple  
through this study. O n this founda tion three more spec ific resea rch questions will be de-
velope d. The chapter closes with an overview of the different artic le s that were written in 
order to address these que stions.   
Chapter 2  introduce s a definition for  populism  as a thin politic a l ideology . This include s an 
examina tion of the key components that constitute the pheno menon. A specific focus will 
   5  
   
be set on the understanding of populism as an identity politic s  to empha siz e that populism 
views politic s and society in stric tly bina ry terms . In doing so, this chapter sets the scene 
for the upcoming three chapters in which I will step from the ideational level to the indi-
vidua l le vel. These chapters will henc e unfold deta ile d illustrations of the reperc ussion of 
populism on the citize n l evel.  
Chapter 3 start s out with an exploration of populism as a politic a l attitude . Based on  a criti-
cal discussion of  p rior resea rch  the conce pt of populist attitudes  will be defined. Going 
from there, a surve y measureme nt for populis t attitudes will be introduce d . T his chapter 
will also be the first to present empirica l findings  as the proposed measureme nt will be  put 
to different validi ty tests  u sing multi -country surve y data . 
Chapter 4 introduce s the  socia l identity approac h to populist attitudes. T his  socia l identity 
perspec tive aims to expla in why and how attitudes, perce ptions and beha vior a l inclina tions  
are interlinke d within the populist belie f system. Once this framew ork is outline d, the 
Chapter explore s  links betwe en populist attitudes and  indiv idua l media perceptions . More-
over, also public opinion perce ptions will be investiga ted as those have been s hown to 
stand in an important relationship to indiv idua ls ’ media perceptions  in previous resea rch . 
At last , the rela tionships betwee n populist attitudes, media perce ptions, and public opinion 
perce ptions  will be empirica lly studied using surve y data in four countries . 
Chapter 5  goes beyond an analy sis of attitudes and perce ptions and links populist attitudes 
to beha viora l inclina tions . Assuming that populist attitudes can be linked to spec ific media 
perce ptions, it could as well be that populist attitud es rela te to partic ula r  media diets . As-
sumptions about respec ti ve rela tionships will be informed by the socia l identity approach 
to popu list attitude s. The Chapter will expand the approac h  by insigh ts comi ng out of the 
selec tive exposure  resea rch . T wo surv e y  studies will be introduce d that provide first com-
parative insigh ts into the news use of citize ns with populist attitudes  in multi ple countries . 
Chapter 6  draws together the dissertations’ mai n finding s and contributions rega rding the 
resea rch on indiv idua l level populism and its rela tio ns to media perce ptions and news  pref-
erenc es. The findings will, each in itsel f but also all in their mutua l interpla y, be discussed 
rega rding their potentia l to cause societa l pola riza tion. Based on  this summ a ry, dema nds 
for future resea rch will be deline a ted .  
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Chapt er 1 : Resear ch Gaps and Rese ar ch Quest ions  
Parallel to the growth of populist partie s within Western Democ rac ie s, t he scientific study 
of the pheno menon intensive ly progressed within th e past deca de . Politica l scienc e, sociol-
ogy, psyc holog y as well as communic a tion scienc e have contributed to  a better understand-
ing of the pheno menon , showing that the study of populism  is  a genuine ly interdisci plina ry 
ende a vor . The common goal s are to expla in the electoral succ ess of populis t actors, to as-
sess populism’s relationsh ip to democ rac y, and to inve stiga te its effec t on politica l cultures.  
Res earch Context  and Main Objective  
T heore tica l  and norma tive  work has been published throughout (Canova n, 1981, 1999; 
Dahl, 1956; Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2018; Panizza, 2005; Taggart, 2000). This work has in-
formed and adva nced the definition of populism and lead  to a widely acce pted consensus 
among schol a rs to under s tand the pheno menon  as a thin center ed politica l ideol ogy (Mud-
de, 2004). Moreove r, in outlining the ideology’s worldview beyond its core assumptions, 
theoretica l  litera ture s  have offered important insigh ts rega rd ing  the potentia l of conflic ts 
betwee n populism and different democ ratic elements , such as  the mas s media  (e.g., 
Krämer, 2014, 2018; Mazzol eni, 2014; Waisbord, 2018). 
Largely guide d  by this theoretica l work, e mpirica l studies on p opulism have evolve d as well. 
This r esea rch can be grouped best by the spec ific perspec tive  that it applie s . First, a  compa-
rably rich  corpus of studies focuses on the supply side of populism  what  encloses investiga-
tions of populism within the politic a l and media sphere s . On the level of texts conte nt ana-
lytica l  studies inve stiga te the manifestat ion of populism within politic a l party manifestoes 
(e.g., Rooduijn, Lange, & van der Brug, 2014 ), politic a l party broadca sts  (Jagers & Wal-
grave, 2007), the news  media (e.g.,  Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018 ; Manucc i 
& Weber, 2017), talk shows (Blassnig, Ernst, Büche l, & Engesser, 2018)  as well as  within  
socia l media (e.g.,  Ernst, Engesser, Büche l, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017 ). These studies also 
enclose very few elite surve ys  tappi ng for the  attit udes of populist politic ia ns (e.g., Stav-
raka kis, And rea dis, & Katsambeki s, 2016 ).  
Second, a  compa rably smalle r , but sturdily  growi ng number  of studies focus  on the de-
mand side of populism, that is,  on  investiga tions of populism within the citize nry. This 
resea rch can for itsel f  be  divided up into  two subfiel ds . One line of work focuses on the 
devel opment of a measure ment  able to capture populist attitudes  within surve y resea rch . 
Over  the past years, vario us populist attitudes  scale s have been introduce d . While most of 
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them rely on the same  or very simila r  definition s  of populism, their spec ific opera tional iz a-
tions  often differ largel y  and are thus , still up for deba te  (cf., Castanho Silva , Andrea dis  et 
al., 2019; van Hauwaert, Schimpf, & Azevedo, 2019) . A second line of  resea rch on dema nd 
s ide populism goes beyond finding and valida ting a measureme nt to popu list attitudes . 
These  studies  are , judged by their gene ral aim , closest to the aim of the present resea rch. 
That is, they  seek  to und erstand  the  genera l mindset , nature, charac ter, or worldview of 
those citize ns who support the populist ideolog y  and in doing so , offer first idea s about the 
shape and extent of the  populist belie f system . This mainly refers to  the analy si s of links 
betwee n populist attitudes  (or sometimes populist voting) and other socio demog raphic, 
dispositiona l, attitudina l, or beha viora l variabl es  such as gender  (e.g., Spierings & Zaslove, 
2017), persona lity traits (e.g., Bakke r et al., 2016 ), mental state s  (e.g., Spruyt, Keppe ns, & 
van Drooge nbroec k, 2016 ), conspira toria l belie fs (Castanho Silva, Vegetti, & Littva y, 2017) , 
politic a l attitudes such as politic a l orienta tion, or  spec ific  issue position s ( e.g., van Hau-
waert & van Kessel, 2018 ).  
Third, o nly r ecently , but with all the more  vigor , media psyc holog ica l studies have started 
to link both sides , supply and dema nd,  by inve stiga ting the effects of populist commu nic a-
tion on citize ns ’ attitudes . This has been done within experime ntal resea rch  (e.g., 
Hamelee rs, Bos, Fawzi et al., 2018; Matthes & Schmuck, 2015; Wirz, 2018a, 2018b ) but
also by linki ng content analy tical and surve y data (P. Müller et al., 2017; Wirz et al., 2018). 
T hese different branc hes of populism resea rch have strongl y contributed to a better under-
standi ng of populism among schol a rs and slowly are scientific insigh ts  informing the public 
debate about this phenomenon’s cha rac ter .2 But  to say the obvious , in each of these fields a 
plethora of resea rch questions still remai n unans w ered. This dissertation will contribute  
theoretica l considera tions as well as empirica l inve stiga tions to the second branc h of popu-
lism resea rch as it appea rs most insu ffic ie ntly studied , espec ia lly when judged  f rom a com-
munic a tion scienc e perspec tive . While sociolog ica l as well as politic a l psy cholog ic a l re-
search have provided most  studies on the ps yc holog ic a l nature of populism, empirica l stud-
ies  of dema nd side populism from an angle partic ula rly interesting to the field of commu-
nica tion are  still  few and far betwe en . 
                                                 
2 For example, see the T he Guardian  series on populism (https://www.theguar dian.com/world/ 
series/the -new -populis m) or the Swiss TV science magazine SRF Einstein  on populism 
(https://www.srf.ch/sendungen/eins tein/populis mus -vers tehen), which both featur e many popu-
lism scholars from sociolog y, political science and communication science.  
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This is surp rising given the many hints offered by anec dotal evide nce that point to an al-
most obviou s rela tionship betwee n populism and media rela ted perce ptions and beha vior. 
Specifica lly, n umerous news reports have within the past years portray ed a rathe r dense  and 
problema tic rela tionship betwee n these two entities . These report s revea l verbal fake news 
accusa tions against leading news institutions by populist leaders, but also physica l attacks 
by followe rs of populist  movements against journal ists that take place in the middle of 
public demonstra tions (e.g., Gujer, 2018; A. Jamieson, 2017; Somaska nda, 2017) . This re-
porting is parall el ed by an increa sing concern about declini ng trust in media institutions  on 
the aggrega te level  (Reinemann & Fawzi, 2016) . Yet, it is compl ete ly unclea r if and in how 
far the rise of populism actual ly relates  to these observations , that is, if the link between the 
support of populi sm  and hostile media attitudes  within the citize nry  is systema tic . 
To this point , mainly  theor etic a l work has made an effort in outlining  and understand ing  
the rela tionship betwe en populism and the media by confronting and comparing these enti-
ties ’ conceptions of society, democ rac y , and truth  (Krämer, 2018; Waisbord, 2018) . To be 
brief, the conc lusions of these considera tions are rather dark in that they  point to a grea t 
damag ing potential that populism can have  for democ rac y in that it can severel y desta bili ze 
the establ ished media system in many ways . However, this thinking has not  yet  been shifted 
to the indiv idua l level and  no respec tive  empirica l inve stiga tion of the matte r has thu s far  
been undertaken. But as  long as the anec dotal and theore tica l links are not analy ze d  empiri-
cally , they remai n at best  weak indica tors for somet hing of which’s a ctua l existenc e we can, 
at this moment, not be sure. We do not know yet, in how far the populist ideolog y  as well 
as its dense rela tionship to the news media  illustrated by anec dotal evidenc e and delinea ted 
by theoretica l work  shows any sign of  systema tic manifestation on the indiv id ua l level . It is 
the main objectiv e of the present resea rch endea vor to fill this resea rch gap . A serie s of 
empirica l studies will be undertak en, in order to understand the  support for populism  and  
it’s relation to media perceptions and news consumption  in the mass public . 
The Populist Belief Syst em  
These rela tionships will be inve stiga ted as elements of  a p op ul ist belief system . P olitic a l b elief 
systems genera lly unfold followi ng a partic ula r structure  that I consider to be partic ula rly 
useful also as a structure for this thesis. In that sens e, the notion of belie f syst ems can  serve 
as a guidi ng principle through this dissertation.  Likewise , in referring to a belie f system I 
acknow ledg e that my resea rch is loca ted  within a grea ter resea rch progra m that aims to 
understand the belie f system  as a whole . As it is therefore rela tivel y important for the re-
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sea rch ende avor, I will introduce the genera l idea behind belie f systems  in more deta il in 
the followi ng . Afterw a r ds, I will turn to this thesis’ specific research questions.  
The notion  of politic a l belie f systems has mainly been put forwa rd by Philipp Con verse in 
his famous article on ‘The nature of belief  systems in mass publics’ (2006). The artic le,  
origina lly  published in 1964, has provoked a  fiercely held and persisting schol a rly debate , 
what has contributed  to it  being cited as “celebrated, or notorious but certainly powerful”  
(Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017, p.  3). The essay is thought of as one of  the most influen tial 
works in the field of mass politic a l opinions , “cited each year in scores of publications, 
some agree ing  and others disagreeing” (Ingleha rt, 1990, p.  107). The said deba te mainly 
concerns Converse’s findings and the conclusions and implications deduce d therefrom, 
rather than the conc ept  of belie f systems in itsel f . I will briefly touch upon parts of thi s 
deba te further below. However, it is i mportant for the reader to know  that t hi s thesi s main-
ly seeks to profit  from the structure that define s belie f s ystems . This structure can be ap-
plie d to the popul ist ideolog y and it can as well serve as a guide through this dissertation.  
The basic idea behind the  notion of politic a l belie f systems is that genera l ideolog ic a l orien-
tations can be sys tema tica lly linked to other attitu des, perce ptions and beh avio r a l inclina-
tions , thereby building a “logical whole” (Converse, 2006, p.  8). In Converse’s terminology, 
the different entitie s that are important to a partic ula r belie f system are referred to as id ea -
elem en ts , the rela tionships betwee n these elements are referred to as constra in ts . The different 
idea -elements  that togethe r constitute a belie f system differ with respec t to the centra lity 
that they have within the system . Some idea -elements are more  centra l than others and 
henc e, potentia lly influence less centra l  components . In this respec t, Converse spea ks 
about sup erordi na te  or cr ownin g postures  “involving premises about the nature of social justice, 
social change, ‘natural law’” (p. 7) that can “ serve as a sort of glue to bind togethe r many 
more specific attitudes and beliefs” (p. 7). Moreov er, belie f systems differ with respec t to 
the number of elements by which they are set togethe r. Some may invol ve large numbers; 
others will be rather narrow i n range. Converse himsel f has  focused on the libe ral -
conserva tive ideolo gy and with that,  according to his own words, he has dealt with “belief 
systems that have relatively wide ranges” (p. 4).  
It was Converse’s main objectiv e to trace  belie f patter n s wit hin the genera l popula tion.  
With that , his centra l aim was very close to the one pursued in  the present study.  One of 
the most important (and most discus sed) findings sparking from his study of belie f systems 
was that the consistenc y  in which the indiv idua l level responds  to a be lie f sys tem seems to 
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inc rea se  with i ncrea sing formal educ a tion. In other words , attitude constr a ints as they 
should come about accord ing to some partic ula r ideol ogy  only show e d  consistently among  
the more politic a lly aware strata  of the popula tion  but were  only very  loosel y conne cte d or 
even random among the l ower educa ted segments  of the popula tion . Converse  argued  that 
the latter might not have the intel le ctua l abili ty to consistently grasp  a partic u la r belie f sys-
tem in al l the compl ex ity that it come s with.  It was prima rily t his conc lusion that caused 
great controversy because, according to Inglehart, “it has powerful normative implications, 
raising the question whether representa tive democrac y is meaning ful or even possib le, if 
nonattitudes are widespread as Converse’s analysis implies” (1990, p. 107). Robert Lane, 
for example, henc e calle d for an inve stiga tion of indivi dua l reasoning proce sses that could 
expla in for what Converse had identifie d as inconsistenc ie s in the response patterns of less 
educ a ted individua ls  (Lane, 1973). 
Alt hough this  deba te is extensive and sensitive, I dare to  add another thoug ht : The cohe-
sion with which belief systems are represente d on the indiv idua l level, that is, across all 
segments of th e popula ti on, could also  depe nd on the  spec ific  belief system’s rang e and 
compl ex ity. More spec ifica lly, it would not be unrea sona ble to assume that belie f systems 
that spark from less com ple x ideologie s should be easie r to comprehe nd across all popula-
tion  strata and subseque ntly reflec t rather consistently  across all parts of the mass public. 
Accordingly, s o -calle d thin -centered ideolog ies  comprised of only few politic a l ideas , such 
as the populist ideolog y, could  be interesting  candida tes  for a respec tive inve stiga tion .  
Converse measures const raints betwee n idea -elements static a lly by estima ting how well 
different idea -eleme nts can predic t one another . A very simila r approac h will be followe d 
within the present resea rch. With a closer look at the indiv idua l level support for populism, 
the populist belie f systems core will be examined first.  This will include considera tions as 
to what could build the populist belief system’s superordinate posture that is deemed to 
hold togethe r the grea ter logic a l whole  as well as a discussion of the core features necessa ry 
for populism to be . In this conne ction, the conc ept of populist attitudes will be develope d. 
Secondl y, moving out of the belie f sys tems center followi ng a trajectory that is of partic ula r 
interest to communic a tion scienc e, constraints betwee n the support for populism and indi-
vidua l media and public opinion perce ptions  will be inve stiga ted . Last , individua l news 
preferenc es  will be rela ted to populist attitud es to see k for systema tic patterns also rega rd-
ing beha viora l inclina tions  within the populist belie f system . Figure 1 visua liz e s  this outline. 
This dissertation devotes one spec ific resea rch question to each of the depicte d  laye rs , 
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w hic h will be derive d  further below in this chapter . Empirica l inve stiga tions will be under-
taken in order to respond to these questions.  
 
Figure 1. The popul ist belie f system.  
But before I can turn to the se  spec ific resea rch questions of this disser tation, another as-
pect warra nts attention  that refers to the question of “what causes beliefs to cluster in cer-
tain ways” (Lane, 1973, p. 83). In other w ords , this question refers to the mecha nisms that 
can potent ia lly expla in which idea -eleme nts  within a partic ula r belie f system  rela te to one 
another and how and why  they do so . Many differ ent scientific paradig ms promise insigh t 
rega rding this question. In  this thesis, I will lim it my own considera tions to two  perspec-
tives as they seem partic u la rly interesting with rega rd to communic a tion scienc e as  well as 
with rega rd to the very nature of  the populist ideolo gy . I am spea king of com mun ica tion effects  
and socia l psychologica l mech a ni sms  as described, for example , by the socia l identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . As Converse 
himsel f  has touche d upon both of them , the two appea r all the more suita ble to bolster the 
theoretica l conside rations in the present resea rch .  
As to the first, belie f syst ems are, according to Converse, crea ted by small crea tive elites 
from which they are as well public ly diffused. For example, a few intel lec tuals or politic al 
leaders might construct  an ideolog y and define how this ideolog y can charge spec ific issues 
or entitie s.  Subseque ntly, these systems are presente d to the public as natu ral whole s  in the 
sense of : “If you believe this, then you will also believe that, for it follows in such -and -s uch 
ways” (2006, p. 9). I argue that as far as populism is concerned, the lion’s share of distrib-
uting the populist idea s is mana ged by populist leaders. In  sprea ding what has been coined  
p op ul ist comm un ica tion , they are  assisted by news and socia l media  in differing  ways (e.g., Aal-
berg et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016). Research on populist communic a tion was able to show 
that the media ted distribution of populist messa ge s and style s influences  citizens ’ emotions 
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(Wirz, 2018b), attitudes  (P. Müller et al. , 2017; Wirz, 2018a; Wirz et al., 2018), p erce ptions 
(Hamele ers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017a; Hamelee rs & Schmuck, 2017)  and behavior a l inten-
tions (Hamele ers, Bos, Fawzi et al., 2018) . Though these effects are by no means uncon di-
tional, populist communic a tion has been  identifie d as a key factor in the establishment of 
indiv idua l level constraints betwee n idea -elements releva nt to the populist belie f system.  
Importantly, t hese studies provide d ifferent conc eptua liz a tions  of populist communica tion . 
Key  to the pre sent projec t is the understandi ng of populist communic a tion as p op ul ist identi-
ty fram in g  (cf., Hameleers, Bos, Fawzi et al., 2018) . According to this notion, populist com-
munic a tion offers socia l identity cues  that constr uct  two socia l groups , which are pitted 
against one another to wit,  the pure peopl e and the evil elite. Adjusting Converse’ s  own 
words to  the notion of  populist identity framing, the populist belie f system is henc e pre-
sente d to the public as a natura l whole in the sense of: “If you are a membe r of this group, 
than these groups are evil against you, for it follow s in such -and -such ways.”  
Second, and inex tric a bly linke d with the first theoretic a l notion , I will make use of the so-
cial psyc holog ica l insigh t that identity cues, as they are employe d within populist communi-
cation, pave  the way for group categoriz a tion  proce sses  (cf., Azrout & de Vreese, 2018; 
Hogg & Reid, 2006 ; Nicholson, 2012 ). Interes tingly, Converse ’s own findings also pointed  
to a possible  importanc e of  respec tive  socia l p syc h olog ic a l mecha nisms  in belie f systems . 
As was revea le d, o nly the smalle st share , namely, the most educ a ted partic ipa nts  in Con-
verse ’s surveys relie d on the  rela tivel y abstra ct and far -reachi ng conc eptual dimensions of 
belie f systems when making judgeme nts about spec ific politic a l entitie s. In contrast to that, 
a  much large r  share of his partic ipa nts evaluated policies, parties and candidates “in terms 
of their expec ted favora ble  or unfavora ble trea tment of different socia l groupings ” (p. 14). 
He therefrom concludes, that “[these] peopl e have a clea r image of politic s as an arena of 
group interests and, provided that they have been properly advised on where their own 
group interes ts lie, they are relatively likely to follow such advice” (p. 15). Aside the fact  
that , in this last quote , Converse  implic itly  repea ts the importanc e of com munic a tion, he 
does not spea k about the question of why  most indivi dua ls should be so like ly to follow 
these group cues . H e merely notes  that  to the mass, groups as attitude objects appea r to 
have higher  centra lity within belie f system s  (p. 40). Further, he assumes that cues concern-
ing socia l groupings  are sometimes so “gross” (p. 43) that they  do no t requir e much politi-
cal sophistica tion to be encode d and adapted and henc e, have it rela tivel y easy to pene tra te 
the whole popula tion . 
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I argue that such group cues are indeed  successful means of politic a l com munic a tion, not 
necessa rily beca use they are simple, but beca use they direc tly spea k to  an important part of 
the human nature . More spec ifica lly, these cues potentia lly resona te with socia l identit ie s  
that  represent a significa nt part of the indiv idua l  sel f -conc ept. In apply ing knowle dge about 
socia l psyc holog ica l mecha nisms  as captured  by a large corpus of resea rch  on the socia l 
identity t heory (Tajfel &  Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987)  I attempt to fatho m the psyc ho-
logic a l origins  of constraints betwee n different idea -eleme nts within the populist belie f 
system . In the spec ific case  of populism , this  soci a l identity  approach appea rs espec ia lly  
fruitful as  the ideolog y is convey ed  to the public via socia l identity framing . I will  further  
outline these group divides within populism  and populist communic a tion in Chapter 2 and 
elaborate on its potentia l conseque nce s on the indivi dua l level in Chapter 4 . Essentia lly, 
these reflec tions  result in a socia l identity approa ch to popul ist a ttitud es  that can  be consulted 
rega rding the question of ‘ w ha t causes beliefs to cluster in certa in ways ’. 
T h us far, the expla na tions in the present chapter serve d to introduce the present project’s 
ge nera l resea rch question as well as  the grea ter motiva tion to examine  it.  Moreove r, the 
notion of politic a l belie f systems has briefly been outline d as  it shall serve as a guidi ng prin-
ciple through all  upcoming analysis. With this, I finally turn to the spec ific resea rch ques-
tions that shall  be tackle d.  
RQ 1: Individual Level S upport for Populism  
It appea rs reasona ble to start t he inve stiga tion of the populist belie f system with an exami-
nation of its core. Necessa rily, t his core  has to  embody the populist ideology itsel f . With 
the conc ept of populist attitudes the litera ture on dema nd side populism alrea dy makes a 
good proposa l for a conce pt that aims to represent the ideology on the indivi dua l level . 
Populist attitudes are define d as the indiv idua l level support for popu lism, as the micro -
level “affinity for populism” (Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde, 2012, p.  1), or as the “citizen 
demand for populism” (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2014, p.  5). 
The attitudina l dimension of populism h as longtime been of subordinate importanc e t o 
resea rch on populism or as put by Ben Stanley , “…there is a pauci ty of data on attitudes 
that rela te directly to the core tenets of populism ” (2011, p. 257) This state ment essentia lly 
addressed the absenc e  of a measureme nt to populist attitudes.  Even though the first at-
tempt to measure populis m on the indiv idua l  level was published more than 50 years ago 
(Axelrod, 1967) , decades went by until schol a rs rega ine d interest in studying populism 
within the citize nry . Stanley  himsel f  (2011) was one of t he first to reope n the deba te about 
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public opinion measures to conte mpora ry populism . His proposition  was quickly followed 
by the introduction of a measureme nt to populist attitudes by Hawkins et al.  (2012), which 
serve d as the base for the devel opment of a s i x -item scale , tested and deploye d by Agnes 
Akkerma n and collea gues (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014) . This very scale is to date 
the most popula r scale to populist attitudes  (Castan ho Silva , Andrea dis  et al., 2019) and has 
been imple mented in a serie s  of studies conduc ted to shed light onto the worldview of 
populist citize ns (e.g., Jacobs, Akkerma n, & Zaslove, 2018; Rico & Anduiza, 2017; Rico, 
Guinjoa n, & Anduiz a, 2017; Spierings &  Zaslove, 2017; van Hauwaert &  van Kessel, 
2018). In this theses I argue  that d espite its popula rity, this scale come s with severa l validi ty 
problems , which is why it might not be the most adequa te instrument to measure populism 
on the indiv idua l level . 
First , the instrument in question claims to measure individual level populism as a “set of 
ideas” (Akkerman et al., 2014, p.  1328), suggesting that the conc ept consists of different 
dimensions. Such conceptua liz a tions, one wou ld expe ct, should lead to multi dimens iona l 
measureme nt spec ifica tions (cf., Castanho Silva , Andrea dis,  et al., 2019). However, Akker-
man and Collea gues (2014) present a unidime nsiona l measure  that does not differentia te 
betwee n possi ble sub dimensions of populist attitudes  on the empirical leve l. This spec ifica-
tion makes it diffic ult to identify  if the measureme nt represents all facets important to pop-
ulism. For thi s reason, t he scale’s c ontent validity  has to  be questione d . Content validi ty 
refers to the extent to which a measure is able to rep resent all dimensions of a given con-
struct  (Brosius, Kosche l, & Haas, 2009) . A prerequisite to establish and assess conte nt va-
lidity is therefore to provide a clea r and most importantly , extensive  definition of  a con-
struct  that refers to all eleme nts  necessa ry for the construct to be. Moreove r, conte nt va-
lidity is itsel f a prerequisit e for other types of validi ty, namely, criterion and construct valid-
ity. If conte nt validi ty is not given, measures fail to gauge  the concept that they claim to 
gauge  and  schol a rs implementing the instrument in their studies run the risk of produci ng 
false and misle a ding findings , for example, about correla tes to the concept . I argue that  
previous resea rch might have  relie d upon an instrument to populist attitudes that cut  short 
on a t least one important compone nt of the populist ideolog y, namely,  the perce ption of 
the peopl e as homoge neous and virtuous . Second , the scale has only been tested with an 
exploratory factor analy sis. This analy tica l choice contra dic ts the idea behind the deduc tive 
approac h that the authors have chosen in basing their measureme nt development on a 
definition to populism first. Specific measureme nt compone nts were  hypothe siz ed but 
after all  neither spec if ie d nor tested approp riatel y as exploratory factor analy sis is  no  s uita-
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ble  tool  for that matter. R ather, a confirma tory factor analy sis is needed to establ ish proof 
for a presumed measurem ent structure  (Kline, 2011). At last , the scale has been  devel oped 
within the conte xt of only two countries, namely, the United States and the Netherland s . It 
has further been replic a ted in the Chile a n conte xt (Hawkins &  Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2014) . 
While the scale has by now been imple mented in even more countrie s, it has never been 
evalua ted whethe r the instrument actua lly w orks inv ariant across countries, that is , if it 
measures  indiv idua l level  populism simila rly valid in different  country  conte xts. However, 
m easureme nt inva riance is a necessa ry scale property  if c ross -country comparisons  are 
planned . As the populist moment reside s in many countries today, a measure to populist 
attitudes should thus suit the needs  of compa rative surve y resea rch and exhibit  sufficie nt 
cross -country validi ty.  
In order to do the best to avoid these different  validi ty problems , this diss ertation start s  
from scratch in devel oping  a mea sureme nt to populist attitudes . The first spec ific resea rch 
question  is : How ca n populist attit udes be measured  across countries ? (RQ 1)  
I will make an effort to capture the superordina te posture as well as all core  components of 
the populist belie f system  when devel oping a new measure for populist attit udes. A s laid 
out above, a  response to this question  has to start with a definition to populism that  em-
phasiz es  all compone nts of which this conc ept is comprised of  as well as the structure of 
the components’ interrelations. This will be pursue d in Chapter 2  in which populism will 
be define d as a politica l ideol ogy . In Chapter 3  the concept of pop ulist attitudes will  be 
deduc ed, items will  be develope d that depict the different compone nts and finall y, the in-
strument will be put through different empirica l  tes t s  (Article I ). This work is of prepa ratory  
kind in  that it devel ops a measureme nt to popu list attitudes that will be impl eme nted in all 
further studies of thi s dissertation. These further studies aim to provide insi ghts into the 
wider populist belie f syst e m  on the indiv idua l level. L ikewise , these further studie s  serve as 
construct validi ty tests to the new inventory of populist attitudes . 
RQ 2: P opulist C itizens ’ Media and Public Opin ion P ercept ions  
Going from there, this dissertation will turn to an investiga tion of  the rela tionship betwee n 
populist attitudes and the  indiv idua l level  perce ptions of news media . T hus far no such 
study has been undertak en despite relentless rhet orica l  attack s against mainstrea m news 
organiz a tion s  voic ed by populist leaders and uncounte d ‘ lie media ’ or ‘ fake news ’ acc usa-
tions by populi st follow ers. A ll of  which have thus far only been docume nt ed within the 
daily news r eporting, at  demonstra tions of populi st movements  or on socia l media (e.g., 
   16  
   
Holt &  Haller, 2017) but not within quantita tive analy ses . It would , however , be of high 
importanc e to examine  the rela tionship betwee n populist attitudes  and hostil e media per-
ceptions systema tica lly , simply, to  determine , whether these media ted snapshots indeed  
indic a te  something that has  substanc e  and  henc e,  public significa nce,  or whether these de-
pictions  are  actua lly  very few  and random but  overempha siz ed within  the media reporting . 
In contrast to the fierce public deba te about a crisis in trust in public institutions, aggrega te 
data analy se s point  to  rather stagna nt or even increa sing media trust levels in different Eu-
ropea n countries , for example, t he Netherla nds, Germany, and Swede n  (e.g., Edelman, 
2018; Hanitzsch , van Dalen, and Steindl  2017; Newman, Fletche r, Kalogeropoulos, Levy & 
Nielsen, 2018; Reinema nn &  Fawzi, 2016). However, it  amounts to an ecolog i ca l falla cy to  
direc tly  transfer these aggrega te findings onto the indiv idua l level. Rather , t he results were 
the same , if citize ns who support populism grow hostile media attitudes, while trust in-
crea ses for those who disagree to populism. On the popula tion level, no change s were 
identifie d, while on the level of groups significa nt differenc es went undiscov ered . As will 
be outline d in the following, such differenc es in news media trust betwee n different seg-
ments or groups within the popula tion  can be conseque ntial in at least two different ways. 
Media distrust or negative attitudes  towa rd the media can converge a ) with differin g per-
ceptions of public opinion, and  b ) with different patterns of news consump t ion. Both con-
seque nce s could foster societa l pola riza tion. I will briefly spea k t o both points in the fol-
lowing.  
As to the first point, public opinion is ascribe d the latent function of keepi ng society to-
gether (Noelle -Neuma nn, 2001) . It is therefo re deemed essentia l for a society that its indi-
vidua l membe rs and entitie s perce ive – at least to some degree – the same opinion as pub-
lic opini on. T raditiona l communic a tion scienc e theory suggests that news reporting  strong-
ly influenc e s  the audiences’ perceptions of public opinion (Mutz, 1998; Noelle -Neuma nn, 
1974). This effect is broadly expla ine d by the individuals’ belie fs  in media effects on others  
(e.g., Davison, 1983). Thus, in the moment in whi ch mass media are acknow le dge d to in-
fluence the audiences’ perception of the public opinion climate, they are recognized as an 
important actor within the proce ss of societa l integ ration.   
A necessa ry condi tion for the mass media to fulfill this function is  that the public trust s its  
reporting within which various types of public opinion cues are embe dded . As was shown 
by a study in the Israeli conte xt, media skeptics  tende d to rejec t the mediated clima te of 
opinion  while those who trusted the news evalua ted public opinion genera lly  in line with 
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the media’s suggestions (Tsfati, 2003). On the one hand, this can be evalua ted as desira ble 
as these media skeptics henc e  appea r to be critica l consumers of  infor mation  and do not 
simply belie ve what is presente d to them  at face value . On the other hand, this perce ptual 
pattern can also be interpreted as a  form of rigidity  or “as shutting one’s ears and eyes to 
reality” (Tsfati, 2003, p.78). Thus, if populi s t citize ns strongl y dist rust e d  the media, they 
could be expec t e d  to reject the media ted clima te of opinion and with that, to reject the 
reality or horizon shared by the remai nder of the popula tion. S ubseque ntly, s ocietie s were  
enda nge red to polarize along populist attitudes.  
It is for these reasons that  this dissertation aims to systema tica lly examine  the rela tion ship 
betwee n populist attitudes  and  media perce ptions . In order to determine the conseque nces 
that this has  for the indiv idua l estima tion of publi c opinion, the present resea rch will, in 
addition, investigate populist citizens’ public opinion perceptions. T he follow ing second 
spec ific resea rch question will therefore be inve stiga ted : How do populist attitudes re-
late to media and public opinion perce ptions  in different countrie s ? (RQ 2)  
This inve stiga tion will be subje ct to Chapter 4. An important part of this chapter will be 
devoted to theoretical conside rations rega rding  the mecha nisms that could define and ex-
plain the  rela tionships betwee n populist attitudes, media perce ptions and public opinion 
perce ptions. To do so, I will reach out to the soci a l identity perspec tive  (Tajfel &  Turner, 
1979) and introduce a socia l identity approach to populist attitudes. The posited r elation-
s hips  will be put to an empiric a l test based on a four country surve y data set  (Article II ). 
As to the second point noted above, differenc es in media trust can also be associ a ted with 
different patterns of news consumption.  Indee d, a  serie s of stud ie s suppo rt this notion 
showing , for ex ample, an associ a tion between strong distrust in the news  media and the 
preferenc e for non -mains trea m news media  in severa l countries  (Fletche r & Park, 2017; 
Tsfati & Ariely, 2014; Tsfati & Cappel la, 2003, 2005). Follow ing common conc erns (e.g., 
Ladd, 2011), such news use patterns can be harm fu l to society in that they potentia lly con-
tribute  to pola rizing it. I will further  expand upon this point in the followi ng and with that, 
turn to a n examina tion of a potentia l  behaviora l dimension of the populist be lie f  system.   
RQ 3: Populist Citizens ’ News Preferences  
As a final contribution , this dissertation seeks to investiga te a beha viora l dimension of the 
populist belie f system, that is, the rela tionships betwee n populist attitudes and news prefer-
ences . Thus, in contras t to the studies cited last, in which media trust was  rel ate d  to  differ-
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ent  indic a tors of news consumption , this thesi s  seeks for direc t associ a tions betwee n news 
consumption  and populist attitudes.  Only in direc tly linking populist attitudes to news 
choice the understandi ng about the reperc ussion of populism on the indiv idual level  can be 
enha nce d . The essentia l assumption underly ing this resea rch interest is henc e, that citiz ens 
with populist attitudes could seek out a spec ific news diet, not (only) because they distrust 
the news, but for the fact that they have populist attitudes.  
This reasoning chimes with that of the rich body of selec tive exposure litera ture, according 
to  which news readers have some intention to choose news that is cong eni al to their own 
opinions, belie fs and convic tions  (cf., Stroud, 2017). When inve stiga ting news choice in 
politic a l conte xts, selec tive exposure studies have most often examined issu e att itudes (e.g., 
Garrett, 2009a)  or politica l ideology (e.g., Stroud, 2008) as drivers to news exposure. By 
politic a l ideol ogy , these studies most often refer  to the politic al left -right orienta tion of 
indiv idua ls (or libe ral -conserva tive in the U.S. conte xt). However, not least with the rise of 
populist partie s, it is discussed whethe r  this traditi ona l continuum  is still functiona l to de-
scribe today’s political and societal structures. Rather, recent literature dis cusses a new 
clea va ge as being just as or even more important to consider , that is, the divide  betwee n 
populists and cosmopolita n libe rals (Bornschi er, 2010; Ingleha rt & Norris, 2016; Kriesi, 
2010). If citize ns who support populism were found to selec t dif ferent types of news as 
compa red to those who disagree to the populist ideol ogy, evide nce for this new division  
with respec t to news audienc es was established.  
This scena rio might become even more like ly  as rece nt  devel opments within the media 
system have crea ted perfec t opportunity structures for selec tive exposure (van Aelst et al., 
2017). Given the large range  of news providers that indiv idua ls can chose from with in to-
day’s high-choice media environments  it ha s become fairly easy for anyone  to find the 
news that correspond s best to the own worldview. It is a common conc ern that the erosion 
of the ‘old mass media ’ and the establishment of new media will, sooner or later, drive so-
cietie s apart and foster fragme ntation (cf., Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017) . However,  despite the 
strong conc erns with regard to the danger of populism and despite the repetitive prophesy 
of  echo chambers and filter bubble s, the inve stiga tion of links betwee n populist attitudes 
and new s consumption is still in its infanc y. It is an open question, if indiv idua ls choose 
news conte nt depe nding on where  they stand on the populist attitude conti nuum. For ex-
ample, this could mean to gravita te towa rd spec ific partisa n alterna tive media and awa y 
from traditiona l news provision.  
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To this point,  only one study has rela ted populist attitudes  to indiv idua l  news media prefer-
ences (Hamele ers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017b) . This study established a link betwee n anti -
establishment attitudes and a preference for entertai nment as well as for populist media 
conte nt. Howeve r, the associ a tions revea le d with rega rd to spec ific news outlets appear 
rather c ounterintui tive. The study showed  a positive rela tion ship  betwee n anti -
establishment populist attitudes and the use  of a quality newspa per while no rela tion was 
found  to reading  a tabloid newspa per. The former  are, however, thought to stand close to 
the politic a l elite while the latter are presumed to provide more populist conte nt (Maz-
zoleni, Stewart, & Horsf ie ld, 2 003). If anything, citize ns with populist attitudes should 
therefore be expecte d to show a preferenc e for tabloid rather than for quality newspa pers. 
Moreove r, the study was con ducte d in t he Netherla nds  only and it is impos sible to say , if 
these finding s w ill replic a te in other countrie s . 
Therefore, the last spec ific resea rch question of this dissertation is : How are populist atti-
tudes related to news choice  in differe nt count ri es ? (RQ 3)  
This question will be tackle d within Chapter 5 . First, two large scale multi country surve y 
studies will be introduce d that offer insigh t s into the media diets of citize ns with populist 
attitudes  with rega rd to traditiona l mainstrea m news genres such as public TV news, pri-
vate TV news, tabloid , and quality newspa pers. Second, populist citize ns exposure to spe-
cific online news providers, for example, alterna tive media or Facebook will be examined  
(Article III  & Article IV ).  
Overview of Articles  
To respond to the presente d resea rch questions of this dissertation four journal artic le s 
have been written. Below these artic le s are  briefly summariz ed.  
Article I:  Schulz, A., Müller, P., Scheme r, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2018). 
Measu ring populist attitu des on three dimension s. Interna tiona l Journa l of Public Opinion Re-
search, 30 (2), 316— 26. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edw037.  
Prior studies have offered unidime nsiona l  conc eptual iz a tions of populist attitudes de-
spite the common unders tandi ng of populism as being an ideology that is set togethe r 
by different politic a l ideas. This artic le present s psyc hometric work that aims at deve lop-
ing a multidimensiona l measureme nt to populism able to grasp the differe nt compo-
nents that togethe r compr ise populi sm according to its definition: anti -elitis t attitudes, a 
perce ption  of the peopl e as a homoge neous and virtuous group, and the indiv idua l pref-
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erenc e for popula r soverei gnty. The measureme nt was succ essfully tested within two 
German data sets using  exploratory and confirmatory factor analy ses . Moreove r, the 
spec ified measureme nt model was also shown to be statistica lly superior to compe ting 
measureme nt model s introduce d by prior resea rch.  
Article II:  Schulz, A., Wirth, W. & Müller, P. (2018). We ar e the people and y ou are Fake 
News. A s ocia l i dentity a pproac h to p opulist c itizens’ h ostile m edia and f alse c onsensus 
p erce ptions. Commun ica tion Research, 1—26. Advance online public a tion. doi:10.1177/00936  
50218794854 
This study empirica lly investiga ted the rela tionship s  betwee n populist attitudes, media, 
and public opinion perceptions in a four country surve y study. Results acros s countries 
provide robust  ev ide nce for strong associ a tion s  bet wee n populist at titudes and  hostile 
media perceptions as well as between populist attitudes and cong ruent public opinion 
perce ptions.  As media and public opinion perce ptions were not found to be rela ted to 
one another, the artic le conc lude s that – to populist citize ns – the news med ia might no  
longer serve as a reference for public opinion estimate s. Further,  t he study provides an 
extensive theoretica l framew ork that attempts to expla in for these findings.  Namely, a 
socia l identity approac h to populist attitude s is int roduce d accordi ng to which citize ns 
who identify with the populist ideas and henc e, identify with the peopl e (as constructe d 
by populism) are prone to follow hostile media cues as well as opinion maj ority cues , 
which are promoted by populist leaders.  The appr oa ch claims , that the pop ulist leader 
functions as a stereotypica l in -group membe r  or a role model  in this proce ss . In -group 
membe rs of the peopl e could be motiva ted to adh ere to the thinking and behavior pro-
moted by the group leader in order to qualify as va lua ble me mbers of the group. This 
can foster self -enha ncement. Moreove r, the artic le identifie s further  psyc holog ic al 
mechanisms that potentially contribute to populist citizens’ news and public opinion 
perce ption s. Specifica lly, the artic le integ rates populist cit izens’ hostile media percep-
tions and cong ruent public opinion perce ptions into the hostile media effect and false 
consensus litera tures.  
Article III: Schulz, A. (2019). Where populist citiz ens get the news: An inve sti ga tion of news 
audie nce polariza tion along populist attitudes in 11 countries. Commun ica tion Monog rap hs, 
86 (1), 88–111. doi:10.1080/03637751.2018.1508876 
T his two study paper investiga ted  populist citizens’ news media preferences in 11 coun-
trie s and in two different points in time. The main aim was  to examine , if the audie nces 
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of tabloid newspa pers, private T V news, online only  news  as well as Facebook are more 
populist than the audie nces of quality newspa pers and public TV news. Both studies 
provide d  evide nce for a strong relia nce on priva te TV news by citize ns with strong 
populist attitudes. To a smalle r extent, but still visible, populist citize ns also tend e d  to 
prefer tabloid newspa pers . Against the expec tations, populist citize ns showed no clea r 
avoida nce tende ncie s toward quality newspa pers or public servic e TV news.  
Article IV:  Müller, P. & Schulz A. ( 2019). Alterna tive medi a for a populist audie nce? Ex-
ploring politic a l and media use  predic tors of expos ure to Breitba rt, Sputnik, and Co.  Infor-
mation, Communi ca tion & Society.  Advance online public a tion. doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.20 
19.1646778 
Alongside the rece nt rise of politic a l populism a new type of partisa n alterna tive media 
has sur fac ed with in the past years. These outlets promote an anti -elitist discourse that 
spea ks to the populist narra tive. This study inve stiga tes psyc holog ic a l, socio -
demog raphic and media -use predic tors of  freque nt and occasiona l  exposure to different 
alterna ti ve media with an affinity to populism (AMP ). 1346 German Internet users were 
surve ye d in 2017 to  shed light on this question . Results indic a te that frequent users of 
AMP hold strong populis t attitudes  and have a higher probabil ity to vote for the Ger-
man po pulist party AfD . Frequent AMP  users mig ht henc e be politica lly motiva ted  to 
access these specific partisa n news websites.    
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Chapt er 2 : The Populist Ideolog y  
This chapter introduce s  a definition for populism as a politic a l ideolog y  what encloses a 
discussion of the core features that constitu te the ideolog y. I will a lso spea k about the un-
derstandi ng of populism as identity politic s (cf., J.-W. Müller, 2016) to illustra te  that an 
identity buildi ng potentia l is firmly rooted within th e ideolog y itsel f . Th is work is of prelim-
inary kind and set s  the stage for C hapter 3, in which I zoom in  on the  concept of populist 
attitudes that will  direc tly be derive d from the populist ideolog y.  
A Thin -Centered I deolo gy  
In trying to unders tand the pheno menon of popul ism resea rch ers have  used different ap-
proac hes to the conc ept.  At least six such approac hes are regul a rly identified within the 
conte mpora ry litera ture on populism  (see Pappas, 2016  who has identifie d even more) . 
Populism  has been defined  as an ideol ogy  (e.g., Abts & Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2004) , as 
a politic al strategy  (e.g., Weyland, 2001), as a discourse  (e.g., Gidron & Bonikow ski, 2013; 
Hawkins, 2009) , as a politic a l logic  (e.g., Laclau, 2005), as a politic a l style (e.g., Jagers 
& Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt, 2016) , and as a movement (e.g., Jansen, 2011). In the past years, 
consensus has been reache d among populism schol a rs rega rding the  so called id eati ona l ap-
proa ch  to populism  (Hawkins, Carlin, Littva y, & Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2019) . This  approac h  
encloses all definitions to the conc ept that acknow ledge that populism incorp orates “a sub-
stantive messa ge that should be distinguished from rela ted but different pheno mena ” 
(Rooduijn, 2018, p. 3). This messa ge is best summariz ed by Cas Mudde , who defined 
populism as:  
“ a n ideology that considers society to be ultima tely sepa rated into two homog-
enous and antag onistic groups , ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and 
w hic h argues that politics should be the expressi on of the volonté générale 
(general will) of the people” (2004, p. 543, 2007).  
With this definition, populism is identifie d as a thin -centered  ideology  (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). 
This notion empha siz es  that the ideology is restric ted  to a set of core ideas, rather than that 
it contains “interpretations and configurations of all the major political concepts attached 
to a genera l plan of public polic y that a spec ific society requires” (Freede n, 1998, p.  750; 
cf., Stanley, 2008). The latter would be true for fu ll ideologies  such as national is m  or socia lism 
from which popul ism is to be distinguished  (Mudde, 2004). 
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That thin charac ter of populism 3 is interesting for  at least two dif ferent reaso ns . First, this 
feature of populism make s the populist ideolog y  an interesting case for the study of politi-
cal belief systems (Converse, 2006). Follow ing Mudde, populism as a thin -centered ideolo-
gy “does not possess ‘the same level of intellectual refinement and consistency’ as, for ex-
ample, socialism or liberalism” (2004, p. 544). Rather, the different idea -elements that to-
gether constitute the phenomenon are onl y few, each straigh tforwa rd and sim ple to under-
stand. I t is a reasona ble assumption that this type of ideolog y  therefore  seep s  through  the 
whole popula tion  with relative ease  as compa red to full ideolog ie s . This shou ld be true all 
the more as the ideolog y itsel f pronounce s clea r group identi ties to which partic ipa nts in 
Converse’s own studies referred to fairly  consistently. The definition given above  promi-
nently sets the group of the ‘ pure peopl e ’ a ga inst the group of the ‘corrupt el ite ’ – with 
both of these group s being homoge neous . As also empha siz ed  by Mudd e and Rovira 
Kaltwa sser , “all manifestations of populism are based on the moral distinction between 
‘pure people and ‘the corrupt elite’ ” (2013, p. 151) I will understand this normative antag-
onism  betwee n the good peopl e and the evil elite  as the sup erordi na te posture  (cf. Converse, 
2006) or the most centra l premise within the populist belie f system  from which further 
eleme nts of the ideology can emana te. In this regard it appea rs quite  fitting that  the litera-
ture on populism refers to this aspec t of populism as its “Manichea n outl ook ” (e.g., Mudde, 
2004, p. 544; empha sis added) . According to this notion, the populist worldview only al-
lows for friends and foes but for nothing in -between. All furt her societa l and politic a l enti-
ties (policie s, institutions, politic ia ns, etc.) are arrange d  along this antag o nism as  either be-
longing to the good people’s side or to the side of the evil elites. In that sense, the Mani-
chean outlook of  populis m represents what Converse refer red to as the na tura l law  or the 
sort of  glue  that bind s tog ethe r many idea -eleme nts  thereby forming a  belie f system. Im-
porta ntly, some of these further eleme nts are  to  be considered necessa ry  or constituent  
eleme nts of populism, while again others can be added  to the concept  in the sense of “ac-
companying properties” (Sartori, 1984, 55f.) a nd will differ depe nding on the conc rete po-
litic a l context in which a partic ula r populism is inve stiga ted.  
Second , defining populism as a thin ideolog y enable d compa rative inve stiga tions of the 
pheno menon. Throughout history, populism has been identifie d in almost all countries 
across all contine nts and it appea red (and appea rs) in so many different shapes that it has at 
times been diffic ult to recog niz e the pheno menon empirica lly and to distinguish it from 
                                                 
3 When I use the term populis m in this study, I will always refer to the thin populis t ideology.  
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other politic a l currents. In this respec t Taggart  (2000) referred to populism as chameleoni c. 
In early discussions of populism it was even doubted possible to find a singl e, unifying 
approac h to populis m that is applic a ble across countrie s and time (e.g., Canova n, 1981). 
But defining populism as a t hin ideology limits the phenomenon’s scope to very few ideas. 
These ideas are understood to represent the lowest common denomina tor of populist 
movements, pol ic ie s, partie s, politic ia ns, and also citiz ens, what should allow for the empir-
ical measureme nt and comparison of populism across globe, time, and entitie s (Mudde 
& Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2013; Rooduijn, 2014a) . Thus, if these core idea s are found to be 
presen t in any empirica l inve stiga tion, populism is identifie d. Most importa ntly, this ap-
proac h is still applica ble, if a spec ific populist phenomenon is found to be accompa nie d by 
additiona l ideolog ies, what is indeed the rule rather than the exce ption. These a dditiona l 
ideolog ie s drive populism into a spec ific politic a l direc tion, for example, into the right wing 
or left wing of politic s. Most studies on populis m conduc ted in the Western hemisphere s 
inve stiga te right -wing populism as this is the mani festation o f populism that occurs most 
frequently within the respective countries’ political realities (e.g., Bos, Sheets, & Boom-
gaarden, 2018; Marqua rt & Matthes, 2016; Mudde, 2007; Wirz et al., 2018) . Studies on left -
wing manifestations of populism traditiona lly fo cus on Latin Americ a n countries (e.g., 
Ruth, 2018; Weyland, 2001) but were also conduc ted in the Europea n context (e.g., Stav-
raka kis & Katsambeki s, 2014; Wirz, 2018a) . What most of these studies hav e in common is 
that they identify populism as a small set of ideas that can be extende d. Against the back-
drop of point one and point two , it is apparent  that the idea -elements  that  are thought to 
be necessa ry to constitute thin populism need to be properly define d. I will introduce these 
spec ific idea s in the fol low ing.  
Populist Idea -E lemen ts  
While there is wide agreeme nt  between different populism schol a rs  as to the ideational 
approac h to populism, it is still open to deba te, which compone nts 4 actua lly build this ide-
ology’s core. In a recent article, Rooduijn  (2018) maps the state of the art in populism re-
search  and refers to a t least two compone nts of which populism consist s: p eop le -centrism  and 
a nti -elitism . These  components neatly meet the ends of the antag onism described above: t he 
first refer s to the pure people, the second to the evil elite. While there is genera lly  consent 
as to what is meant by the anti -elitism compone nt , dissent can be identifie d  when inspec t-
                                                 
4 In this study I use the terms compo nents, featur es, ideas, elements, idea -elements, and subdimen-
sions interc hangeably.  
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ing  how  peo ple -centrism  is approac hed by different schol a rs . Some  schol a rs seem to focus 
on the matter of p opul a r sovereignty  when referring to the role of the peopl e in populism  (e.g., 
Akkerma n et al., 2014; Castanho Silva , Andrea dis  et al., 2019), others refer to the centrali ty  
and character of the people  (Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2010; Cran mer, 2011; Jagers 
& Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn & Pauwe ls, 2011) . However, l ooking at  the definition pro-
posed above , both interpr eta tions should be consid ered necessa ry eleme nts of populism as 
otherwise  the conc ept cannot be considered to be fully described . Populism as define d by 
Cas Mudde makes an explic it state ment about the nature of the peopl e (i.e., they are ho-
moge neous and pure ) and it makes an additiona l explic it state ment about the way how 
politic s should be run (i.e., it should follow the will of the  peopl e ). In the follow ing , I will 
therefore focus on populism  as a thin -ideolog y that comprises three key components: (1) 
anti -elitism, (2) homoge nei ty and virtuousness of the peopl e , and (3) popula r sovereig nty  
(for equa l  deduc tions  see Mudde & Rovira Ka ltwa sser, 2015 ; March, 2017 ; van Kessel, 
2015; Wirth et al., 2016).  
Anti -Elitism . As state d above, most schol a rs on populism agree that populism holds  a 
strong negative stanc e toward the elite. As summarize d by  Wirth et al. (2016) the litera ture 
on populism describes the elite in populism as “corrupt”, “exploitative”, as “the enemies of 
the people” (Albertazz i & McDonne ll, 2008, p.  4), as “evil” and “conspiring” (Hawkins, 
2009, p. 1042), as “unaccountable” and “incompetent” (Mény & Surel, 2002, p. 9) and so 
forth. Evidently , all attributions to the elite are conno ted negative l y . What is less clea r 
among schol a rs on populism is the question of wh o  belongs to the elite. Jagers and Wal-
grave have mapped the most compl ete list of actor s that could be considered to be a part 
of it: “Elites can be political elites (parties, government, ministers, etc.), but also the media 
(media tycoons, journalists, etc .), the state (admini stra tion, civil service), intelle ctua ls (uni-
versities, writers, professo rs) or economic powers (multina tional s, employe rs, trade unions, 
capitalists)” (2007, p. 324). However, a s the present study inve stiga tes thin populism, the 
elite against which populism opposes shall be limite d to the p olitica l elite  only.  If this partic u-
lar elite is not rejecte d thin populism cannot be identifie d.  T he rejection  of other types of 
elites will be understood as additiona l features that can be part of p opulis m and that shape 
spec ific sub type s of populism (Mudde &  Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2013)  but which do not be-
long to its core  in the sen se of con stitutive features . For example, if populi s m vents its  an-
ger not only against the politic a l elite, but also agains t the wealthy elite a form of left -wing 
populism is present . If the media are the targe t elite, anti -media populism is identifie d 
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(Krämer, 2018). As this  thesis is occupie d with the inve stiga tion of the relationship be-
tween popul ism and the media, I will get back to this partic ula r elite  further below.  
Homogeneity and Virtuousness of the People. In thin populism the politic al elite is set against the 
unity of the pure peopl e. Undenia bly , this group is essentia l for populism . If it was not for 
the p eopl e , populism had no purpose. Simila r to the elite concept, it is rather clea r how  the 
peopl e are, but not nece ssa rily who  they are. According  to a summary provided in Wirth et 
al. (2016), populism schola rs  agree  on exclusive ly  positive charac teristics , which a re at-
tributed to the  populist peopl e . The y  are depicted as “inherently good” and  “paramount” 
(Alberta zz i &  McDonne ll, 2008, p.  6). Moreove r, they are said to act according to “com-
mon sense” (Taggart, 2000, p. 95) what in its consequenc e leads to the  people sharing the 
same value s, preferences, and interests (J.-W. Müller, 2016). Importantly, these attributes 
are assign ed to all memb ers of the group of the peopl e what results in thi s group being , 
above all, define d as homoge neous. The definition of who  the peopl e are , howev er,  hinges  
upon the explici t manifestation of populism. While the thin -centered ideology leave s the 
concept of the people vague or an “empty vessel”  (Mudde &  Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2013, 
p.  151), in r ight -wing popul ism, the peopl e are  defined as those who hold a spec ific nation-
ality or share the same ethnos  (Mudde &  Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2015) . In left -wing populism, 
the peopl e are referred to as a class (e.g., the working class  or the ordinar y peopl e ) that 
strugg le s against privi le ged el ites (Mudde &  Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2013) . 
Pop ul a r Soverei gnty . At last, the populist ideolog y  empha siz es popula r sover ei gnty as  “the 
only legitimate source of political power” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 151). 
P opulism denounc es the current state in which the ruling political elite ‘ pulls  the strings’, 
thereby defrauding the peopl e of their right to make own decisions. Populis m sees the only 
right way  to  free and empow er the peopl e in imposing unrestric ted popula r sovereig nty. It 
is partic ula rly th is eleme nt of populism that leads schol a rs to revie w  the pheno menon as 
potentia lly harmful to libera l or constitutiona l democra ci es. In its  extreme form, popula r 
sovereig nty as dema nded by populism implie s unrestra ine d majority rule, that is, majority 
rule  at the expenses of libe ral democ ratic elements and/or minority rights  (Abts 
& Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2004; Waisbord, 2018) . 
It is worth noting, that some  authors on populism list further eleme nts as centra l compo-
nents of populism. Most notably, Jagers and Walgrave (2007; see also Hamelee rs & de 
Vreese, 2018 ) add the idea of exclusionism as a “third constitutive feature of populism” (p. 
324), next to peopl e -centrism and anti -el itism. This idea -element refers to seg ments of the 
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popula tion that are neither part of the elite nor part of the peopl e. Rather these groups, 
which are often also referred to as the “dangerous others” (e.g., Rooduijn, 2014a, p. 727) 
are exclude d from the p eople on a horizonta l level (while the elite is excluded vertic a lly) in 
being defined as “a threat to and a burden on society” (Jagers &  Walgrave, 2007 , p. 324). 
As it appea rs diffic ult to think of a respec tive group that is horizonta lly excluded in left -
w ing populism, the present study understands thi s feature as one that is partic ula rly rele-
vant in right -wing populism , were these ‘ others ’ are most often immigra nts or asylum seek-
ers (e.g., Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Hence, this compone nt is not understood a s a necessa ry 
feature of thin populism in the present study . 
Moreove r, and mainly the case in dema nd -side studies, the Manichea n outlook of populism 
is often also trea ted as one compone nt among others, that is, as set on the same level next 
to anti -elitism and peopl e -centrism  (Castanho Silva , Andrea dis  et al., 2019; Hawkins et al., 
2012; Spruyt et al., 2016). As was expla ined above, the present study understands this di-
mension as a posture of paramount order within the populist belief system. Th at is, as 
something that underlie s and impacts the nature of more spec ific/less abstra ct dimensions 
of populism. This conc erns both, the necessa ry dimensions of populism (i.e., those that 
comprise the core  of the belie f system  and were described above ), as  well as additiona l 
features to populism (i.e., those that concern rela ted attitudes, perceptions and beha vior 
within in the belie f systems periphe ry). It is thi s very posture of populis m via which the 
pheno menon can be identified as a form of identity pol itics.  
Populism as Identity Politics  
As was identifie d  above, the Manichea n outlook of populism represents the most centra l 
posture within the populist belie f system . By confr onting the group of the peopl e with the 
group of the politic a l elite, the ideology sets out to view society and all politics in bina ry 
and agoni stic terms (Waisbord, 2018). The promo ted socia l structure is very definite  and 
simple  and often paraphr a sed  as ‘ us versus them ’ or ‘ bla ck and white ’ or, maybe most fit-
ting, as this paraphrase  also captures the norma tive dimension of populism, as ‘ good and 
bad ’. Indee d, the two groups that play a role in populism are by no means conce ive d of as  
neutral but r ather, the peopl e  is understood  to be admirable while the elite is described as 
dange rous and malevole nt.  In the moment in which  populism recog niz es that t he elite 
threa t ens and supp resses the peopl e it  identifie s a state of injustic e  that surrou nds the latter 
group . 
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With that, popu lism meet s all criteria needed to call it a form of identity politics  (J.-W. Müller, 
2016, p.3; see also Marchle w ska, Cichoc ka, Panayiotou, Castell a nos, & Batayneh, 2018 ). 
According to Heyes  (2018), id entity politic s signify political activity “founded in the shared 
experience of injustice of members of certain groups.” Moreover, “identity political for-
mations typic a lly aim to secure the politica l free dom of a spec ific constituenc y margi na liz ed 
within i t s larger contex t. Membe rs of that constituenc y assert or recla im ways of under-
standi ng their distinctiveness that challe nge domina nt oppressive charac teriz a tions, with 
the goal of grea ter self -determinations”. In populism, the peopl e form the margi na lized 
constituenc y and t he domina nt oppression is led by the politic a l elite  and established poli-
tics . Greater self -determi na tion shall be enable d via the imple menta tion  of popula r sover-
eignty. Populism advoca tes only one group in particula r and therefore it promotes politic s 
that p romise an adva ntage to this group  only, thereby ignoring the interests of others . In 
line with this argument, populism has been i dentified to be anti -plural ist (e.g., Mudde 
& Rovira Kaltwa sser, 2015) .   
Important for populis m as identity politic s (or any other identity politic s) is the public dif-
fusion of the releva nt group categorie s.  This is also true when seen from Converse’s per-
spec tive on belief systems. As was state d in Chapter 1, information about the composition 
of a belie f system needs to be distributed  so that the mass public can interna liz e  the  differ-
ent constraints  composing such systems . In this rega rd, litera ture on populist communic a-
tion considers  socia l identity framing as a central means to promote the binary populist 
worldview  (Hamele ers, Bos, Fawzi et al., 2018) . Thereby , populist identity frames are de-
fined as a) empha siz ing “a threat to the ingroup of the people, who are perceived as rela-
tively worse off than other groups in society” (p. 4) and b) a s presenting “multiple [out -
groups]  that threaten the people from above (the elites) and within (the others)” (p. 5). Put 
differently , populist communic a tion conta ins social identity  cues  that construct the peopl e 
as an attrac tive (i.e., virtuous)  and unfairly threa tene d in -group  and  it invites i ndivi dua ls to 
identify with this group. Moreove r , populist com munic a tion displa ys the elite  as a dange r-
ous and malev ole nt out -group  and advic es indiv idua ls to be skeptica l about this group . 
What shall be empha siz ed here is that direc tly within  the populist ideol ogy there roots an 
identity buildi ng potentia l that can be expressed as identity framing and play out as identity 
politic s.  
D rawing back on socia l psyc holog ic a l terminolog y it can be spec ified  that populist  com-
munic a tion offers socia l categorie s that, if salie nt, can trigg er socia l categoriza tion proce ss-
es  (cf., Hogg &  Reid, 2006). Follow ing insigh ts coming from resea rch on the socia l identity 
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t heory, the human nature is indeed very conduc ive to such group c ues  what potentia lly 
makes respec tive communic a tion very succe ssful  (see also, Azrout & de Vreese, 2018; Ni-
cholson, 2012) . Concerning populism, we could  expec t that indiv idua ls start to self -
categoriz e (i.e., to identify)  as membe rs of the in -group of the peopl e . This can have  many 
micro level conseque nces rega rding how these individua ls  perce ive the world and how they 
act upon it . Chapter 4 will outline  this self -categoriza tion mecha nism  that  potentia lly sparks  
from populi st communic a tion in further depth and introduce a socia l identity approac h to 
populist attitudes. Furthe r, conseque nce s of the self -categoriz a tion as a membe r of the 
peopl e with rega rd to media and public opinion perceptions  will be determine d . Chapter 5 
will investiga te the news preferenc es of citize ns who identify with the popul ist ideolog y . 
Such considera tions and inve stiga tions must be  c onside red extreme ly releva n t as , assuming 
that  populist identity pol itics is succ essful, societa l pola riza tion  along the conflic t line s 
promoted via  populism becomes highly like ly . Following Kriesi et al.  (2006; cf., Bornschi er, 
2010) a compa rable  conflic t line has alrea dy emerged in the party politic s of different 
Western countries. This clea vage  has also been describe d by others who have identifie d i t 
to di vide  cosmopolita n libera lism from populism  (Ingleha rt &  Norris, 2016). That is, popu-
lism is said to sepa rate  politic s and citizens who  embrac e (or are able to embra ce) the pos-
sibil i ties of globalization and who “favor pluralistic forms of governance based on respect 
for the protec tion of min ority rights and check s and bala nce s in decision -making proce ss-
es” (Ingleha rt &  Norris, 2016, p. 17) from those citize ns who embrace  closure  (cf., J.-W. 
Müller, 2016) and who have “faith in the ‘decent’, ‘ordinary’ or ‘little’ people over the cor-
rupt political and corporate establishment” (Ingleha rt &  Norris, 2016, p. 17). I will now 
turn to Chapter 3, which is devoted to the devel opment of a surve y measureme nt that aims  
to  identify those latter citize ns, who are in this thesis referred to as p op ul ist citiz ens  and who 
can be conside red as partic ula rly receptiv e and susceptible to populist identity politic s.   
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Chapt er 3 : Populi st Attitu de s  
In this chapter I will explore in more detail the conce pt of populist attitudes. This conc ept 
has been used in previous studies to identify those who suppo rt the populis t ideolog y or  
rather , those w ho agree to the core  compone nts of the populist belie f sys tem . The main 
motiva tion behind studies focusing on populist attit udes is to learn more about the demand 
for populism on the indiv idua l level  and to understand whethe r and how micro level sup-
port for populism is interl inke d with the perva sive ness of conte m porary populism . Central 
to this aim is the question how populist attitudes can be measured (RQ 1).   
When this thesis started out five years ago, artic le s on populist attitudes commonly regret-
ted that the majority of studies on populism were supply side i nvestiga tions. For example, 
Hawkins and colle ague s stated: “[We] still have little sense of which people actually hold 
populist ideas, or how idea s held at the indiv idua l level might lead to ma ss outcomes” 
(2012, p. 1). This very quote points to two subfields within the study of populist attitudes 
that I have alrea dy identifie d in Chapter 1. To briefly reitera te, the first subf ie ld conc erns 
the question of how to identify citize ns who agree to populism  and is, hence, ma inly occu-
pied with the devel opment of a surve y measure for populist attitudes.  Resea rch dealing 
with this question cur rent ly  deba tes the compone nts that need to be measure d in order to 
extensive ly  depict the citizen support for populism as well as the adeq ua te model spec ifica-
tion and aggrega tion method (cf., Castanho Silva, Helbling, Jungkunz, & Littva y, 2019; 
Wuttke, Schimpf, & Schoen, unpublished draft) . T he second subfield conce rns resea rch 
that applie s populist attitu de scale s to zoom in on potentia l co nseque nce s that the interna l-
ization of these attitudes by the indiv idua l might have. The present Chapter focuses on the 
first subfield, while Chapter 4 and 5 will reflec t the second subfield in a communica tion 
scienc e perspec tive.  
Below, I will offer a re view of the litera ture that has been occupied with  respec tive  meas-
ureme nt devel opments and set a focus on three public a tions that have inspired the present 
study’s own scale development. I will then turn to this very scale development and intro-
duce it refe rring to Article I  as well as to an additiona l paper that has tested the devel oped 
measureme nt for its inva rianc e across countries  (Wettstein et al., 2019). At last , I will  point  
to a selec tion of further scale devel opments that were undertak en parall el to  or followi ng 
the one presente d here  in order to give a more comple te overvie w about the state of the art 
in resea rch on this topic . In the same spirit, I will refer to open questions and debates with-
in the field of populist attitudes measures.  
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1 st  Genera tion Meas ure ment s  
Chapter 1 offered first insigh ts into how conte mp orary populism resea rch star t ed the de-
bate rega rding surve y measureme nts approxima tely ten years ago.  In this respec t, t hree 
public a tions clea rly deserve mention  as they set the starting point for a deba te that has, 
un til today, produce d at least  17 different measurem ent s  to populis t attitudes  (see Table 2) : 
Stanley (2011), Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) 5, and Akkerma n, Mudde and Zaslove 
(2014).6 I will refer to these scale s as the 1 st  genera tion of populist attitude measures. 7  
These schol a rs  all apply the ideolog ica l approac h to populism and refer to the definition 
brought forwa rd by Cas Mudde  introduce d above. All three  studies are freque ntly cited in 
dema nd side inve stiga tions of populism and at the moment of writing, the measureme nt 
introduce d by Akkerma n et al. (2014) is the most freque ntly applie d measureme nt to  popu-
list attitudes  (cf., Castanho Silva , Andrea dis  et al., 2019). I will briefly summarize these 
studies in the followi ng and thereby discuss their achiev eme nts, but also diverse problems 
within these studies that have partic ula rly motivated the present study’s own measurement 
dev el opment.  
St anle y  (2011) identifie s  four  compone nts of populism: the existenc e of two homoge neous 
groups ( the peopl e and the elite),  the agoni stic relationship betwee n these two  groups , the 
positive valoriza tion of the peopl e and the denigra tion of the elite , as wel l as  the idea of 
popula r sovereig nty  (p. 258). If this set of ideas is compa red with the dimensions identifie d 
in  the  definition for pop u lism above they seem to line up compl ete ly . Although  Stanley  
chose to structure and name the dimensions  diffe rently as proposed in Chapter 2, th ey 
perfec tly match the dimensions that were identifie d above.  
                                                 
5 The publication by Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) can be under stoo d as the publication of 
the Hawkins and Riding  (2010) conference paper, which is also sometimes cited as the original 
publication of the survey items (e.g., van Hauwaer t et al., 2019).  
6 Akkerman et al. (2014) also review a rather early meas urement development by Elchar dus and 
Spruyt (2012). At the time, however, this study was publis hed in Dutch only and as Akker man et al. 
judge the measure to tap “into broader anti-establi shment sentiments” (p. 1329) rather than meas-
ur ing populism per se, I am not cons ider ing it here among the initial studies on populist attitude 
scales.  
7 Admittedly, there is also what could be called a gener ation zero of very early attempts to meas ur e 
po pulist attitudes that served as a point of refer ence for the meas ur es that were introduced in the 
years between 2011 and 2014. To these belong Axelrod  (1967) and Farrell and Laughlin  (1976). 
These two publications were important as they were the firs t to  conceive populism as a micro level 
phenomenon (cf., van Hauwaer t et al. (2019). However, their unders tanding of populis m differs 
strongly from that of contempor ar y populis m resear ch and is commonly regar ded as dated or, in 
the case of Axelrod, to U.S. cen tr ic (cf., Akkerman et al., 2014). I am therefor e not going into fur-
ther details of thes e publications.  
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In his empiric a l take, Stanley  chooses  two item s  for each  compone nt and enter s  these item s  
as sepa rate predi ctors in multiple linea r regression analy ses predi cting party prefe rence s and 
voting behavior in  the 2010 Slovak elec tion. He finds  that populist attitudes as measured in 
his study expla in neither of these outcomes. Among the reasons that could account for 
these non -expec ted findings, Stanley discusse s  potentia l flaw s in his measureme nt. Specifi-
cally, he assume s  that the items might not have captured populism  and sugges ts broade ning  
the “general palette of survey questions” (p. 269). Indee d, t wo  items per dimension might 
not be sufficie nt to fully displa y the su bdime nsion s of populist attitudes. To this  cri tique,  
one  might want to add that multicoll inea rity could also have caused the non -significa nce s 
as Stanley seems to have entered all items (which supposedl y measure the same latent  con-
struct ) as indiv idua l predic tors  into regression analy ses . In effect, the non -significa nce s 
could indic a te that the variabl es have indeed a lot in common and hence, take each other’s 
va rianc e. Unfortunatel y, Stanley does not provide any further statistica l in fo r mation about 
his  measureme nt (e.g., correla tions betwee n the items, factor analy ses and so forth ). 
Hawkins et al. (2012) as  well as Akkerma n et al. (2014)  approac hed differently . First of all, 
they extra ct three key dimensions of populism from the ideational definition. They focus  
on the Manicha ea n view of politic s, on the  notion of popula r sovereig nty as well as  on an 
opposition to the elite.  In contrast to Stanle y, the set of idea s identi fied by the s e two author 
teams thus lack s  one componen t important to the definition, that is, the conce ption  of the 
peopl e as homoge neous and virtuous , which  is not listed as a distinct feature  of populism  
in these two publica tions . This is surpri sing, g iven the centrali ty that the conce pt of the  
peopl e has for populism , also according to these authors themsel ve s. For example, Akker-
man et al. (2014) declare the conc ept of the people as the “starting point” (p. 1327) of 
populism. However , the six item set proposed by Akkerma n et al. (2014) which was built 
upon the work by Hawkins et al. (2012) does not conta in item s  that describe the peopl e as 
homoge neous , pure , or virtuous. Regarding the measurement’s construct validi ty, s k epti-
cism is therefore warra nted.  
The authors then continue  and test  the measureme nt within an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) including several other items tappi ng for additiona l concepts with the aim to show, 
that popu list attitudes are distinct from other attitu des such as plural ism, ste alth democ ra-
cy , specific  issue stanc es (Hawkins et al, 2012) or plural ism and elitism (Akkerman et al., 
2014). This aim is very reasona ble, because  at the time, populist attitudes were a rela tively 
new concept within the politic a l science litera ture . Factor  analy sis  was the right  means  to 
show  that the measures “are getting at a coherent, underlying set of ideas (…) that is dis-
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tinct from traditional political ideologies” (Hawkins et al., 2012. p. 14). Moreove r, both 
studies made efforts and succ ee ded in valida ting the scale s by te sting whethe r they are con-
sistently  linked to sociodemographi c variables and partisa n attributes (Hawkins et al., 2012)  
as well as to populist party preferenc es (Akkerman et al., 2014). In doing so, these public a-
tions have laid the foundations for many fut ure studies on the topic and have done nothing 
less but establ ished the conc ept of populist attitudes in the literature.  
However, when judged from today’s point of view  the applica tion of exploratory factor 
analy se s as well as the results that they produce d prove diffic ult. First, in the case of both 
studies, the analy se s estab lished a single factor for populist attitudes what does not neces-
sarily provide e vidence for the concept’s multi dimensiona lity , which is howeve r implie d by 
referring to populis m and populist attitudes  as “a set of ideas” (Hawkins et al., 2012, p. 3; 
Akkerma n et al., 2014, p.  1328). Second, in order to examine multi dimensionality , confirm-
atory factor analy ses (CFA) are more appropriate  as compa red to EFA . Thus, these studies 
impl ic itly hypothe siz e speci fic measureme nt components but do  not test for them appro-
priate ly.  
At last, all three public a tions report single country studies and  it is difficult to say, if the 
respec tive  measureme nts work equa lly across countries. Stanley (2011) starte d out in Slo-
vakia, Hawkins et al . (2012) investiga ted different surve ys conduc ted  in  the U.S. and Ak-
ke rma n et al., (2014) set out in t he Netherla nds. Even t hough the six item scale as pro-
posed by Akkerma n  et al. h as in the meantime been imple m ente d also in many other coun-
tries, it has never been tested, if it measures populist attitudes inva riant l y . 
To summariz e, the s cales that were used to measure populist attitudes when the present 
study  itsel f  set out  on stu dyi ng populism  are proble matic for different reason s. While Stan-
ley’s (2011) approac h acknow le dge s  the concept ’ s multi dimensional ity also on the empirical 
level,  he does not genera te  a scale but uses indiv idua l items as proxie s for different compo-
nents (cf., van Hauwa er t et al., 2019). And while Hawkins et al. (2012) as well as Akkerma n 
et al. (2014) each employs  severa l items to tap for the subdime nsions  of pop ulist attitudes , 
their  measureme nt proposa l a) does not tap for the perce ption of the peopl e as homoge ne-
ous and  virtuous  and b) does not acknow le dge  the multi dimensional ity of the conc ept 
within the empirica l analyses . Moreove r, nothing is known about either of these scale s 
measureme nt equiva le nce properties. It were these defic its that motiva ted the scale devel-
opm ent of the present dissertation  that I am now to present.  
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A Hierarchical Three -Dimensional  Meas ureme nt  
In the present thesis,  the populist ideolog y  is examined as a politica l belie f system. A Mani-
chean outlook , according to which politics is seen as a strugg le betwee n the ‘good peopl e ’ 
and the ‘ ev il elite ’ was set as  this belief system’s superordinate posture from which further 
ide a -elements of the belie f system emana te. Anti -elitism, the perce ption of the peopl e  as a  
homoge n eous and virtuous entity , and agree ment to  popula r sovereig nty were identifie d as 
the three idea -elements that are closest to this centra l posture , togethe r, constituting the 
belie f systems core . If populist attitudes are defined as the support for the populist ideolo-
gy on the indiv idua l level, they need to be underst ood as being composed of all of these 
eleme nts. Accordingly, if we were to say that a pers on  holds  populi st attitude s, that per son 
ne ede d to exhibit a Manichea n outlook on politic s and society , she or he needed to agree  to 
anti -elitism, to the idea of popula r sovereig nty  and to the homoge nei ty and virtuousness 
perce ptions of the people . In this thesis a measure to populist attitudes is introduce d and 
tested that accounts for all of these dema nds.  This measureme nt is introduce d in full deta il 
in Article I (Appendi x  A). I will briefly summariz e this public a tion as well as a further artic le 
in which the proposed scale  was put to a measureme nt equiva le nce test in 11 countries 
(Wettstein et al., 2019). In addition, I seek to apply the idea of a populist  belie f system  to 
the measureme nt, what has not been a part of Article I  itself. These analy tica l steps were  
undertak en in order to respond the  first spec ific resea rch question of thi s thesis: How can 
populist attitudes be measured across countries? (RQ 1) 
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Res ults Article I  
Against the background of the presente d litera ture revie w  Article I  sets out wit h the follow-
ing hypothe sis:  
A1 -H1: 8 Popul ist attitu d es can be concep tua liz ed as a latent second -order  factor with three distinct sub d i-
mensions, namely, anti -elitism attitu d es, a strong demand for popul a r sovereignty, and an understan d ing of 
t he people as being homogenous and virtuous.  
Figure 2 displa ys the pat h diagra m that results fro m this hypothe si s. As can be seen, the 
proposed measureme nt model  is reflec tive  (Sommer, 2017) , hierarchic a l as well as three -
dimensional . This spec ifica tion implie s that the second -order factor is thou ght to have a 
causa l impact on the three  first -order factors  that  are themsel ve s thought to  influenc e the 
indiv idua l reaction s  on different indic a tor variabl es . This measureme nt design correspo nds 
well to  the populist belief system outline d above. P arallel to how the Manichea n outlook is 
thought to inform  further idea -eleme nts within the populist belie f system, the second -order 
latent variable informs the three subdime nsions in the model. Importantly, only the indica-
tor items are measured direc tly. The spec ifica tion implie s  that the first -order latent varia-
bles capture information (i.e., varianc e) that the  respec tive indic a tor variabl es have in 
common. L ikewise , the  second -order latent vari a ble is thought to capture  inf orma tion, that 
the three first -order latent  variabl es  share.  
 
Figure 2. Path diagra m of a  hierarchica l three -dimensiona l measureme nt  model . 
                                                 
8 The hypothesis are co unted as follows in this thesis:  In A1 -H1  the A1 points to the article in 
which this hypot hes is was tested. A1 - is Article I , A2 - is Article II , and so forth. The -H1  indicates  
the number of the hypothes is as it was assigned in the original article. I did not chos e to renumber 
the hypot hes es in order to make it easier for the reader to find the original hypothesis in the origi-
nal a rticles.  
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T he second -order latent factor can only be interprete d as represent ing  the Manichea n out-
look , if the indica tors slat ed  to tap for the three subdime nsions mutua lly  refer to this con-
cept . This of course, next to a referenc e to the conce pt that they are uniquely  thought to 
displa y . Put differently, indic a tors are ne eded that can tap distinctly for yet one of the three 
subdime nsions (anti -elitis m , popula r sovereig nty, homoge nei ty and virtuousness of the 
peopl e) and in addition to that also cover the Manichea n outlook of politic s in pitting the 
group of the people agai nst the group of the elite.  
A rticle I  set  out to colle ct  items  that can account for these dema nds. Partia lly, the gathered  
items stem from previous ly published scales (as cited above), partia lly, they were  informed 
by resea rch on entita tivity and in -group homoge n ei ty (Carpenter & Radhakrishna n, 2002; 
Lickel et al., 2000; Quattrone & Jones, 1980) . The initia l item pool comprised  21 items. 
Nine items reflec ted anti -elitism attitudes  (anti) , six items tape d fo r a dema n d for popula r 
sovereig nty (sov) and another six items were sought out to depict the indiv idua l perce ption 
of the peopl e as homogeneous  and virtuous  (hom) . Among thes e  last six items, three re-
ferred  to the people as “the ordinary people” as this is more common in left-wing popu-
lism, while the remai ning three items referred  to the notion of the peopl e as a nation, for 
example, as “the Swiss” or “the Germans”. As the aim is to measure thin populism, bo th 
interpreta tions of the people need to be covered as otherwise, the inst ru ment could be 
discussed as tilting  towa rd the politic a l left or right. Moreove r, i n severa l of these items the 
evil elite is direc tly pitted against the good peopl e what captures  t he populist Manichean 
outlook on politic s and society.  
To turn these 21 items into a scale that would follow  the  posited  hiera rchic a l, three -
dimensional structure two online surve ys were cond ucte d in the Swiss context. Survey I 
was fielde d in Decembe r 2014 in the German speaking part of Switze rland (N = 400). Sur-
vey II  was conduc ted in April 2015, and based on a sample taken from  the metropolita n 
area of Zurich (N = 1260). Several tests were run on these data.  
First, the 21 item s were entered into an EFA that  was run on each  dataset. Items were ex-
cluded if communa lities or factor loading s were too low or when items loaded on more 
than one factor. As a first conf irma tion for the proposed multi dimensional structure, this 
explorator y analy sis already revea led the proposed three -dimensional ity rega rding the first -
order latent factors . The rema ining 15 items were then entered into a CFA to  also  test for 
the proposed hierarchic a l and multi dimensional structure of populist attitu des. The  first 
test  indic a ted  an acce ptable fit.  After the remova l of further three items followi ng the mod-
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ifica tion indic es, the model fit reache d a satisfac tor y degree  with all items exhibiting sub-
stantia l loading s on the first -order latent variabl es. For each o f the three subdime nsions, 
four indic a tors were identifie d. Moreove r, the first -order latents themsel ve s showed signifi-
cant  loading s on the proposed second -order latent variabl e. This result confirmed  the as-
sumption that populist attitudes are a latent hig her -order construct made up of the lower -
order dimensions of anti -elitism attitudes, a prefere nce for unrest ricted popu la r sovereig n-
ty, and a belie f in the homoge nei ty and virtuousness of the people.  
Further, it can carefully be implie d that the second -or der latent factor  indeed captures the 
Manichea n outlook  of populism . However, as the analy ses led to the exclusion of all items 
that depict e d  the Manichea n outlook on the  hom -subdime nsion , skeptici sm is warra nted . 
Table 1 lists all i tems that remai ned in the scale. As can be seen, n o item tappi ng for the 
perce ption of the peopl e as a homoge neous and vir tuous group mutua lly refers to the peo-
ple and  the elite. Rather all four hom -items make a referenc e to the peopl e  only . Interest-
ingly,  it is  also this very dimension that shows the lowest loading onto the second -order 
factor  as compa red to the other two subdime nsion s . While this can have many reasons, it 
can be assumed that this dimension lacks one importa nt communa lity with the other di-
mensions, that is, the refe rence to the Manichea n outlook of populism . 
Ta b le 1 . English item s comprising the final IPA as suggested in Article I.  
 
Item  
Maniche a n 
Outlook  
Wordin g  
anti
-elitism
 
a nti1  Yes  MPs in Parlia me nt very quic kly lose touc h wit h ordina r y peo ple.  
anti2  Yes  
The diff e r e nc e s betwe e n ordina r y people and the ruling elite are much 
greater than the diff e r e nc e s betwe e n ordina r y people.  
anti3  No  People like me have no influ e n c e on what the gove r n me nt does.  
anti5  No  Politic ia n s talk too much and take too lit tle action.  
demand 
for 
popular sovereignty
 
sov1  No  
The people should have the fin al say on the most imp or tant politic a l 
issue s by votin g on them dire c tly in refe r e nd u ms.  
sov2  No  The people should be aske d whene ve r impor tan t decisions are take n.  
sov3  Yes  
The people, not the poli ticia ns, should make our most impor ta nt polic y 
decisions.  
sov4  Yes  The pol itic ia ns in Parlia me nt need to follow the will of the pe ople.  
homogeneity 
&
 
virtuousness 
of the 
people
 
hom1  No  Ordina r y people all pull togeth e r.  
hom2  No  Ordina r y people are of good and hone st chara c ter.  
hom3  No  Ordina r y people share the sam e value s and inter e sts.  
hom4  No  
Alth ou g h the [Swiss] are very diff e r e nt from each othe r, when it come s 
down to it they all think the sa me.  
Note.  anti – anti -elitis m; sov – popula r sove r e ig nty; hom – homogene ity and virtuous ne ss of the people  
The items were measu r e d on 5pt Likert scale s rangin g from 1 – strongly disag ree  to 5 – stro ngly agree.  
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However, the three subdimensions still share d  suff ic ie nt variance as the model fit ted  the 
data well across both surve ys  and further, also the loading s for the hom -component onto 
the second -order factor still reach e d  level s above .500. Moreove r, the developed measur e 
passed  additiona l tests  that were set up to corrob orate the construct val idity of the pro-
posed conc eptua liz a tion. First , the hierarchic a l three -dimensional spec ifica tion was tested 
against the unidime nsiona l approac h  followe d  by Akkerma n et al.  (2014). This test clea rly  
indic a ted  that the former and actua lly  more compl ex measur e ment spec ifica tion outper-
formed the unidime nsiona l, less complex measureme nt according to different model fit 
indic es. Second, it was shown that populist attitudes are distinct from elitism  and plural ism 
attitudes. Article I  therefrom concludes: “These results provide evidence that the present 
conc eption of populism  is a valid construct that is distinct fro m other conc eptions of de-
mocra cy,  tha t is, elitism and plural ism ” (p. 7). For the remai nder of thi s diss ertation, this 
devel oped inventory for populist attitude s will be abbrevia ted with IPA (Inventory for 
Populist Attitudes).  
I will now turn to the measureme nt equiva le nce test of the measur eme nt as reported in 
Wettstein et al. (unpublished draft) that  further valida ted the instrument wit h rega rd to its 
cross -national and constru ct  validi ty  in 11 countries . 
Measu rem ent Invaria nce Test  
In a further study (Wettstein et al., 2019) the IPA was tested for measureme nt equivale nce . 
Measureme nt equiva le nce (or measureme nt inva ri a nce ) is considered an essentia l scale 
property when conduc ting compa rative resea rch  (Davidov, 2009) . If a scale possesses this 
property it is said to be able to  measure the same  (latent)  concept equally well in different 
cultura l or other contexts. A property as such appears espec ia lly important when popul ism 
is inve stiga ted. Since the populist Zeitgei st  was identifie d to have envel oped much of Europe 
and the Ame rica n continent , schol a rs are asking to what extent the public has come to em-
brace populism and if this differs acros s countries (Rooduijn, 2017; van Hauwa ert &  van 
Kessel, 2018). In order  to  examine these questions , a measureme nt is needed that is able to  
trace thin populism equa lly well across time and space.  Dependi ng on the type of meas-
ureme nt equiva lenc e established (see below), this scale property allow s  to compare correla-
tions of populist attitudes with other conc epts or even  the compa rison of mean v alues and 
distributions of populis t attitudes  across nation s . Moreove r , if equiva le nce for the measure 
is  found , the idea that thin populism is a con struct  that has unive rsa l status across countries 
(as it represents the common denomina tor of different typ es of populism ) would rece ive  
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empi rica l  support . This so calle d etic approach (Wirth & Kolb, 2012) is followe d in the 
present study  rega rding both, the conc ept as well as the measure . Hence, w ith a measure-
ment equiva le nce test, the core of thin populism is sought to be identifie d in different na-
tions, despite the fact that preva ilin g politica l realities shape populism  diff erently within 
these nations .  
M easureme nt inva rianc e is conventiona lly tested using multi group confirma tory factor 
analy sis (MGCFA) w hich allow s for the asses smen t of dif ferent types of inv arianc e: con-
figural, metric and scala r inva rianc e  (Davidov, 2009; Steenka mp & Baumga rtner, 1998) . In 
that order, the inva rianc e types get more demand ing but , if establ ished, offer more possibil-
ities  f or conc lusion s. As summarized in Wettstein et al.: “If the same correla tional structure 
among the items and latent variabl es may be imposed on the data of all countrie s, config u-
ral inva rianc e is established and the scale is relia ble in each indiv idua l country.  More de-
manding is metric inva riance, which requires that the loading s of like items and factors are 
inva riant across all groups. Metric inva rianc e is a necessa ry condi tion for cross -national 
compa risons on correla tions with other constructs. If re sea rchers aim at comparing abso-
lute values, scala r inva riance is required. This means that measureme nt intercepts must be 
identica l across countries. With scala r inva rianc e, differenc es in the observe d item means 
are direc tly proportiona l to d ifferenc es in  the latent means” (p. 6; cf., Scheme r, Kühne, & 
Matthes, 2014 ). 
The IPA was transla ted into eight  langua ge s and then tested for the degree to which it ex-
hibits the different types of measureme nt equiva le nce via an 11 country surve y data set 
gathered onlin e in 2015. The country sample includes two Eastern (Bulga ria and Poland), 
two Northern (Sweden and the U.K.), one Southern (Italy), and five Western European 
(Austria, France, Germany, the Netherla nds, and Switze rland) countries, as well as the 
United Stat es and in each country 1000 responde nts (but 1017 in Germany) were queried.  
The inva riance test revea led the IPA to exhibit c onfigural and metric invariance  to full de-
gree s . Scalar invarianc e was only established rega rding a compromise d  model in which con-
straints had to be  relea sed across countries for three items in total  and moreov er, the mod-
el  did not seem to fit the data in Swede n . The manuscript concludes therefrom that, “albeit 
no compl ete scala r invarianc e was found, there is partia l scala r inva rian ce” (p. 14). Taken 
togethe r, while the struct ure and factor loading s are inva riant and an interpr eta tion of cor-
rela tions of this scale with other concepts across countries is admissible, the compa rison of 
mean scores across countries is not  advised  without reserva tions. In genera l, the proposed 
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hie rarchic a l three -dimensiona l measure proved to measure populist attitudes validl y across 
countries.  
As Article I  also this additi ona l paper engage d  in construct validi ty test s of the measure, this 
time acr oss countries. These tests were quite  succ essful in all samples . First, it was expecte d 
that this measure for thi n  populism would exhibit a curvil inea r rela tionship to left -right -
wing politica l orienta tion. In all countries the IPA related to the left - and  right end of the 
politic a l orienta tion scale what indica tes that the IPA is suited to assess  thin  populism re-
gardless of other politic a l ideolog ie s.  Moreove r, it was shown that the IPA consistently 
rela ted positive ly to voting intentions for populist part ie s and negatively to voting inten-
tions for non -populist pa rtie s. Only a few exceptions were reported and discussed in the 
limita tions of the manuscr ipt.  
To sum up, the present thesis introduce s a  hierar chi ca l, three -dimensional measure that 
was devel oped  in an etic approac h, that is, based on a common definition for populism. 
The measure fully captures the core dimensions of the thin populist ideolog y and the refore 
the degree to which the populist belie f system ’s cor e  is interna liz ed . Moreover, the measure 
exhibits very satisfying degrees of construct validi ty, both interna lly (as was shown via CFA  
and MGCFA ) as well as externa lly (as was shown via severa l correl a tiona l analysis).   
2 nd  Generation M eas ure ments  – An Ongoing Debate  
Starti ng in 2016 fu rther populist attitudes inve ntorie s were published, including the IPA  
introduce d above . This second genera tion of populist attitude scale s follows the first gen-
eration in the assumption that populist attitudes consist of two or more essentia l  compo-
nents.  At least 17  different scale s to populist attitudes have been published after 2013 (see 
Table 2 for an overview). As most of these scale s were published only in the las t three 
years and as 2019 started  out with the publication of yet another “new scale” (Castanho 
Silva , Andrea dis  et al., 2019, p. 150) it is quite apparent, that the search for a measureme nt 
to populist attitude s is ongoi ng. Alt hough, most of these scale s have a lot in common as 
they were  built upon the ideational definition to thin populis m, their shee r number whets  
the suspic ion  that the agr ee ment on a single measure to populism is today maybe further 
away than it might have been ten years ago. In his state of the art report on populism re-
search Rooduijn closes with a similar concern: That the current “sexiness of populism” 
(2018, p. 8)motiva tes many schol a rs to employ the term in their studies, even though they 
might be focusing on a different topic. Potentia lly, this increa se s  rather t han decrea se s  the 
conc eptua l blurrine ss that has always surrounded populism.  
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Most of the scale s devel oped after 2014 are still unidimensional and largely built on the six 
item index proposed by Akkerma n et al.  (2014), however , extend the index  by the one or 
other item for yet different reasons (e.g., Stavraka kis et al., 2016; van Hauwaert &  van Kes-
sel, 2018). In addition to these scale s, a few recent measureme nt approac hes acknow ledg e 
that a measureme nt to populist attitudes should sepa rate between  the different facets that 
the concept is comprised of and henc e, propose multidimensiona l model spec ifica tions 
(e.g., Castanho Silva , Andrea dis  et al., 2019; Schulz, Müller et al., 2018). Among the multi-
dimensional measureme nts some do not only focus on thin populism but reach out for 
compone nts that tran sfor m the conc ept into, for example, radic al right -wing populist atti-
tudes (Rooduijn, 2014b)  or distinguish betwee n anti -elitism and exclusionis m (Hamele ers 
& de Vreese, 2018) . 
Ta b le 2 . List of publica tions includ in g pub lic opinion measu res to popul ist atti tud es.  
Authors, Year  Specification  Type populis m  
Hawkins &  Riding, 2010 unidimens ional  thin  
Stanley, 2011  single items  thin  
Hawkins et al., 2012  unidimens ional  thin  
Akker man et al. 2013 (print, 2014)  unidimens ional  thin  
Rooduijn, 2014b  
hierar chical,  
three -dimens ional  
thin & nativis m  
Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016  unidimens ional  thin  
Hobolt, Anduiza, Carkoglu, Lutz, &  
Sauger, 2016  
three -dimens ional  thin & out -groups  
Spruyt et al., 2016  unidimens ional  thin  
Stavrakakis et al., 2016  unidimens ional  thin  
Oliver & Rahn, 2016  three -dimens ional  
thin &  
nationalis m  
Schulz, Müller et al. 2017 (print, 2018)  
hierar chical,  
three -dimens ional  
thin  
Vehrkamp & Wratil, 2017  unidimens ional  thin  
Spierings &  Zaslove, 2017  unidimens ional  thin  
van Hauwaer t &  van Kessel, 2018  unidimens ional  thin  
Steiner & Landwehr, 2018  
hierar chical,  
three -dimens ional  
thin  
Hameleer s &  de Vrees e, 2018 two -dimens ional  
anti -elitism &  
out -groups  
Castanho Silva , Andreadis  et al., 2019 
hierar chical,  
three -dimens ional  
thin  
No te.  This list might not be complete.  
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To close this chapter, I would like to point to three spec ific aspec ts rega rding which there 
is, on my account, still room for improve ment in scale developme nt  and which should 
henc e be considered by future resea rch. The first and the second one touch upon the ques-
tion of construct validi ty again. First, disagree ment persist s with rega rd to the core compo-
nents of populism. Looking into the cited works, four compone nts appea r regula rly  but in 
different compositions : the Manichea n outlook, anti -elitism, popula r sover ei gnty and the 
homogeneity and virtuousness of the people. Based on Philip Converse’s work, I intro-
duce d an approac h that is able to integ ra te all four features. This approac h understands the 
Manichea n ou tlook as the superordina te postu re of the populist belie f syste m from which 
other compone nts emana te. It further identifie s anti -elitism, popula r soverei gnty and the 
homoge nei ty and virtuousness of the peopl e as three idea -elements essential to populism 
an d  that  henc e, constitute  the core of the populist belie f system. The specifica tion of the 
measureme nt as a hierarc hic a l three -dimensional model introduce d in Article I  largel y fol-
lows this structure. However, this spec ifica tion only implie s that the Manich ea n outlook is 
captured in the second -order latent variabl e of the model. As the IPA’s homoge nei ty di-
mension does not carry items that reflec t the Manichea n outlook, skeptici sm is warra nted  
rega rding the scale s fit to its theoretica l spec ifica tion . But , wh en compa ring all measures, 
the one proposed in the present study is arguab ly one of the most compl ete captures of the 
populist ideolog y. In any case, schol a rs on popu list attitudes should  in a concerted exerci se , 
‘balance the books’ and find  a compromise. As populism is under suspic ion to severel y 
threa ten establi shed d emocra ci es, socia l sciences are well -advised to offer the best possible, 
that is, the most adequa te measure to gauge populism on the indivi dua l level.   
Secondl y, most of the measures devel op ed (including the one introduce d in the present 
study) tap for what could be coine d libera l forms of populism but they fail to tap for the 
phenomenon’s illiberal dimension (see Pappas, 2016  for a simila r critic). P otentia l damag-
ing aspec ts that populism can have for democ racy , as for example, the suppression of mi-
noritie s and the erosion of check s -and -bala nce s are missing. P ut briefly, t he items tap for 
agree ment to popula r sovereig nty but not for un r estricted  popula r sovereig n ty. A conse-
quenc e of this ca n be detec ted when examining the means found across these measures in 
nationwi de representa tive surve ys  that often appea r to be compa rably high, that is, above 
the scales’ respective midpoints. Evidently, a great part of the surveyed populations can 
a gree to the state ments comprising these inst rume nts (cf., Castanho Silva , Andrea dis  et al., 
2019, p.150). However, it would  be false to concl ude therefrom  that a majority within 
these popula tions is populist and that this is immine ntly dangerous for democ rac y.  As 
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populism can be both, a correc tive and a threa t to democ rac y (Mudde & Kaltwa sser, 2012)  
schola rs  should keep a watchful eye on the sprea d of populism discov ered with these 
measures but not be too quick in ringing the alarm bells. Attention is  strongl y dema nded as 
the step from libe ral to illibera l populi sm is certa inly very small. In any case, a measureme nt 
that explic itly taps for the illibera l dimensions of populism could shed light on the question 
of the extent to which the distinct dangerous face of  populism has perva ded societie s. Fu-
ture resea rch on populist attitudes should make a conce ntra ted  effort  also in  this direc tion.  
The third question is compa rably new to the study of populist attitudes but essentia l to the 
applic a tion of the scale. It is of rather technica l type and refers to the adequa te aggrega tion 
methods applie d to the construct (cf., Wuttke et al., unpublished draft) . In accordanc e with 
severa l other approache s to populist attitudes, the present approac h claims to identify  indi-
vidua ls  as populist , if they agree to all core compone nts comprising the conc ept. All com-
ponen ts are henc e deemed necessary  for the presenc e of populism. However, the cited stud-
ies, including the present one, compute indivi dua l populism scores as mean scores or f actor 
scores what, admittedl y, ignores this centra l premise. With this approac h, l ow scores on 
one dimension compe nsa t e high scores on another. Future resea rch needs to discuss , if thi s 
is a severe  drawba ck or if the error that it causes is tolera ble against the fact that all 
measures have exhibite d  decent predic tive power rega rding vote choice, issue positions or 
many other correla tes . Moreove r, alterna tive aggrega tion methods need to be tested aga inst 
the one employe d  most common l y  to see if they lead to different outcome s.   
In the upcoming chapters  I will employ the IPA to gauge populist attitudes in surve y re-
search and use it as a predic tor for media perce ptions , public opinion perce ptions , and me-
dia use in multi -group regression analy sis. The  aim is to examine, if low  trust in news insti-
tutions as well as cong ruent public opinion perceptions can be systema tica lly linked to 
populist attitudes and if, moreov er, individua ls who support populis m exhibit different 
media diets compa red to citize ns who disagree to the populist ideas. To start these exami-
nations, I will outline a socia l identity approac h to populist attitudes according to which 
strong populist attitudes  indic a te  identific a tion to th e group of the people. This framew ork 
shall help to expla in how and why different idea -elements important to the populist belie f 
stem are constraine d to one another. If systema tic  correl a tions are indeed established in the 
empirica l inve stiga tion s  that are  to be presente d in each of the followi ng two Chapters, 
respec tive attitudes, perceptions and beha v ioral inclina tions  were identifie d as additiona l 
compone nts of the popul ist belie f system.   
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Chapt er 4 : Populi st Citizens’ M edia & Publi c Opinio n 
Percept ions  
The next two Chapter s  follow a trajec tory  through the populist belie f system that moves 
out of the systems core  into a direc tion that is of partic ula r interest to comm unic a tion sci-
ence. More spec ifica lly,  in Chapter  4, populist attitudes are se t in rela tion to media perce p-
tions  and public opinion perce ptions , and Chapter 5 examines the rela tion betwee n popu-
list attitudes and news preferen ce s . To this mome nt, no scientific inve stiga tion on these 
rela tions  can be found in the litera ture . Merely  anec dotal evide nce and theoretica l work  
give rise to the suspic ion  that citizens who support the populist ideas could be prone to 
systema tica lly reject the mainstrea m news media as agents of the evil politic a l elite . A scien-
tific analysis of this link is , howev er, highly importa nt as a rejec tion of the mass media in 
genera l by a partic ula r segment of the popula tion can amplify societa l polariza tion  in at 
least two different ways . According  to theory on public opinion, the mass media are 
thought to inform the audie nce about the present tilt of public opinion. In doing so, they 
shall bring  about societa l integ ration  (e.g., Noelle -Neuma nn, 1974) . However, i f indiv idua ls 
strongl y dist rust mainstre a m news institution s , they tend to a) reje ct the media ted clima te 
of opinion and  b) turn to alterna tive news providers (Tsfati, 2003). Both out come s would 
mean that a ffec ted individua ls live in different realities as compa red to the remai nder  of the 
popula tion . If citize ns with populist attitudes perce ive d the media hostile against their own 
views, they as well could reject the media ted clima te of opin ion  and settle in opinion con-
gruent information envir onments . Thus, i n addition to the rela tion betwee n populist atti-
tudes and media perce ptions I wi ll also examine the link betwee n populist attitudes and 
public opinion perce ptions (Chapter 4)  as well as the link between populist attitudes and 
media use (Chapter 5) . Thereby, media  perce ptions, public opinion  perce ptions and media 
use  will be considered relev a nt  idea -elements within the populist belie f syste m. How these 
entitie s are perce ive d and used by indiv idua ls holding populist attitudes  (RQ 1 & RQ 3)is 
thus an inve stiga tion of constrain t s preva ilin g betwee n the system’s core and these idea -
eleme nts.  
T hese analy se s will be of theoretica l and empirica l kind. I will first expand upon theoretica l 
considera tions to offer expla na tions for why and how the different idea -eleme nts could 
stand in interdepe ndence . Afterw a rds,  multi -country  surve y studies  will seek for evide nce  
of these rela tions in diffe rent country conte xts . The theoretica l considera tions mainly in-
volve the outline of a socia l identity approa ch to populist attitu d es , to  which I will turn at first . 
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Once this framew ork is established, it will be applie d to devel op hypothes e s rega rding 
populist citizens’ perce ptions of public opinion and the media  as well as rega rding  their 
news preferenc es . Within these more spec ific deduc tions , I will make use of theoretica l 
approac hes and  conc epts that are commonly employe d in media psyc hology . More spec ifi-
cally, I will consider literature on the false consens us, the h ostile media effe ct, the persua-
sive press inferenc e , and selec tive exposure . I will then introduce empirica l findings  with 
rega rd to the proposed relationships  that were presented first  in Article II  (Chapter 4) , Arti-
cle III and Article IV  (Chapter 5) . Moreove r, the present chapter also presents an additiona l 
analy sis that inve stiga tes media genre skepticism by populi st citiz ens.  
Social Identity Approac h to Populist Attitu des  
To introduce the socia l identity approac h to populist attitudes, I will briefly reiterate what I 
have thus far said about the role of socia l identity in this thesi s. In Chapter 1 , I have point-
ed to the importanc e of grou p  identitie s for belie f systems. In Converse ’s findings, a re-
marka ble share of indiv idua ls view e d  and evalua te d  politic s alon g the line s of socia l group-
ings  (Converse, 2006) . I have considered  that this could have to do with the human na ture 
that tends to think about the self and others in ter ms of in -group and out -group membe rs. 
Further , I have pointed out that thi s may be partic u la rly fertile  for populist communica tion, 
which strongl y focuses on the distribution of socia l identity frames . Hence, I have conclud-
ed  that populist communic a tion and  socia l psyc holog ic a l theories as well as both in inter-
play should  be considered when we want to understand the  constrai nt s constituting  the 
populist belie f system.  These considera tions were extende d in Chapter 2 , w h ere I intro-
duce d the notion of popul ism as identity politics . I stated that  populist identity  frames offer  
socia l categorie s along which socia l categ oriza tion processes can unr oll  and added  that in-
sights coming out of the resea rch on the socia l identity theory offer reasons to belie ve that 
the human nature is very conduc ive to communica tion based on such cues (cf. Hogg & 
Reid, 2006). Finally , I claimed in the end  of Chapter 3 , t hat populist attitudes can serve  as 
an indic a tor of  identific a tion with the group of the peopl e. I will use the pres ent subcha pter 
to expla in this line of argument in more depth  and in doing so, make it applic a ble for the 
inve stiga tions with regard to RQ 2  and RQ 3.  
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The Socia l Identi ty Persp ective  
To start with, I will summariz e premises of the socia l identity perspective 9 (SIP; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987)  that I consider important for the argument being made 
here.  In this conne ction , I will strongl y rely on an artic le published by Hogg and Reid  
(2006), who applie d the socia l identity perspec tive to communic a tion resea rch.  
The SIP suggest s that the self -concep t  is comprised of a persona l and a socia l identity. While 
indiv idua ls possess but one p ersona l identity , their socia l identity  is set togethe r by numerous 
group membe rships  and  is  henc e, multiple . A person can be a member of a partic ula r fami-
ly, school, band, socia l class, party, gender, race, and so forth.  According to the theory, 
these group identitie s, if salie nt  in a certa in conte xt , can guide thoughts, feeling s, perce p-
tions, and behavior concerning the self as well as others. The socia l cogni tive proce ss that 
“ ca uses indiv idua ls to identify with groups,  construe themsel ve s and others in group terms, 
and manifest group behavior ” (Hogg &  Reid, 2006, p.9) is named socia l categoriza tion . The 
spec ific proce ss in which the self itsel f identifies with a spec ific  group is termed self -
categoriza tion . 
The motiva tion underly ing socia l categoriz a tion proce sses  (including self -categoriz a tion)  is 
a self -enhancem ent motivation . According to a main premise of SI P, it is partic ularly important 
for the human self -estee m  that the different group membe rships which co nstitute  the indi-
vidual’s self-concept  are positive ly valued . The need for p ositive socia l identity  thus motiva tes 
the indiv idua l to “create, maintain or enhance the positively va lued distinctive ness of in-
groups compared to outgroups on relevant dimensions” (Turner, 2000, p.8). The indiv idu-
al adapt s  different strategie s to reach this goal. As the quote indica tes, t his proce ss  most 
often  invol ve s  socia l comp a r ison s  that are set to resul t in the perce ption of in -group superiori-
ty over out -groups . As  a vast amount of studies on the minima l group paradig m show e d , 
socia l categoriza tion, that is, the mere perce ption of belongi ng to a distinct group, can fos-
ter the search for positive attributes that the in -group shares ( i.e., in-group favoritism ) as
compa red to negative attributes that the  out -group shares (i.e., out -group deroga tion ) (e.g., 
Brewer, 1979; for an overview see Gramzow, 2007) . Th ese perce ptions  can  serve to  en-
hance percei ve d in -group entita tivity, in -group cohesion and/or in -group homoge nei ty . All 
of these reactions  can help  the indiv idua l to feel as a part of a united socia l whole  that is 
                                                 
9 Following contempor ar y social psychological liter atur e (e.g., Hogg & Reid, 2006, p. 8), I use the 
label so cial identity pers pectiv e to refer to what are in fact two separate but “allied and largely comple-
mentary” Turner (2000, p. 7) theor ies, t hat is, social identity theor y and self -categor ization theor y.  
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superior to any other out -group  on releva nt dimensions  (Kelly, 1989; Simon & Brown, 
1987). Further, socia l categoriz a tion can underpin  “conte xt -rele va nt group and intergroup 
beha viors ” (Hogg &  Reid, 2006, p.12; Kelly, 1989; Turner et al., 1987) in which indiv idua ls 
favor in - over out -group membe rs . 
These positive and negati ve attributes that define spec ific s ocia l categories are also termed 
p rototypes . According to Hogg and Reid, t hese prototype s can be understood as  group norm s  
as they do not only descr ibe but also prescribe  how one has to “ feel, pe rcei ve , think, and 
behave” (Hogg &  Reid, 2006, 10f.) as an in -group membe r , as well as how in -group mem-
bers  ought to think about out -groups . In order to count  as a group membe r  the indiv idua l 
recon figures the self and others as representa tions  of these prototype s  what is referred to 
as the proce ss of d epers ona liz a tion  (Turner, 1982). Th r ough this process , neithe r the self nor 
others are recogni ze d as unique  indiv idua ls  but as group membe rs who embo dy all kinds of 
group attributes. Hence, d epe rsona liz a tion invol ves an adjustment of own perce ptions and 
own beha vior to meet the expec tations of the own group, while it encourag es stereotype -
consistent interpreta tions of out -group beha vior  (Hogg &  Reid, 2006). 
Importantly, from a socia l identity  perspec tive, i n -group confirma tive thinking and beha v-
ior are a function of in -group identific a tion and do  not follow, for example, the wish to 
avoid socia l sanctions or disapproval . More spec ifica lly, to  the socia l identity argu ment 
compl ia nce with group norms is not just super ficia l obedi ence but it is partic ula rly im-
porta nt for the self -conc ept  and has in this sense, a self -definitiona l function  (Abrams & 
Hogg, 1990). This is why such adaptions can  be encourag ed by  high levels of in -group 
identific a tion  or different types of in -group threa t  such as, for example, minority status  
(Marks & Miller, 1987) . 
This point s to a significa nt influe nce on human perceptions and behavior  that group proto-
type s understood as grou p norms may have. Against this ba ckground , it is important to ask  
how these group norms are establish e d . Follow ing Hogg and Reid (2006), g roup p roto-
type s are constructe d, modifie d , and shared via direc t and indirec t  communica tion . Group 
members infer their group’s norms from thi s communic a tion . T herefore, they need to pay 
attention to what other group membe rs say and how they behave (direc t) or what is said 
about the own group by external source s, such as the mass media  (indirec t). The moment 
in which these cues lead indiv idua ls to change their ow n thinking and beha vior  (as empha-
sized above, in the sense of actua l interna l cognitive change through persua sion ) is termed 
socia l influ ence  (cf. referen t informationa l influe nce theory, e.g.,  Abrams &  Hogg, 1990 ). 
   48  
   
Importantly, n ot all group membe rs exert the same influenc e as to the definition of group 
norms. Rather , in most groups only a few actors or even one person alone will be im-
porta nt  in that sense . These persons  are what Hogg and Reid refer to as “entrepreneurs of 
prototy pically” (p. 15) or “entrepreneurs of identity” (p. 20) or put simply, as group lead ers . 
G roup leaders embody (or purport to embody) all group prototype s and henc e  function as 
a referenc e to all in -grou p membe rs. In  other words, they are the “ best  source of infor-
mation about the group norm ” (p. 20), what gives them grea t power  to influenc e the self -
understandi ng of the in -group and the spec ifica tion of out -groups.  Thereb y , existing in -
group prototype s are rhet orica lly  acce ntuated while appropriate out -groups are demoniz ed  
(Reicher & Hopkins, 1996) . Indeed, effective leaders have the ability to “present their mes-
sage in such a way that it enables social identity mobilization” (Haslam, Reiche r, & Platow, 
2011; Mols, 2012, p. 331). In today’s communication environment, g roup leaders have 
many possibil ities  to reach their followe rs. They can either meet them within persona l en-
counte rs, on socia l media  (direc t) , or, should they be perce ive d as important enoug h, their 
ideas can be distributed via the mass media  (indirect) . It must not be said, that this come s 
with a high potentia l of their ideas being amplified , rega rdless of whethe r they represent 
majoritie s or minorities  (Moscov ic i, Mugny, & van Averma et, 1985) . With these words, I 
am now turning back to the inve stiga tion of the populist belie f system. Below, I will sum-
mariz e the socia l identity perspec tive  presente d above  in a direc t applic a tion to populism.  
Applying the Socia l Identi ty Perspective to Popul ism  
The socia l identity approac h to populist att itudes  starts with one  main premise: The ap-
proac h  understands indiv i dua ls who support the core dimensions  of popu lis m  as in -group 
membe rs of the peopl e , or more briefly, as populist citize ns . If this is the basic premise, we 
should be able to describe and expla in all perce ptions and beha vior exhibite d by these citi-
zens via the different mecha nisms invol ve d in socia l categ oriza tion and socia l influ ence. 
Or, in Converse’s terminology, these socia l psyc hologi ca l mecha nisms  sho uld be applic a ble 
to expla in constraints betwe en different idea -elements within the populist belie f system  
(Converse, 2006) . This is how t he present study seeks to expla in populist citizens’ public 
opinion perceptions as well as their media rela ted attitud es, perce ptions, and behavior . 
Social categ ories established by p opulism.  In app ly ing the so ci a l identity perspec tive to 
populism I will start  with what I have referred to la st  in the SI P subcha pter , that is , an ex-
amina tion of the prototypic a l group -membe r  from which social influence can be expe cted 
most. I argue  that in popu lism this role is playe d  by the populist leader , who can be a leader  
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of a populist move ment  or the head  of a populist party . Populist leaders  are not any leader s  
but they are often “charismatic leaders” (Alberta zzi &  McDonne ll, 2008, p.  5) and maybe 
most impo rta nt ly, they all claim to  embody the people’s will (Barr, 2009, p. 40). More spe-
cifica lly, populist leaders often origina te (or claim to origina te) from within the peopl e.  This 
l ends them a lot of credi bili ty when they assert  to be as ordinary as the peopl e or to  incar-
nate the people’s culture (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). The populist leader is also de-
scribed as “one with the people whose deepest feelings he (or she) articulates” (Kriesi, 
2013, p. 7). To the socia l identity perspec tive, the populist leader is thus the perfec t repre-
senta tive of a group prot otype and a clea r  reference for other in -group member’s percep-
tions and beha vior. Once other in -group membe rs accept t he leader’s status, it should  be  
possible  for this leader  to manipula te or add new in -group attributes and  to  demoni ze out -
groups , or , in Converse’s terms, to define what constitutes the populist belie f system.  
First and foremo st, the populist leader uses populist communic a tion as define d in Chapter 
2, to build  the virtuous in -group of the peopl e and to demoniz e the politic al elite as an out -
group. With this, populism construes  two  socia l categ ories which , if sal ie nt, potentia lly trig-
ger socia l categoriza tion. However, a s also others have recog nized, populist communic a-
tion does not stop at this point  (Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbä ck, & de Vreese, 
2017). In -group attributes can di versify  or the out -group  can be extende d  by ever more evil 
dimensions and ac tors who are  then  reproa che d to  be jointly  hatching a plot against the 
peopl e.  For example, o ut -groups commonly added in right -wing populism are immigra nts 
and/ or relig ious groups . The in -group  is most often shaped by adding further attributes 
such as intel lig ence or poverty but it can as well be expanded  by adding further groups. For 
example, in 2018 members of the German populist party A lterna tive for Germany (A fD ) 
founded a  Jewis h a ssoci a tion  within the own party  (Ju d en in der AfD ) what was like ly done 
to  support  the  claim that the AfD is not anti -Semitic  (Prange, 2018). With this, the Jews 
were  as a group , willin gly or not , include d as part of the peopl e for whom the AfD and its 
party leaders  claim to  stand up  for . 
In the same way , I will argue,  populist actors repro a ch mainstrea m news organiz a tions to 
be the enemies of the people and claim, that populist citize ns represent a sile nt majority, 
whose shared views and interests are not heard by the malev ole nt politic a l elite. I will turn 
back to these two features further below and disc uss in how far the se cues can partia lly 
cause populist indiv idua ls to adapt hostile media perce ptions and cong ruent public opinion 
perce ptions.  Next, I will discus s what the self -categoriz a tion as a membe r of the peopl e , 
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that is an identific a tion as a populist citize n,  could enta il according to the socia l identity 
perspec tive.  
Social psyc holog ica l reactions . As state d, the socia l identity approac h to populist attitudes 
understands those who support the populist ideas as having identifie d with the in -group of 
the peopl e. If this socia l identity is salie nt, persons should depe rsona liz e and accordingly, 
adjust th eir perce ptions and beha vior to meet the expecta tions of the in -group. Further 
socia l  compa risons shoul d be unlea sed  that are  set to perce ive the group of the peopl e as 
superior to the politic a l elite . Both, the human self -enha nce ment motiva tion as well as  cues 
within populist communi ca tion should jointly reinforce  these proce sses . In other words, 
populist communic a tion provides  a  direc tion  in that it offers solutions on how  in -group 
membe rs can  gain most from socia l compa ri son s . However, as this was sho wn in the min-
imal group experime nts, part of the respec tive reactions would also result without partic u-
lar cues but rather, as genuine socia l psyc holog ica l conseque nce s  (cf., Gramzow, 2007) . But
if cues are present, the need for positive identity should grate fully follow these cues what 
paves the way for respec tive adaptions of attitudes, perce ptions and beha vior into the di-
rection desired by those who count in this proce ss as identity entrepren eurs.  
M any conseque nce s are conce iva ble  for populist citize ns : For  example,  posi tive  in -group  
attributes should  be pronounce d within indiv idual perce ptions.  To populist citize ns this 
could enta il that they think about themsel ve s a nd other membe rs of their group  as being 
virtuous, innoc ent, pure, and inherently good.  Furt her , perce ive d in -group homoge nei ty 
should  in crea se. That the group of the peopl e is homoge neous is to a large extent direc tly 
promoted within populist communic a tion but, according to the socia l identity  perspec tive, 
perce ive d simila rity is also a genuine cognitive output of self -categoriz a tion (Turner et al., 
1987). As was shown, the perce ption of in -group homoge nei ty is partic ula rly functiona l for 
minorities as it promotes “perceived strength of the in-group and allo w[s] group membe rs 
to define themselves as an integral part of a social whole” (Kelly, 1989, p. 242). To add 
another possible outcome , we could also expec t populist  citize ns to self -enha nce via out -
group discrimina tion. More spec ifica lly, socia l p syc holog i ca l resea rch has shown  that in 
case of salie nt socia l identitie s, out -group membe rs are downgra ded on dimensions im-
porta nt to a  spec ific socia l compa rison  what leads the in -group (and its membe rs) to thrive . 
In populism such mecha nisms are again trigg ered by identity cues. For example, according 
to a common populist claim, the politica l elite is to blame for the unfortunate situation of 
the peopl e. This perce ption absolve s the in -group from guilt which is instea d put on the 
elite  (cf., Hameleers et al., 201 7a). This can involve increa sed out -group homoge nei ty per-
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ce ptions followi ng which membe rs of the out -group are perceive d to be more simila r than 
they ac tual ly are, that is, all guilty to the same degree. The out -group is swee ping ly rejected 
with no exce ptions.  
These examples were tho ught to illust rate how the socia l identity perspec tive  can be ap-
plie d to populism. That is, how it can serve to expla in indiv idua l level reactions followi n g 
populist identity cues. Before I will apply this approac h to the inve stiga tion of populist 
citize ns perce ptions of the media and public opinion, I will briefly share some thoughts on 
measuring in -group identific a tion to the people.  
M easuring in -group id ent ifica tion to the peopl e.  With rega rd to the IPA introduce d in 
Chapter 3 , it might appea r counte rintuitive that populism  is measured metric a lly, that i s, as 
a dimension, but that  in this chapter  I seek to understand popul ist attitudes as identific a tion 
i n bina ry terms, that is, of those who identify with the ideolog y (i.e., populist citize ns) and 
those who do not (i.e., non -populist citize ns). However, also with rega rd to other ideolo-
gies this is rather commo n. While ideolog ica l identifica tion  with a grou p  is, of course, cate-
goric a l, it is at the same time dimensional in that the degree of psyc holog ica l attachme nt 
can vary continuously (cf., Kinder &  Kalmoe, 2017, p.  48). I argue that particul a rly high 
levels of populist attitudes can represent a spec ific group consciousnes s and henc e, be read 
as in -group identific a tion (cf., Elchardus &  Spruyt, 2016). Admittedl y, t his might not be 
equa lly true  for those who strongly disagree to the populist ideas as this ‘group’ is likely 
ve ry heterogene ous. However, in line with socia l identity theory, in -groups can  also  estab-
lish as a simple reaction to out -groups and norm s sprea d by these out -groups. This is par-
ticul a rly  like ly in the absenc e of clear in -group norma tive information. In -group s than 
evolve  in the spirit of counterconformity, that is, as “polarized away from the out-group” 
(Hogg & Reid, 2006, p. 13). Thus, with so me reser va tions, but for the sake of simplic ity, I 
am trea ting partic ula r strong support to the populist ideas as an indic a tion for identific a tio n 
as a populist citize n and partic ula r strong disagree ment to these same ideas as an indic a tion 
for identific a tion as a non -populist citize n . Because it is diffic ult to set a threshold that de-
fines were in -group identific a tion starts or end s, a metric meas ure still appears most appro-
priate. I will therefore use the IPA as a metric index in all analysis in this the sis. In this re-
gard, the develope d measure is not dichotomous but it is still able to categoriz e. The fact 
that also established measures of in -gr oup identifi ca tion are metric measures further sup-
port s  thi s approac h (Leach et al., 2008). 
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In the followi ng I am going to apply the socia l identity approac h to populist attitudes to an 
inve stiga tion of populist citize ns media and public opinion perce ptio ns. It seems reasona-
ble to start with consider a tions rega rding populist citize ns ’ public opinion perce ption as  
this  conc erns the self -und erstandi ng of the in -group. Afterw a rds I will deduc e a hypothe sis 
with regard to populist citizens’ media perceptions, w ha t concern s  the spec ifica tion of out -
groups.  
Populist Attitudes and Public Opi nion Percept ions  
Follow ing the social identity approac h to populist attitudes introduce d above, populist 
communic a tion and the human socia l psyc holog y can be functiona l to the establishment of 
a  populist belie f system on the indiv idua l level. This conc erns spec ifica tions a nd perce p-
tions as to the self -unders tandi ng of the in -group as well as spec ifica tions and perce ptions 
of the out -group  or out -groups . Regarding these extensions, the presum ed persua sive 
mecha nism  is always the same: Identity  cues are offered and embra ce d a nd reinforce d by 
high -identifying individuals’ social psychology. I argue, that we should also be able to de-
duce a hypothe sis rega rding populist citizens’ public opinion perceptions drawing back on 
these mecha nism. I will start the deduction focusing on re lev a nt identity cues first , before 
discussing  spec ific socia l psyc holog ic a l mecha nisms that could pave the way for these cues 
to be persua sive.  
Populist majority cues.  Contempora ry resea rch on the socia l identity perspec tive  has shown 
that political leaders can exert social influence with regard to the audience’s collective self-
understandi ng (Haslam et al., 2011; Mols, 2012; Reiche r & Hopkins, 2001). This is partic u-
larly important to  the populist ideolog y  that is pri marily a bout advoc a ting the in -group of 
the peopl e. According to the populist ideolog y, the peopl e are crafted as a homoge neous 
and virtuous group, a coheren t entity of good and honest charac ter who form a unity in 
sharing the same interests and value s  (Mudde, 2004; Wirth et al., 2016). 
Follow ing  the socia l identity perspec tive , populist leaders could  be expe cte d to  extent these 
core features of the peopl e by further attrib utes which they belie ve to be potentia lly helpful 
in mobili zi ng  their followers . The distribution of p op ul ist majority cues  that, if effec tive, lead s  
in -group membe rs to believ e that their own opinion represents what the socie tal majority 
belie ve s could be one such useful add -on. Indee d, the litera ture on populism discusses that 
the people in populism are often displayed as “the silent majority” (Taggart, 2000, p. 92). It 
can further be discussed  that alrea dy the  mere reference to “the people” implies, that a 
maj ority is being  addressed and  represente d. However, espec ia lly in right -wi ng populism, 
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w ere the narra tive also points  to ‘ w a ve s of immigra nts ’ that  threa ten to extermina te the 
national people  and, de facto, reduce them in their number , the term peopl e cannot  not  be 
taken as  a synony m for majority. Rather, it appea rs more adequa t e to sepa rate majority cues 
as an additiona l feature to populist communic a tion. As there is thu s far no content analy sis 
on the freque ncy of opinion majority claims voic ed by populist actors as compare d  to oth-
er politic a l actors , only anec dotal evide nce can serve to illustrate such rhetoric. For exam-
ple, Donald Trump could be  heard saying the follow ing in a campaign speech in Phoeni x, 
Arizona held in July, 2015: "The silent majority is back, and we’re going to take the country 
ba c k ” (Right Side Broadc a sting Network, 2015) . Likewise, Jair Bolsona ro addressed his 
followe rs in Brazil as the majority in a campai gn speech in September, 2018: “Let's make a 
country for majority! The minority must bow to the majority. Law must exist to de fend the 
majority! The minority suits itsel f [to the law] or just disappea rs ” (Magalha es, 2018) . State-
ments like these set a  norm that is partic ula rly releva nt for the in -group’s sel f -
understandi ng . The in -group is defined as a group that is ‘ de facto ’ a m ajority but whose 
voic es are not heard but suppressed by the ruling politic a l elite. As outline d above, cues like 
these can foster in -group bias through the proce s s  of socia l categoriz a tion. I will look more 
closel y into these proce sses in the subseque nt paragra phs.  
The socia l psyc holog ic a l reaction . Those who identify as populist citize ns should be like ly 
to follow populist majority cues as illustrated above. As these cues are promoted as shared 
by all group membe rs,  that is, as group p rototype s or norm s,  individua ls wo self -categorize  
as  group  membe rs should interna liz e these cues  through the proce ss of depersona liz a tion. 
To reitera te, depe rsona liz a tion leads the indiv idua l to view the self as a membe r of the 
group and not as unique.  Th e more important the group is to the individual’s self-concept, 
the stronge r sho uld such adaptions become  as they are important to the definition of the 
self. In other words, if the group is important to the self and if majority status is set as a 
group prototype indiv iduals should be like ly to change their perceptions followi ng  the  cue. 
It can be expec t ed that  populist citize ns belie ve their own opinion to have majority status 
and that this perce ption streng thens the more somebody identifie s as a group m embe r.  
This hypothe sis is also plausible for further reason s  as socia l categoriza tion can also cause 
in -group bias without spec ific cues  being necessa ry . Indee d, t o belie ve that a more genera l 
other , as for example represente d by public opinion, agree s to  the own worldvie w is a qui te 
common perceptual distortion that has been investigated under labels such as “false con-
sensus” (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) , “projection” (Holmes, 1968) , or “looking glass 
effect” (Fields & Schuman, 1976) . While the projection of the own opinion onto the opin-
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ion of other s seems to be a very genera l human tende ncy , resea rch has established circum-
stanc es under which this biased perce ption occurs even more pronounce d . Central to the 
argument of the present study is the i nsigh t, that perce ive d in -group threa t or minority 
status can motiva te indiv idua ls to engage in consen sus perce ptions (Mullen, 1983; Mullen 
& Hu, 1988; e.g., Sanders & Mullen, 1983; Simon et al., 1990; Wetzel & Walton, 1985) . In 
genera l, majority belie fs, perce ive d simila rity to others or false consensus perce ptions can 
increa se self -estee m and help in devel oping a favorable self -view (Hoorens, 1993) . More 
spec ifica lly, consensus perce ptions  can “bolster perceived social support, validate the cor-
rectne ss or  approp riaten ess of  a position, maintai n self -estee m, maintai n or restore cogni-
tive balance, or reduce tension associated with anticipated social interaction” (Marks 
& Miller, 1987, p. 73).  
Many of these reason s could play a role for populist citizens’ public opinion perceptions as 
w el l. While populism construes the group of the people as a numeric a l majority, the popu-
lis t narra tive state s  as well that the peopl e are constantly suppressed by the politic a l elite. 
Thus, w ith rega rd to pow er  yet not number the peopl e within populism form a group that 
has minority status and that  is thus, a group that is under threa t. This is furth er supported 
by ana ly sis that show  that citize ns with  populist attitudes perce ive themsel ves to  be rela-
tivel y deprive d as compa red to others (Spruyt et al., 2016). According ly, majority perce p-
tions could be functiona l for those high on populist attitudes without respec tive cues being 
necessa ry. For example, the populist opinion  or populist actors ar e often public ly critic iz ed 
and deleg itimize d for being immora l, reactiona ry, politic a lly incorrec t, or extreme within 
the daily mainstrea m news reporting  (Herkman, 2015; Koopmans & Muis, 2009; Wettstein, 
Esser, Schulz et al., 2018) . Under these circumstan ces, public opinion majority perce ptions 
could help populist citiz ens to valida te the appropriaten ess of their otherwise attack ed posi-
tions. T his socia l psyc holog ic a l mecha nism should be reinforce d by populist majority cues. 
Against this background, Article II  posit s the followi ng first hypothe sis :  
A2 -H1: A person’s populist attitudes become stronger, he or she becomes more likely to perceive public 
op in ion as congruent with his or her own stand p oin t.  
Populist Attitudes and Media Perceptions  
Next, I will discuss populist cit izens’ perceptions of the media against the background of 
the socia l identity approac h to populist attitudes. This include s considera tions as to social 
identity cues sprea d by populist leaders as well as to socia l psyc holog ic a l m echa nisms that 
are assumed to interac t with these cues.  
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Populist anti -media cues.  Group  leaders do not onl y shape the self -unders tandi ng of the in -
group but they also spec if y the out -group or out -groups. In politic a l populis m, the releva nt 
out -group is notabl y the politic a l elite. However, f or reasons  to be discus sed in this sub-
chapter , populist politic ians also vent  their ange r against established  news institutions. Ac-
cording to the main populist reproach, ‘the media’ lie and conspire with the political elite 
against the people and are considered “an instrument of the established parties” (Mudde, 
2007, p.67). This cue enlarges the malicious out -group by yet another actor what immedi-
ately increa ses its threa tening nature. Not only is one spec ific actor working against the 
peopl e, but rather, numerous evil actors coope rate. Furthermore, the out -group is con-
strued as being very homoge neous. More spec ifica lly, politic ia ns and media  are evil to the 
same exten t  and share the same goal, that is, to deprive the peopl e and there are no excep-
tions to this rule. Moreove r, and simila rly important to the psyc holog ica l reactions which I 
will displa y below, both groups are attributed high powe r. While politic ia ns have power 
over decisions (and the peopl e have not), the ‘lie media’ are setting the agenda, frame 
events, and potentially, influence or manipulate other’s opinions.  
Only a few supply side studies have thus far inve stiga ted what has b een termed a nti -media 
popul ism  by Benja min Krämer (2018). These studies revea le d , that the Belgia n populist party 
Vlaams Blok  most freque ntly employe d attack s against the mainstrea m media as compa red 
to other partie s (Jagers &  Walgrave, 2007) , and  that representa tives of Swedish alterna tive 
media believ e that mainstrea m news institutions have joint force s with the politic a l elite 
(Holt, 2016). These scientific observa tions can further be exempl ified  by anec dotal evi-
denc e. A very promine nt example, Donald Trump, was cited in the introduction of this 
thesis. But lie media accusa tions or system media reproa che s can be found elsew here  as 
well . For example, in 2015 two promine nt AfD politic ia ns , Björn Höcke and Alexa nder 
Gauland , held a speech  a bout “democratic principles” in parallel in two  different German 
cities. One of these democ ratic principle s can be transla ted from the German spee ch script 
as follows: “The by many so-calle d liars press has often earned its name. Instea d of objec-
tive reporting, a fatal welcome culture is propag a ted. The GEZ -funded state -owned tele vi-
sion label s us as enemies, because we say what shall not be said” (Kubitsche k, 2015) .10 This 
                                                 
10 German original: „Die von vielen so genannte ‚Lügenpresse‘ hat sich ihren Namen nicht selten 
r edlich verdient. An Stelle objektiver Berichter s tattung propagier t sie eine fatale 
Willkommens kul tur. Das GEZ -gebühr enf inanzier te Staats f er ns ehen markiert uns als Gegner, weil 
wir sagen, was nicht gesagt werden soll.“ 
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ex a mple illustra tes qui te well how populism  as identity politic s can sound. In a pply ing an 
‘us’  versu s ‘them’ rhetori c, the med ia are pitted against the peopl e and  in defining the me-
dia as state -owned the institution is  direc tly tie d to the ruling politic al elite. Follow ing Hogg 
and Reid, these ki nd of cues can function as group norms which, in this case, “ cha rac terize 
the beha vior of membe rs of releva nt out -group s” (2006, p. 10) Individua ls who self -
categoriz e as populist citi ze ns should be prone to follow these cues and accordingly, cate-
goriz e ‘ the media ’ as a n out -group that is  potentia lly harmful to the own group (cf., Fiske & 
Rusche r, 1993) . 
The socia l psyc holog ic a l reaction . Indee d, f rom the socia l identity perspec tive  the populist 
anti -media cue  could be  partic ula rly functiona l  for both, in -group favoritism and out -group 
deroga tion . First, s ocia l psyc holog ic a l studies have shown that the perce ption of the own 
group as being  controlled by homoge neous, powerful out -groups has an in -group cohe sion 
effect what includes  both, increa sed in -group  identifica tion and increa sed in -group favorit-
ism (Bettenc ourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001; Dépret & Fiske, 1999) . In other words, 
the populist anti -media cue can be very functional to the search for positive distinctive ness 
of the in -group and hence, to  the in -group members’ self-estee m . Second, next  to the re-
percussion t hat  the  popul ist anti -media cue can have on the perce ption of the in -group , it 
can as well be  expec ted to foster out -group der oga tion and discrimina tion . Most im-
porta ntly, the cue indica tes a strong out -group homoge nei ty what should contribute  to  
perce ive the out -group as more homoge nous as compare d to the in -group. This cue is like-
ly very effective as it supports what is in effect a very genera l human tende ncy . According 
to the out -group homoge nei ty effect, individua ls usually tend to percei ve greater simila rity 
betwee n out -group members as compa rted to in -group membe rs (Linville & Jones, 1980) . 
A reason for this is the grea ter famili a r  that indiv idua ls experie nce with rega rd to other in -
group membe rs what leads them to perce ive their own group to be rather heterogene ous. 
Importantly, o ut -group homoge nei ty perceptions are very influentia l. T his condi tion  facili-
tates the depersona liz a tion of out -group membe rs  wha t can in turn , dehumaniz e these in-
dividua ls, increa se their threa tening nature , and foster  discrimina tion  against them (Brewer, 
1979; Simon & Mummen dey, 1990; Wilder, 1978, 1984) . Studies showed, that out -group 
homoge nei ty perce ptions encourag e  the stigma t iza tion of out -group membe rs in stereotyp-
ical terms (Simon, 1992) and “facilitate[s] aggressive responses toward them” (Wilder, 
1986, p. 316). 
A study in the bipa rtisa n US conte xt provided evidenc e for the out -group homoge nei ty 
effect with respec t to the perce ption of bias of spec ific partisa n media outlets. Liberal 
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Democ ratic partisa ns perce ive d a grea ter variability in media bias among libe ral news 
source s (e.g., MSNBC or CNN) as compa red to a more homoge neous bias of conserva tive 
media outlets (e.g., Fox News) and the oppo site pat tern was found for Conse rvative parti-
sans  (Stroud, Muddima n, & Lee, 2014) . The very genera l populist  anti -media cue could 
trigg er compa rable perceptions by indiv idua ls who identify with the populist ideolog y. 
However, rather than that the cue  refer s to spec if ic outlets, i t lump s toget her all main-
strea m news providers with no room for exce ptions and henc e , provokes  o ut -group ho-
mogenei ty perce ption s  of much larger scale . Arguably, in -group membe rs of the people 
w ho interna liz e  this mess a ge can be expec ted to swee ping ly  rejecte d  all  established news 
institutions. Mainstrea m media should be perce ived as buildi ng one stereotypic a l evil mass 
against whic h in -group membe rs of the people have to op pose and against whic h, eventual-
ly, one  has to re spond  aggressive ly. That populist followe rs increa sing ly attack journal ists , 
verball y as well as  physica lly , can be taken as first anec dotal evide nce for such reactions. 11  
Against this background it would be reasona ble to assume that citize ns with populist atti-
tudes turn away from mainstrea m news institutions and seek elsew here for information 
about politic s. I will turn to this question in Chapter 5. But even if these news were still 
approac hed, a categ oriza tion of ‘the medi a ’ as an out -group  can be very conse quentia l with 
rega rd to how conte nt sprea d by these outlets is perce ive d. Specifica lly, resea rch on the 
hostile media effect shows that i ndepe ndent  of the bias of the r eported cont ent, the mere 
fact that  a news was prod uce d or distributed by an out -group source result s in perce iving 
the content as hostile towa rd own views (Reid, 2012). These hostile perceptions can further 
be enha nce d by factors such as high in -group ide ntifica tion (Arpan & Raney, 2003) , illegit-
imate, low in -group statu s (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013) , and high reach suggesting that po-
tentia lly many others can be influenc ed by the hostile messa ge (Gunther & Storey, 2003) . 
All these condi tions coul d play a role for the pop ulist citize n. In -group membe rs of the 
peopl e should perce ive a low, illegitima te status as compa red to the out -grou p. Moreove r, 
as the out -group is none other than the ma ss  media, the antici pa ted reach of host ile messa g-
                                                 
11 Indeed, journalism faces sever e threats, not only in countr ies that have cons is tently scor ed low in 
press freedom rankings but also in countr ies in which the freedom of speech, expres s ion and in-
formation as well as the independence of media is actually pro tected by cons titutional law and in 
which media freedom is thus officially acknowledged as one of these democracies’ foundational 
pillar s. However, according to the latest repor t by Reporters Without Borders (2017) an eros ion of 
media freedom was in 2017 e specially visible in European countr ies and the United States.  
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e s  should be high. In taking all these considera tions togethe r, Article II  posits the followi ng 
second hypothesis:  
A2 -H2: As a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, he or she becomes more likely to perceive the main-
stream media’s reporting as in congruent with his or her own stand p oin t.  
Populist A ttitu des and the Persuas ive Press I nference  
The argumenta tion in this chapter thus far assumes that populist attitudes rela te to a) con-
gruent public opinion per ce ptions , and to b) hostil e media perce ptions. This suggests that 
c) populist citizens’ media and public opinion perceptions drift a pa rt with increa sing popu-
list attitudes . In other words, the stronge r populi st attitudes become, the more hostile will 
the media be perce ive d and the higher the perce ive d cong ruenc y betwee n own and per-
ceive d public opinion. Hostile media perce ptions are  hence expec ted to correla te positive ly 
wi th cong ruent public opinion perce ptions  for those in support of populism . Interestingly, 
this argumenta tion is in fact inconsistent  with insigh ts  provided by resea rch on the persua-
sive press inferenc e. In contrast to what this disse rta tion assumes to be tr u e for populist 
citize ns , this resea rch shows  that peopl e infer public opinion perceptions from what they 
perce ive within media coverag e (Gunther, 1998; Gunther & Christen, 2002; Gunther, 
Christen, Liebha rt, & Chia, 2001) . According to this line of resea rc h public opinion should 
be perce ive d as incongruent to the own vie w s if the media are percei ve d as hostile . These 
assumptions thu s am ount  to a negative  rela tionship betwe en these conc epts.  
To illustrate the  conseque nce s of the perce ptual distortion predic ted for pop ulist citize ns I 
draw back on an  influentia l theory of public opinion formation to which the persua sive 
press inferenc e mecha nism is centra l : T he spiral of sile nce theory introduce d by E lisabeth 
Noelle -Neuma nn in 1974 assumes strong media effects on public opinion as indiv idua ls 
presumabl y understand  the media tone as a reference to that opinion  (about the recog ni-
tion of the theory see Donsba ch, Salmon, & Tsfati, 2014) . Hence, when the argument a tion  
herei n determine s  th at populist attitudes rela te to hostile media perce ptions and  to cong ru-
ent perce ptions of public opinion , it neglec ts the media ’s influence in the process of public 
opinion formation. Put differently, the  presente d  line of argument claims that to populist 
citize ns, the media lose  their function as a referenc e for public opinion and henc e, poten-
tially fail  to integ rate society as a whole. As outlined in earlier Chapters of this thesis, this 
could cause societie s to pola rize along populist attitudes.  As strong pola riza tion is a threa t-
ening  scena rio for democ ratic  societie s, this study sets out to examine the role of the per-
suasive press inference mechanism for populist citizens’ public opinion perceptions.  
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T he socia l identity approach to populist attitud es as well as insigh ts by the resea rch on pre-
sumed media effects on others can offer an expla nation for why the per sua siv e press infer-
ence could indeed be turned off for populist citize ns. P opulist citize ns perce ive the peopl e 
as their very homogene ous and  positive ly charged in -group  and strive to reach high simila r-
ity to other in -group members. Moreove r, the people in populism are charac terize d as a 
very intel lige nt and emanci pa ted group that is able to make own decisions followi ng com-
mon sense (Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). Under these condi tions, r esea rch on presumed 
media effects would predic t that  an indiv idua l who identifie s with this group perce ive s 
membe rs of this group to be less susce ptible to media influence s  (Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 
1995; Reid & Hogg, 2005; Sun, Pan, & Shen, 2008). More spec ifica lly, i ndividua ls who re-
gard the peopl e as their in -group should be motiva ted to belie ve in weak media effects on 
this group as a function of perceived similarities and because of the group’s intelligence, 
w hic h should protec t the group from simply belie ving the disinformation sprea d by the 
manipula tive enemy. Resea rch on the third perso n effect seconds this arg ument. It was 
found that indiv idua ls estima te larger  media effects  for out -groups as for the own g roup 
(Hoffner & Rehkoff, 2011) . For these reason s, the persua sive press inferenc e mecha nism is 
like ly weaker for populist citize ns  as prior studies on the mecha nism suggest . This could  
lead the gap between hostile media and cong ruent public opinion perce ptions to widen 
rather than to shrink. Article II  therefore posited the followi ng third hypothesis:  
 A2 -H3: As a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, the difference between perceptio ns of congruent pub lic 
opin ion and of a hostile media increa ses.  
In addition to this hypothesis  that assumes a gap to open betwee n hostile media and con-
gruent public opinion perce ptions  along increa sing populist attitudes , Article II  also  under-
took a dire ct test of the persua sive press inferenc e mecha nism  which was not explic itly 
hypothe siz ed. I will  use the space in this synopsis  to put grea ter empha size on this test 
when I summariz e the results below.  
Before I will turn to a summary of the hypothe sis tests and results that  were published in 
Article II , I would like to close the theoretica l considera tions in turning  back to the resea rch 
question t o which I am seeking a response within the present Chapter. RQ  2 asked, how 
populist attitudes re la te to media and public opinion per ce ptions in different countries.  
Above , I have used a socia l identity approac h to populist attitudes to expla in  possible rela-
tionships betwee n the conce pts important to this resea rch question . Yet, another objective 
tied  to this question demands an examina tion  of the  degree to which the  suggested rela-
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tions can be found within different countries . The revela tion  of such patterns trave ling 
across country borders would be partic ula rly interesting to the inve s tiga tion of populis m as 
a politic a l belie f system. In fact, finding such patterns across count ries  would lend empiric a l 
validi ty to  the idea that respec tive rela tions are not random but part of an attitudina l syn-
drome . The confirma tion of the assumed rela tions hips in different countrie s would espe-
cially point to the socia l psyc holog ic a l approac h chosen within this thesi s. Robust results 
across countries could imply that a) communic a tive cues as to the spec ifica tion of in - and 
out -group are simila r in different countrie s and that b) the human socia l psyc holog y reacts 
compa rable  to these cues described above . Hence, Article II  presents a multi -country study 
on the rela tionships betwee n populist attitudes, media perce ptions and public opinion per-
ception s . 
Res ults Article II  
Article II  tested for the three hypothe se s in making use of a cross -sectional data set gath-
ered in the metropolita n areas of Ber lin and Brandenburg, Germany (N= 640), Paris and 
Île -de -France, France (N =640), Zurich and can ton of Zurich, Switze rla nd (N= 1,250), and 
London and Bucki ngha mshire, United Kingdom (N= 824). The origina l articl e is filed in 
Appen dix  A  and can be consulted for deta ile d informa tion about  sample, measures, and 
results.   
The analy sis set out with a factor analy sis , which provide d evide nce that the different con-
cepts important to the stu dy are empirica lly distinct. After this was established, multi -group 
regression analy se s were  run  in  order to test for the hypothe se s . The effect of populist atti-
tudes on the different  outcome variables was controlled against several further variabl es: 
sex, age, educa tion, politica l interest, politic a l orientation, and politic a l extremi ty.  Moreo-
ver, the model s controlle d for the fact that cases  were nested within countries by  fixing all  
slope s to the country variabl e. Only interce pts were randomly estima ted what meets the 
resea rch question aiming  to inve stiga te patterns betwee n different variabl es but not the 
extent to which populism has perva ded socie ties.  
The  results support all three  h ypothe se s. The strong er populist attitudes are, the more hos-
tile  are the media  being perce ive d and the  higher is the perce ived cong ruence betwee n own 
and public opinion. Moreove r, the study also revealed that the differenc e betwe en incon-
gruent media perc eptions  and cong ruent public opinion perce ptions increa ses with increa s-
ing populist attitudes. In all model s populist attitudes turned out to be the stro nge st predic-
tor. The findings are robu st also acro ss the country samples what spea ks for the notion of 
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populism as a politic a l belie f system. The differen t conc epts rela te to each other as was 
predic ted no matter in what polit ic a l conte xt they are surve ye d and they do so to simila r 
strong degree s.  
In an additiona l analy sis, Article II  presents  a path model that was spec ified to inve stiga te 
the extent to which populist citize ns infer public opinion from perce ive d media tone. The 
data used to estima te the model was cross -sectional and henc e, causa l interpreta tions have 
to be made  with caution. How ever, the  model specifica tion followe d prior studies in which 
the presumed direc tional ity of the projec tion effect, the hostile media effec t, and/or the 
persua sive press inferenc e was demonstra ted within experime ntal resea rch (e.g., Gunther et 
al., 2001). Again, regression slope s were constraine d while interce pts were allow ed to vary 
across countries. Table 3  displa ys the estima ted coeffic ie nts. The model replica tes  the  find-
ings with rega rd to A2 -H1 and A2 -H2 as populist attitudes are again strongl y rela ted  to 
hostile media perceptions and  cong ruent public opinion perce ptions.  Importantly, t he path 
from media perce ptions onto public opinion perceptions is far from being sig nifica nt.  
Ta b le 3 . Country -fixed effects for popu list attitu d es and media perceptions pred ictin g 
pub lic opinion perceptions.  
  β b  SE  p  
Fixed effects      
Congruent Media Perceptions    
 
Populis t Attitudes  -.35 -0.64 .03 .000 
Congruent Public Opinion Perceptions  
Populis t Attitudes  .42 0.73 .03 .000 
Congruent Media Perceptions  -.01 -0.02 .02 .447 
     
R ando m Intercepts      
Congruent Media Perceptions  
Berlin   3.37 .03  
Paris   3.51 .03  
Zürich   3.07 .02  
London   3.43 .03  
Congruent Public Opinion  Perceptions    
Berlin   3.12 .06  
Paris  
 
3.14 .07  
Zurich  
 
2.95 .06  
London  
 
3.10 .06  
No te.  N =3354. The model was estimated as a path model in R using the 
package lavaan  (Rosseel, 2012). The model fit indicators for this path 
model show an acceptable fit:  χ2=32.93, df =9, RMSEA=.056, 
SRMR=.032, CFI=.97.  
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This finding indic a tes  that if hostile media and public opinion perce ptions can be attributed 
to  populist attitudes, the persua sive press inferenc e mecha nism is indeed annulle d. That 
says, the media are no longe r acce pted as a reference rega rding the tilt of public opinion to 
those who sup port populist ideas. This can be trouble some to democ rac ie s. If a spec ific 
segment within the popula tion no longer belie ve s in the realitie s reported by the media and 
henc e rejects th e media ted clima te of opinion, societie s are in dange r to polarize (cf., Tsfati, 
2003). Although the projection of the own opinion onto public opinion was in all  previous  
studies on the topic shown to be remarka bly strong  (as this was the case in the prese nt 
study) , these studies also revealed that “perceptions of public opinion are also swayed by 
perceptions of media content” (Gunther et al., 2001, p. 314). In that sense the media have 
always been found to work as a correc tive against projec tion effects. A lso if to only little 
degrees, their reporting seems to re mind  indiv idua ls that public opinion is also influenc ed 
by opinions dive rging fro m their own. To populis t citize ns, howev er, this correc tive does 
no longer seem to play a role.  
Polariza tion can fur ther be driven, if indiv idua ls who support populi sm turned away from 
mainstrea m news to settle in opinion cong ruent information environments. Therefore, an 
inve stiga tion of populist citize ns news consumption is of high interest to this study. I will 
turn  to  such examina tions in Chapter 5. Before, I will undertak e an additiona l analy sis that 
follows a limita tion of the inve stiga tion presente d in A rticle II . 
Pop ul ist Attitud es and Genre -S pecific Media Skepticism  
Article II  comes with severa l limita tion whi ch are d iscussed in deta il within the ar ticle itsel f. 
They shall not be repea ted here. However, I have identifie d one partic ula r limita tion that 
can be overcome with an additiona l analy sis. This analy sis will not only be useful for the 
present chapter, but  it can also inform the media consumption studies which I am about to 
present in the upcoming chapter. More spec ifica lly, A rticle II did not differentia te betwee n 
different types of media when asking for indiv idual media perce ptions. Rather , media per-
ceptions were measured  in a very gene ral manne r  as th e study a sked for the partic ipa nts ’ 
opinion rega rding the media  or  the media reporting . T his approac h  is reasona ble with rega rd  to 
the present resea rch endea vor . The study aimed at inve stiga tin g the populist perce ption  of 
the media  and argued  that this perce ption is inspire d by populist identity cues according to  
which the media are being attack e d  as one entity  without much differentia tion . Moreove r, 
it was assumed that socia l psyc holog ic a l mecha nisms tied to socia l categoriza tion could 
reinforce the homoge nei ty perce ptions of this out -group. The surve y conducte d hence 
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tappe d for perce ptions of the media  in this  gene ral  way  as well . However, there are reasons 
to assume, t hat differenc es in perce ptions could occur , if the surve y differenti a ted between 
spec ific news genres. On the one hand, tabloid newspa pers and priva te TV news often 
portray themsel ve s as mouthpiec e and advoc a tes of the peopl e (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et 
a l., 2018) and with that engage in what has been termed media populism (Krämer, 2014). It 
is possible that this suit s the populist perce ption and leads to less skeptici sm rega rding this 
media genre. On the oth er hand, public servic e media and quality newspa pers are often 
direc tly associ a ted with the politic a l establishment (Mazzole ni et al., 2003) . For example, 
p ublic TV is funded “by the state” as was claimed by Gauland and Höcke in the spee ch 
cited above. It is therefor e reasona ble to assume  that populist citize ns have these genres in 
mind when they respond to an item that asks for their evalua tion of the media . In order to 
inve stiga te these ad -hoc hypothe ses  I am conduc ting the followi ng additiona l analy se s:  
I wi ll use a 2017 surve y data se t (‘2017 data ’) in which measures for both, the IPA as well 
as genre spec ific media skeptici sm can be found. Convenie ntly, this very data set was also 
used in Article III , which will be presente d in Chapter 5. Details about the surve y can thus 
be found in the respec tive paper , filed in Appendix  A . For the present matt er, I will limit 
the method report  as to the measures not introduce d anyw here else, as yet. Importantly, 
the data set has been gathered in the exact same countrie s which were investiga ted in Ar ticle 
II. However, the sampling was conduc ted on the national level and was not restric ted to 
metropolita n areas. On the one hand, this compromises the compa rabil ity with the results 
provided by Article II . On the other hand, howev er, the results that will  be presented in the 
followi ng are based on data that is more representa tive to the national popula tions in the 
inve stiga ted countrie s.  
As a first analysis, I replica ted the media perce ption model as the 2017 data set conta ined 
the very same measure for media perce ptions as the 2015 data set used in Article II . Inter-
es tingly, the results of a random -interce pt -only -model reported in Table 4  almost com-
pletely match the results reported in Article II . The b -value for  populist attitudes is -.62 
(p <.001) and was -.63 (p <.001) in the 2015 data. Of course, this is partly due to mere coin-
cidenc e but the simila rity of the result s is nonethe le ss rema rkabl e. The only differenc e in 
terms of significa nce s occurred with rega rd to polit ic a l extremi ty. Article II  suggested, that 
extreme politic a l attitudes should foster hostile media perce ptions. Surprisin gly, there was 
no effect found for politica l extremi ty in Article II . However, it is significa nt in the replica-
tion data and tends in the expec ted direc tion. This first analy sis lends confid enc e wit h re-
gard to the 2017 data set.  
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Ta b le 4. Replica tion of the media perception model of 
A rticle II with the 2017 data.  
I therefore  turn to the  more spec ific 
inve stiga tion of media genre skeptici sm. 
The 2017 surve y asked for skeptici sm 
with rega rd to severa l media genres (i.e., 
tabloid newspa pers, qua lity newspa pers, 
public TV news, private TV news, Fa-
cebook, Twitter ). The measure has been 
devel oped for that su rv ey  only . The 
introductory question  to the measure  
read as follows in the UK question-
naire : “If we now no long er talk about the 
media in genera l, but divid e them into group s 
again,  could you then tell us whether (and if 
yes, how much) you are scept ica l of  the listed 
media  when the distrib uti on of pol itica l infor-
mation is concerned?”. A  series of  single 
items  tape d for  skeptici sm towa rd the 
d ifferent media genres. The items and a 
basic descriptive report can be found in Table 5. For each item answers could be given on 
a 7 -point Likert -type scale that  ranged from 1 – I’m not at all skeptical of it to 7 – I’m very skep-
tica l of it . Partic ipa nts could also indica te, that they do not know the one or other media 
genre (8 – I don’t know it). 
I have used each item pre sente d in Table 5 as an outcome  variabl e in a serie s of random -
in terce pt -only -model s. The predic tors were kept equal to the analy sis presente d in  Article II . 
The results, reported in Table 6, are very telling. While populist attitudes are strongl y rela t-
ed to perce ivin g the media in genera l as very  hostile, interesting differenc es occur as to 
which spec ific news genre is suspec t to populist citize ns. More spec ifica lly, the results show 
that populist citize ns indi ca te skeptici sm with rega rd to quality  newspa pers ( b =.38; p <.001) 
as well as public TV news shows ( b =.39; p <.001) but not with rega rd to othe r news genres 
and neither with rega rd to Facebook and Twitter. This confirm s half of the ad hoc hypoth-
eses deline a ted above. It was also considered that populist citize ns could be less skeptica l 
rega rding the tabloid press as well as priva te TV news as these genres often act as advo-
 
Congruent Media  
Perceptions  
  b  SE  t  
Fixed effects  
   Intercept  -0.24 0.25 -0.97 
Age  0.00 0.00 0.93 
Sex (male)  0.00 0.05 -0.06 
Education (high)  -0.03 0.06 -0.59 
Political Interest  -0.05 0.02 -2.92 
Political Orientation (r.)  -0.06 0.01 -5.39 
Political Extremity  -0.12  0.02 -5.90 
Populis t Attitudes  -0.62 0.04 -15.57 
R ando m inter cepts     
Berlin  0.97   
Paris  1.07   
Zürich  1.36   
London  1.56   
R 2 adj.  .18 
N  2165 
AIC fixed effects  6368.32 
AIC random effects  6978.04 
No te.  The depended variable is coded as in Article II . 
High values indicate non -hostile perceptions, low 
values indicate hostile media perceptions.   
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cates of the people what should match populist citizens’ worldview. Such relations were 
not revea le d, whatsoev er. Rather , the respec tive effects did not turn significa nt what indi-
cates that populist as well as non -populis t citize ns are equa lly skeptica l (or equa lly un -
skeptica l) with regard to these news types.  
Ta b le 5 . Depend ent varia b les used in the test  of genre specific media skepti cism . 
Item  N  M  SD  
Commuter and/or tabloid news paper s (e.g., The Sun, Daily Mail,...)  2022 5.08 1.72 
High -quality and/or subs cr iption news papers (e.g., The Guardian, The 
Telegraph,...)  
2006 3.85 1.61 
News shows on privately  owned television channels (e.g., ITV1,...)  2087 4.41 1.65 
News shows on public televis ion channels (e.g., BBC News,...)  2116 3.81 1.72 
Facebook  1889 5.22 1.76 
Twitter  1550 5.16 1.88 
I have also tested for the populist perce ptions of Facebook and Twitter as Chapter 5 will 
look into the extent to which populist citize ns use these platforms to get politic a lly in-
formed. I will come back to the respec tive findings presente d in Table 6 when  I turn to the 
corresponding analy sis in the next Chapter.  
Taken togethe r, this additiona l analy sis showed that it does indeed make sense, to look for 
differenc es in populist citize ns media perceptions betwee n  genres. Despite the populist 
reproa ch to the media being a very genera l reproa ch, populist citize ns are partic ula rly criti-
cal with rega rd to high quality traditiona l news. It are these news genres which populist 
citizens have in mind, when they reproach ‘the media’ to lie and to conspire with the pol iti-
cal elite against the people.  
Summary  
In the present  Chapter I have inve stiga ted populist citize ns media and public opinion per-
ceptions using multi -country surve y data. The results were qu ite robust and provide d  for 
the first time in the research on populism system a tic  evidence for a strong relationship be-
tween populist attitudes and hostile media perce ptions as well as betwee n populist attitudes 
and  opinion majority beliefs  in four Western Europea n democra ci es . In addition, n o link  
was found between media perce ptions and public opinion perce ptions . This last observa-
tion stands in cont rast to findings provided by stud ie s (e.g., Gunther &  Christen, 2002) on 
the persua sive pres s infer enc e . These studies have demonstra ted  an inferenc e m echa nism 
followi ng which indiv idua ls infer public opinion from perce ive d media tone perce ptions. 
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This mecha nism was not found to work  for populi st citize n s  what indic a tes that the main-
strea m media might no longe r work as a correc tive rega rding the public o pinion perce p-
tions of populist citize ns. On the contrary, populist citize ns ’ public opinion perce ptions 
seem to be essentia lly drive n by projec tion. An expla na tion to these perce ptual patter n s 
was provided by a socia l identity approac h to populist attitude s that has as well been intro-
duce d in the present chapter . Although this appro a ch was not  put to an empirica l  test , it 
provided a number of  socia l psyc holog ica l idea s helpful  to understand the perce ptual phe-
nomena , including their underly ing dyna mics . 
The observe d rela tionship s  are cause for conc ern and deserve a comprehe nsive discussion.  
This discussion will be held in Chapter 6 against the background of all other findings  pre-
sente d within this dissertation.  However, some of the findings presente d abov e  can  inform 
the investigations of populist citizens’ media preferenc es that will be subje ct of the next 
chapter. Individua ls who distrust the mainstrea m news do not only tend to rejec t the medi-
ated clima te of opinion but they also show dist inc t media news choice s  (Fletche r &  Park, 
2017; Tsfati &  Cappel la, 2003) . The hostile media perce ptions exhibite d by citize ns with 
populist attitudes give rise to the suppo sition that this group turn s away from the main-
strea m and towa rd alterna tive news so urce s  to get politic a lly informed. The  additiona l anal-
ysis conduc ted above provide d insigh t into what media genres in partic ular populist  citi-
zens are skeptica l about to wit, public TV  news as well as quality newspa pers. Against this 
background it is reaso nable to assume, that populist citize ns essentia lly avoid these hard 
news outlets. Chapter 5 is devoted to an inve stiga tion of this question and I will pick up the 
insigh ts revea le d in Chapter 4 when deducing respectiv e hypotheses.  
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Ta b le 6 . Fixed and random effects for popu list attitu d es on media genre s kepticism.  
 
 
T abloid Press  Quality Press  Private TV  news  Public TV  news  Facebook  Twitter  
  b  SE  t  b  SE  t  b  SE  t  b  SE  t  b  SE  t  b  SE  t  
Fixed effects  
      
            
Intercept  4.60 0.40 11.56 2.84  0.34 8.40 3.91 0.29 13.54 2.00 0.37 5.42 4.78 0.33 14.56 4.48  0.39 11.37 
Age  0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 -1.31 0.00 0.00 -1.24 0.01 0.00 2.07 0.01 0.00 2.26 
Sex (male)  -0.08 0.07 -1.10 -0.24  0.07 -3.46 -0.11 0.07 -1.45 -0.05 0.07 -0.63 -0.10 0.08 -1.24 -0.07 0.10 -0.77 
Education (high)  0.20 0.08 2.41 -0.10 0.08 -1.23 0.20 0.08 2.42 0.12 0.08 1.50 0.06 0.09 0.63 0.13 0.11 1.20 
Political Interest  0.16 0.03 6.24 -0.05 0.02 -2.18 0.07 0.02 2.92 0.00 0.03 -0.08 0.15 0.03 5.36 0.13 0.03 3.96 
Political Orientation (r.)  -0.04 0.02 -2.59 0.03 0.02 2.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.50 0.09 0.02 5.65 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.05 
Political Extremity  0.08 0.03 2.90 0.05 0.03 1.71 0.08 0.03 2.88 0.05 0.03 1.71 0.02 0.03 0.65 0.04 0.04 1.13 
Populis t Attitudes  -0.06 0.06 -1.15 0.38 0.05 7.16 0.08 0.06 1.51 0.39 0.05 7.18 -0.11 0.06 -1.83 -0.07 0.07 -0.99 
R ando m inter cepts                    
Berlin  4.53   2.55   3.91   1.65   4.82   4.61   
Paris  5.20   2.58   3.91   1.57   4.90   4.68   
Zürich  3.90   2.85   3.91   2.31   4.59   4.17   
London  4.76   3.37   3.91   2.48   4.79   4.45   
R 2 adj.  .13 .10 .02 .12 .04 .04 
N  2002 2006 2087 2116 1889 1889 
AIC fixed effects  7747.14 7485.16 8034.29 8132.16 7482.27 6364.96 
AIC random effects  7746.84 7493.33 8033.11 8129.45 7480.31 6368.32 
No te.  Effects signif icant at p < .05 are in boldf ace. AIC fixed is the AIC for models in which only inter cepts were randomly estimated. AIC random is the AIC for models in 
which intercepts as well as slopes for populist attitudes were randomly estimated. The r andom intercepts repor ted for the Private TV  news  model are diff er ent from each 
other but only after the tenth decimal place.  
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Chapt er 5: Populist Citizens’ News Pr efe r e nc es  
The inve stiga tion of indiv idua l media use and media diets has become partic ula rly releva nt 
in today’s digital times. These times are cha rac terized  by high -choice media environments 
in which indiv iduals can  theoretica lly  seek out the conte nt that suits thei r needs and own 
interests best. It i s a com monly held fear that such news selec tion leads to the radic a liza tion  
of indiv idua l view s and to pola rize d news audienc es on the aggreg a te level (K. Jamieson & 
Cappel la, 2010; Stroud, 2011; Sunstein, 2002). This chapter presents consid era tions and 
severa l empirica l investiga tions of news audienc e pola riza tion along populist attitudes. 
Should populist attitudes be found to consistently relate to the use of spec ific news genres, 
evide nce for a  pola riza tion alon g this politic a l attitude would be  established. Moreove r, a 
beha viora l component of the populist belie f system would be  identifie d . 
The chapter refers to Article III  and Article IV  of this cumula tive dissertation that inve sti-
gated populist attitudes as a predic tor for the use of different kind s of news providers. 
However, the artic le s did not put much empha siz e on the socia l identity approac h to popu-
list attitudes that is appli ed in this synopsis . Rather, the respec tive theoretica l considera-
tions focus on insigh ts coming right out of the resea rch on selectiv e exposure . The  theoret-
ical outline presente d in the followi ng w ill therefore devia te to some extent from what was 
discussed in the artic le s themsel ve s. More spec ifica lly, I will link the socia l identity  ap-
proac h to populist attitud es to the selec tive exposure approac h in order to deduc e hypoth-
eses with rega rd to populist citize ns news s elec tion patterns. Moreove r,  some of the hy-
potheses tested within the artic le s (espec ia lly Article IV ) are of no releva n ce to the present 
resea rch question. I will therefore limit the summary to information that can offer a re-
sponse to that question: How are populist attitudes rela ted to news choice in different 
countries?  The inve stiga tion of rela tionships betwee n populist  attitudes and news media 
preferenc es shall offer insi ghts rega rding media rela ted behaviora l inclina tions as part of the 
populist belie f system.  
The conventiona l  selec tive exposure approac h suggests that indiv idua ls selec tively ap-
proac h  information that is in line with own view s and selec tively avoid content that chal-
lenge s the own opinion  (Festing er, 1957) . Although the selec tive exposure literature  mean-
while  strongl y critic iz es this classic a l distinction  of selec tive approach and selec tive avoid-
ance (e.g., Garrett, 2009b; Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Gentzk ow & Shapiro, 2011; McGuire, 
1968), it still offers a usef ul structure through the fast amount of litera ture on the topic. I 
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w ill therefore divide this chapter followi ng these two facets  of selec tive exp osure and spea k 
about selec tive approac h to opinion cong ruent content by populist citize ns first, followe d 
by considera tions rega rding populist citize ns behavior vis -a -vis  opinion in -congruent con-
tent. Before, howev er, I will spea k in all brevity about the  applic a bility  of the socia l identity 
perspec tive to selec tive exposure  resea rch . 
Selec tive Exposure as a Produc t  of Social Identi ty  
The “theory of selective exposure” (Stroud, 2017, p. 1) has been of grea t importanc e to 
communic a tion science  ever since the conc ept  appea red first in Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet’s influential study on “ t he people’s choice” (1948). According to its traditiona l 
claim  (cf., Festing er, 1957)  individua ls purposefully selec t messa ge s that are in line with 
their belie fs and c onvictions. A serie s of psyc hologi ca l expla na tions for why indiv idua ls 
seem to gravita te towa rd like -minde d information have been put forwa rd in the litera ture. 
The role of socia l identity for selec tive exposure , howev er , has not often bee n looke d at  in 
pr evious resea rch . A coupl e of studies have inve stiga ted  socia l identity as a driver  for expo-
sure to non -politic a l media conte nt  (Harwood, 1999; Knobloc h -Westerw ic k & Alter, 2007; 
Knobloc h -Westerw ic k & Hastall, 2010; Mastro, 2003) . Only rece ntly, also exposu re to in-
formation about politic s has been examined as a product  of socia l identity  by two studies  
(Long, Eveland, & Slater, 2018; Wojciesza k & Garrett, 2018) . These two studies acc ord 
with each other in the observa tion t hat the socia l identity perspec tive  can be  partic ula rly 
meaning ful for selec tive exposure resea rch in times in which “intergroup animosities have 
reached troubling levels” (Wojciesza k &  Garrett, 2018, p. 247) and in which  “communica-
tion technologies […] could lead to an increasingly fragmented and adversarial society” 
(Long et al., 2018, p.2). However, as also pointed out by Long et al.  (2018), many  previous  
selec tive exposure studies have inve stiga ted partisanship as a driver to news choice . Ac-
cording to psyc hometric studies and resea rch on partisa nship, common measures of parti-
sanship arguab ly tap  into in -group identific a tion as well (Huddy, Mason, & Aaroe, 2015; 
Iyenga r, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012) . Hence,  it is not unrea sona ble to read studies on partisa n 
selec tive exposure in the light of the socia l identity perspec tive  also if respec tive conc epts 
and expla na tion s  have not been explic itly consulted (e.g., Garrett &  Stroud, 2014; Iyenga r 
& Hahn, 2009). 
Indeed, there is little que stion to the  genera l assu mption put forwa rd by all these studi e s : 
Politic a lly motiva ted selective exposure  is  a product of either attitudes, parti sa nship  or in -
group identific a tion . What is less clea r and still discussed are the conditions under which 
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sel ec tivity occurs (Garre tt, 2013). With respec t to this question, the socia l identity perspec-
tive can  be  partic ula rly informative to selec tive exposure resea rch as it offers comprehe n-
sive  expla na tions for exposure decisions and int ro duce s new modera tors and media tors 
that h ave not yet been taken into considera tion by selec tive exposure studies that ap-
proac hed the pheno menon  from other theoretica l angles . For example, Long et al.  (2018) 
argue that selec tive exposure to partisa n media is driven by externa l threats to the own 
ident ity. Wojcie sza k and Garrett  (2018) reason that because identity salie nce motiva tes so-
cial compa risons (cf., Tajfel &  Turner, 1979) identity salie nce should also trigge r exposure 
to information that can help the indiv idua l to positive ly distinguish the in -group from out -
groups . Group statu s, the permea bili ty of group bounda ries , perce ive d in - and out -group 
homoge nei ty , or, notably, spec ific cues set by group leaders  represent other factors that 
could play a role. Most intrigui n g, a soci a l identity approac h to selec tive exposure can help 
to refine hypothe se s about approac h and avoida nce tende ncie s as it takes group spec ifici-
ties  into account . In a group conflic t, assumptions about a  partic ula r group ’s information 
preferenc e s  can differ fro m the assumption s rega rding the information prefe rence s of the 
opposing group  depending on each group’s specific characteristics and not only depe nding 
on the streng th of identifi ca tion . 
In the followi ng,  I will d evel op hypothese s rega rding populist citiz ens ’ news preferenc es. In 
line with the argument presente d above , I argue that the news diet of populist citize ns 
should differ from the news diet of non -populist citize ns as the group of the populist peo-
ple  is different in many respec ts as c ompa red to the group of those not supporting the 
populist ideolog y. Mainly, I will argue that populist citize ns are like ly to prefer spec ific 
news genres over others for the same socia l psyc holog ic a l reasons that let them trust and 
distrust these genres. Essentia lly , news media that are define d as supportive to the  in -group 
should be approac hed  and news  media that are labeled as the out -group shoul d be avoide d . 
Approach to In -Group Sources  
I will start with consider a tions as to the exposu re to conte nt that promi ses to be in line 
with the own worldview , that is, conte nt that is kin dly disposed to the in -gro up . Research 
on selec tive exposure has established the approac h to opinion cong ruent conte nt as a very 
stabl e and remarka ble strong huma n tende ncy. D ifferent psyc holog ic a l notions are consid-
ered  in the litera ture  to expla in for this pheno menon (for a revie w see Stroud, 2017 ). In his 
early account, Festing er (1957) argued that the desire to avoid cognitive discomfort can 
expla in both, a gen eral preferenc e for attitude -consistent information and an aversion of 
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counte rattitudina l conte nt. Another approac h  explain s  the turn towa rd like -minded conte nt 
arguing that cong enia l informa tion is easie r to process  and therefore attrac tive for cognitive 
misers  what also  expla ins the avoida nce of opinion challe nging conte nt (Ziemke, 1980). It 
has also been argued that like -minde d information is perce ive d as more credible as com-
pared to attitude -inconsis tent conte nt and therefor e preferred (Fische r, Schulz -Hardt, & 
Frey, 2008).  
The socia l identi ty approac h chosen in this thesi s proposes the followi ng rational e : Populist 
citize ns should be inclined to approac h news genres that promise sympa thy with rega rd to 
their in -group. From what  media outlets or genres such sympa thy can be expe cte d is ac-
cording to the applie d socia l identity approac h not so much a question of own experie nce 
but rather define d by cues diffused by group leaders. As discu ssed by resea rch on selec tive 
exposure these cues can indeed be considered as guiding news selection: “[P]olitical elites 
ca n exacerba te selectiv e exposure. Their cues direct citize ns about which media outlets to 
use and which to avoid ” (Stroud, 2017, p. 12). In the populist case, the elite cue on me dia 
bias is mainly given by the populist leader who , in doing so,  continue s to cons true the pop-
ulist belie f system.  
In Chapter 4  I have argued that the populist reproach against the media is of very gene ral 
kind . All established media are rejecte d with no room for exce ption. Hence, a  first analy sis 
set out to investigate populist attitudes in relation to perceptions of ‘the media’ without 
differentia ting betwee n s pec ific outlets or even genres to find that populi st citiz ens exhibit 
strong hostile media perceptions. Against this backgro und, it could be expected that sup-
port to populism leads to a genera l avoida nce of mainstrea m news  as they might all be rec-
ognize d as enemies  or out -group  to the in -group of the peop le . However, an additiona l 
analy sis  presente d in Chapter 4 examined media genre skeptici sm and indica ted that popu-
list citize ns mainly have  public servic e TV news as well as the quality press segment  in 
mind, when they judge the media a s reporting hostile against  the own view . In contrast to 
that, n o pronounce d skeptici sm was exhibit with rega rd to tabloid newspapers as well as 
priva te TV news , neither on the low nor on the high end of the populist attitude continu-
um. This  result was found , although  also these outlets arguab ly count as mainstrea m or 
established news  providers.   
These findings rega rding the differences in populist citizens’ media genre perceptions de-
mand a discussion of what could be different for tabloid newspa pers and priva te  TV  news  
as these differenc es potential ly influence how  populist citize ns approac h these genres.  It 
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coul d be assumed, that the populist anti -media cue is not as broad and genera l as was sug-
gested first in this thesis. This would mean, that populist politic ia ns spea k p ositive ly about 
tabloid newspa pers and private TV  news , while only their cues regarding the quality press 
and  public TV news are negative. Unfortunatel y, a systema tic analy sis on populist politi-
cians ’ attitudes towa rd speci fic media genres is missi ng. Assumptions can only be informed 
by anecdota l evide nce . For example, the  German AfD has a diffic ult relationship to the 
tabloid Bild Zeitun g  a s this newspa per has always been critic a l of the right -wing populist 
PEGIDA 12 movement as well as of right -wing pol i tica l actors in genera l (Kemper, 2016; 
Mudde, 2007, p. 249). This has led AfD party members so spea k critic a lly about the outlet.  
For example, the party’s former leader Frauke Pet ry state d in a TV interview  in 2017 that  
not all artic le s published by the tabloid support  the AfD and that  much of its  reporting is 
undifferentia ted . In that same interview Petry evalua te d  the reporting of the magazi ne Der 
Spiegel  as depe nding on the  journal ist writing  for the magazi ne (Lamby, 2017). With that, 
the politic ia n presents  a rather ambiva le nt position towa rd this news bran d . If anything, 
such cues should lead populist followe rs to distrus t and hence, turn away from the tabloid 
newspa per Bild Zeitun g  as it is identifie d as an out -group membe r  by popul ist leaders . 
T he litera ture on media bias perce ptions suggests that cues as to what media peopl e can 
trust  and not trust  and hence, like ly use or avoid, can also be diffused by the media them-
selve s (Watts et al., 1999). Accordingl y, anti -media cues do not have to  stem from populist 
politic ia ns but can also be provided by journal ists. In this respec t, communica tion science 
h as discussed and investiga ted a pheno menon termed m edia popul ism . Media populism is 
defined as “ the use of the  above mentione d styli stic and ideolog ica l  eleme nts by some me-
dia, viz. the construction and favoritism of in -grou ps, hostility  towa rd, and circumve ntion 
of the elites and institutions of representa tive democra cy,  relia nce on charisma and (group -
rela ted) co mmonsense, and appea l to moral  sentiments (thus on an emotiona liz ing, person-
aliz ing, and ostenta tiously plainspoke n  discourse) ” (Krämer, 2014, p. 48). The notion of 
m edia populism suggests that also news outlets can be entreprene urs of the populist identi-
ty.  Most interesting for the conte xt of the present study, r ecent empirica l  studies have 
found that espec ia lly tabloid newspa pers portray the peopl e positive ly and the politic a l elite 
negatively (Hamelee rs, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017c; Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018). 
However, no study has thus far identifie d , if tabloid news outlets are also part ic ula rly criti-
cal with regard to other media  outlets . 
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Nonethe le ss, in positionin g themsel ve s as the mout hpie ce of the peopl e, tabloid news out-
lets should in the eyes of populist citize ns qualify as close to the in -group, or even, as 
membe rs of the in -group. This could expla in the low skeptici sm exhibited towa rd these 
media by high identifyi ng indiv idua ls . This could also indic a te, that populist citize ns selec-
tivel y approac h this media genre  to stronge r degrees as compa red to their non -populist 
counte rparts  because it promises like -minde d conte nt . No conte nt an aly sis has thus far 
examined levels of media populism for TV news outlets. However, on many other dimen-
sions the reporting by tabloid media was found to be simila r to the reporting of priva te TV 
news  (Reinema nn, Stanyer, & Scherr, 2016) . Against this backg round, it is reasona ble  to 
assume that populist citizens also show a preference for news aired on public TV channels.  
The socia l identity approac h applied here therefore posits the followi ng t w o hypothe ses , 
which were tested in the studies presente d by Art icle III: 
A3 -H1a: Popul ist atti tud es are positively asso cia ted with tabloid newspa p er use.  
A3 -H1b: Popul ist atti tud es are positively asso cia ted with comm ercia l TV news use.  
M uch more explic it  in comparison to tabloid news, spec ific news providers  that can pri-
marily be found online appea r to te am up with populist politic ia ns, partie s , and move-
ments . Among those that shall be focused on within the present thesis are anti -elitist alter-
native media as well as the socia l network site Facebook.  
T he lite rature on alterna tive media is compa rably rich (Atton, 2006). However, a common 
definition for the concept is still missing  as it is trea ted differently almost by publica tion  
(Haller & Holt, 2018). Much of the resea rch on the topic has focused on alterna ti ve news 
outlets that are potentia lly functiona l for democ rac ie s , for example, in suppo rting protest s 
and resistanc e movement s against undemoc ratic regime s  (e.g., Leung & Lee, 2014). Other 
studies focus on alterna ti ve media that might be rather dysfunctiona l  to  libe ral  democ ra-
cies, for example, in promoting right -wing  and exclusionist ideolog ie s  (Hellmue lle r & Re-
vers, 2017). The latter perspec tive on alterna tive media is releva nt in  the conte xt of the 
present thesis.  I focus on one spec ific featu re shared by many brands that are often label ed  
as partisa n alterna tive media , that is, a systema tic opposition to the politic al and media es-
tablishment  (cf., Baile y, Cammae rt, & Carpentier, 2007; Newman, et al. , 2018). For exam-
ple, i n the  self -under standi ngs that these outlets present many  decla re  the devel opment of a 
counte r -public to the mainstrea m politic a l discours e presente d withi n the established news 
media  as part of their central mission (cf., Bachl, 2018; Schwei ge r, 2017). In the moment in 
which  such outlets position themsel ve s as anti -establishment  they share a significa nt  part of 
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the populist worldview. P otentia lly , these outlets can become assistants to populist leader s  
in that they help them to sprea d their views  further . What is more, these outlets might help 
to construe the in -group and demonize the out -group on their very own accounts . It is 
reasona ble to assume, that alterna tive media  with such affinity for populism can function as 
a referenc e to populist citize ns when it come s to the spec ifica tion of in -gro up and inter -
group attitudes and behavior.  
For two reasons, populi s t citize ns should be likel y to approac h these news providers from a 
socia l identity perspec tive. Fi rst, in sharing a populist worldview, these outlets provide 
sympa thy to the in -group and promise a consonant information environment to in -group 
membe rs of the peopl e. Second, should these outlets be recog niz ed as group prototype s, 
in -group membe rs shoul d have high interest in turning towa rd them to learn about in -
group adequa te thinking and beha vior. This could be partic ula rly important for the evalua-
tion of compl ex politica l affairs. In any case, t o citiz en supporters of populi sm  these two 
features  could qualify these  alterna tive news  outlets as close to the populist in -group what 
should in turn, make the selec tive approac h to ward  these outle ts more like ly.  
A4 -H1: Popul ist atti tud es will predict frequ ent exposure to anti -elitist alterna tive media.  
As a s pec ific platform,  Facebook has been a focus of inve stiga tions focu sing on news pro-
vide rs sympa thetic to ward  the populist ideas  (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). In-
deed, the platform has been identifie d as a host to a plethora of populist partisa n p age s. 
For example, m erely for the German case Bachl (2018) has identifie d 7911 Facebook pag-
es, which could be led back to the core AfD Facebook pag e via snowball network sam-
pling . Also conte nt analytic a l work has shown, that populist conte nt is particula rl y  preva-
lent on Facebook (Ernst et al., 2017). While like ly not  the whole platform will be recog-
nized as an in -group entity, populist citizens can be expec ted to prefer access to politic al 
inf orma tion via this platfo rm as it hosts  many refere nce groups that  are positive ly disposed 
towa rd the populist worldvie w. Moreove r, these page s present many reference s to tradi-
tional and alterna tive media that  can function as cues as to which  media are trustworthy 
and which are not  (Haller &  Holt, 2018). A s  also the additiona l analy sis provided in Chap-
ter 4 indic a ted that populist citize ns are tangentia lly less skeptica l towa rd Facebook as a 
provider for politic a l information, I assume in this thesi s  that populist citizens should be 
incline d to approac h Face book to get informed about daily politica l affairs.  
A3 -H3a: Popul ist atti tud es are positively asso cia ted with using Facebook for politica l  infor m a tion.  
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Avoidance of Out -Grou p Sources  
According to the socia l identity approac h applied in this thesis  elite cues on media bias 
inform the populist citize n  about which  media to use and which media to a void. While the 
populist position with rega rd to tabloid media and priva te TV is rather ambiva le nt as out-
line d above , populist partie s and their representa ti ve s are outspoke nly critica l and hostile 
when it come s to public servic e media and quality newspa pers. Especia lly public servic e 
media are often displa yed  as partners of the politica l elite and henc e explici tly identifie d as 
part of the out -group. With rega rd to public TV news this can mainly be expla ine d by the 
fact that these brands  are public ly funded. Though different system s persi st, most often it 
is f ede ral  law that force s citize ns to support public br oadca sting in various countries. Ac-
cording to a common populist reproa ch, this directly ties respec tive news outlets to the 
politic a l establishment and causes them to report positive ly  about the rulin g el ite. In their 
party manifesto the German AfD has hence explic itly positione d itsel f as critic a l of the 
public TV news servic es (Alterna tive für Deutschla nd, 2016) . This position was carrie d 
much further in Switze rland , where the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) la unche d an initia tive to 
stop public funding of the public service broadca sting i n 2017 (Scherrer, 2018). Also theory 
suggests that – according to the populist narra tive – public TV news and quality newspa-
pers are associ a ted much more with the politic a l e lite as are tabloid media: “[T]hey tend to 
a dopt a law -and -order attitude and to use their journal istic weapons for the defense of the 
statu s quo  when it come s under attack from anti -establishment force s, such as prote st 
groups and populist movements” (Maz zol eni, 2008, p. 51). 
The additiona l analy sis provided in Chapter 4 indica ted that populist citize ns are very skep-
tica l when it come s to public servic e news as well as to established quality newspa pers.  
Here I argue that this per ce ption is like ly  informed by such identity cues  spre a d by populist 
leaders . I further assume, that this leads populist citize ns to turn away from respec tive 
source s  as they should be considered as an out -group from which indiv idua ls need to keep 
away . Article III  provides  the tests of two avoida nce hypothe se s . One posits an avoida nce 
of quality newspa pers and another one posits an avoida nce of public TV news in the c ase 
of strong popul is t attitudes.  
A3 -H2a:  Popul ist atti tud es are negatively associa ted with quality newsp a p e r use.  
A3 -H2b:  Popul ist atti tud es are negatively associa ted with public TV news use.  
To close the theoretica l conside rations I would like to return to the resea rch question that 
shall be tackle d within the present chapter. In light of the cur rent public an d schol a rly de-
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ba te on news audienc e and societa l pola riza tion, it was suggested that spec ific news prefer-
ences by populist citizens could foster  such pola rizat ion along the populist attitude  contin-
uum. Against this background it was thus asked how populist attitudes are rela ted to news 
choice in different countries? (RQ 3) I reache d out to the socia l identity perspec tive as well 
as to insigh t s provided by the litera ture on selec tive expos ure to derive spec ific hypoth ese s 
rega rding the news genre preferenc es of  populist citiz ens. Howeve r, as this was the case for 
all other resea rch questi on s , also thi s questio n dema nds compa rative analyses . Distinct 
populist media diets discov ered across countries would argue in favor of the  socia l psyc ho-
logic a l reasoning applie d in this theses.  
Article III  tested for the hypothe ses  A3 -H1a (tabloid use), A3 -H1b  (priva te TV news use), 
A3 -H 2a  (quality newspa per use), A3 -H2b (public TV news use), A3 -H3a (Facebook use) . 
A rticle IV  tested for the hypothe sis A4 -H1 (alterna tive media use).  
Res ults Article III  
In order to explore the hypothe ses  two  multi -nationa l cross -sectional surve y  studies were 
conduc ted. As the measureme nts  for the conc eptua l variabl es important  to  the hypothe ses  
were almost identica l in both studies, the one surve y function e d  as a conc eptua l replic a tion 
of the other. The first surve y was conducte d online in 11 countries  in spring 2015 : Austria,  
Bulga ria, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Nethe rlands, Poland , Swede n, Switze r-
land (German and the French spea king part), and the United States.  In each country ap-
proxima tely 1000 cases were collecte d  (N=10570). Two years later, the surve y was repea ted 
in 4 countries that had also been part of  the first surve y. Approxima tely 500 cases were 
gathered in each, Fra nce, Germany, Switze rland and United Kingdom  (N=2197). Also this 
surve y was conduc ted online  and in spring 2017. Article III , filed in Appendi x  A , discl oses 
deta ile d information about  the  sample s , the  measures, and the re sults and further , it tests 
hypothe ses  that were not reca pitula ted above . In the followi ng  I will summariz e  the results 
provided by Article III  regard ing the hypothese s derive d within this synopsis . 
The media use measureme nt was very extensive in both surve ys . A list -freque ncy techni que 
was employe d what offered different possibil ities to opera tional iz e news genre use. Two 
different approac hes  were followe d in the analyses . First, a freque ncy score was compute d 
tha t conta ine d information rega rding the mean frequenc y of contact an indiv idua l had with 
each genre during a week . Second, a sum score was compute d that reflecte d  information 
rega rding how many outlets of the same genre an indiv idua l had claimed  to use dur in g a 
week. With two data sets , four traditiona l news genres (tabloid press, private TV, quality 
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press and public TV),  and two different opera tiona liz a tions, 16 models were spec ified  to 
test for A3 -H1a, A3 -H1b, A3 -H2a and A3 -H2b. In contrast to that, I had t o rely on one 
model only to test for populist citize ns exposure to Facebook as Facebook use was only 
tappe d for in the second surve y, yet not in the first . All models were multi -group regression 
model s with varying interce pts and fixed slope s  and they were  all controlled for the same 
variabl es: sex, age, educa tion, need for cognition, politic a l interest, politica l orienta tion, and 
media skeptici sm . In both surve ys, populist attitudes were measured using the IPA.  D e-
pendi ng on the level of the depe nded variabl e, the type of regres sion was different. The 
mean freque ncy scores demand ed linea r regressions, the sum scores calle d for zero -infla ted 
poison regression s and as Facebook use for politic a l informati on was measured dichoto-
mously, a logistic regres si o n was perfo rmed as well. As the number of analy se s is  so high 
and as the docume ntation of the resul ts is partia lly hidde n  in  the online appendix  of Article 
III, I chose to s ummariz e the results in Table 7 and Table 8  for  this synopsi s.  
Hypothe se s A3 -H1a a nd A3 -H1b posited an approa ch tendenc y towa rd tabloid newspa-
pers and priva te TV news for increa sing  populist attitudes. T hese hypothe se s rece ive sup-
port rega rding both genres, across both data sets, and both opera tional iz a tions for  the de-
pende nt  variable . With increa sing populist attitudes, the mean freque ncy of exposure to 
tabloid newspa pers and priva te  TV news increa ses and so does the sum of approac hed 
outlets belongi ng to these two categorie s. This analy sis was reple nished by an additional 
analy sis in w hich  the slope s for populi st attitudes were free d from the coun try -constrain t . 
Regarding priva te TV news use, t he results of this analy sis parall el the findings provided by 
the estimation of the rand om -interce pt -only -model s. Moreov er, in all cases the BIC (Bayes-
ian Information Criterio n) value was smalle r for the random -interce pt -only -model s as 
compa red to th e random -interce pt -random -slope -model. This indic a tes that the approach 
tende ncy toward priva te  TV news found for increa sing populist attitudes is robu st across 
countries. However, r egarding tabloid newspa pers differenc es occurred that qualify the 
results reported first. In the 2015 survey data set the BIC value for th e random -interce pt -
random -slope -model was smalle r as compa red to the BIC val ue of the r andom -interce pt -
only -model. This indic a tes that the rela tionship  betwee n populist attitudes and the freque n-
cy of tabloid newspa per use varies acros s  countrie s. A look at the country spec ific slope s 
for the ran dom -effects -model revea le d the expec ted positiv e effects in Austria,  Bulga ria, 
United Kingdom , Nethe rla nds, Swede n, and Switzerland . However, c ontra ry to what was 
hypothe siz ed, tabloid newspa pers  were used less freque ntly during the week the higher 
someone’s populist attitudes were in Italy ( b = -.38), the US (b = -.33), Poland (b = -.30), 
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France ( b = -.21), andGerma ny ( b = -.13). T he signiﬁcant positive rel a tionship betwee n 
populist atti tudes and the mean freque ncy of weekly tabloid news use that was found via 
the estimation of ﬁxed-e ﬀec ts is henc e,  not  robust across countries . 
Ta b le 7. Summa rized results of 8 multi -group regression models on the sum of approa ched outl ets per genre.  
 sum of selec ted outlets per news media type  
  t abloid press  p rivate TV  q uality press  p ublic TV  
sex (male)  no  no  no  no  
age  no  no  no  more  
educ a tion (high)  no  less  more  no  
need for cognition  no  no  no  no  
politic a l intere st  more  more  more  more  
pol. orientation (r.)  no  more  no  no  
media perce ptions  no  no  no  less  
populist attitudes  more  more  less  no  
test for A3 -… H1a  H1b  H2a  H2b  
Note.  Results stem from two survey data sets (2015 and 2017). A ‘no’ indicates that across 
both data sets either no significa nce occurred or only one surve y provided a significa nt 
result; ‘more’ indicates that a positive significant effect was found in both data sets; ‘less’ 
indic a tes that a nega tive signi fica nt effec t was found in both data sets.  
 
Table 8 . Summa rized results of 8 multi -group regression models on the mean frequen cy of conta ct with 
different news genres.  
 mean freque ncy of selected outlets per news media type  
  t abloid press  p rivate TV  q uality press  p ublic TV  
sex (male)  no  no  no  no  
age  no  more  more  more  
educ a tion (high)  no  less  no  no  
need for cognition  no  no  more  no  
politic a l intere st  more  more  more  more  
pol. orienta tion (r.)  more  more  no  no  
media perce ptions  no  no  no  less  
populist attitudes  more  more  no  no  
test for A3 -… H1a  H1b  H2a  H2b  
Note.  ‘no’ indicates that across both data sets either no significance occurred or only one 
survey provided a significant result; ‘more’ indicates that a positive significant effect was 
found in both data sets; ‘less’ indicates that a negative significant effec t was found in both 
data sets.  
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The assumptions rega rding an avoida nce of public servic e news and quality newspa pers by 
populist citize ns (A3 -H2a, A3-H2b) were not supported by the a naly ses. As reported in 
Tables 7 and 8 , anega tive rela tionship between populist attitudes and one of these news 
genres was only found for the sum of selec ted quality newspa pers. This find ing was con-
sistent in both data set s, howev er, it was not parall el ed by the second opera tional iz a tion, 
that i s, the mean freque ncy of quality newspa per use .  
At last, a  multi -group logistic regression tested  for the  posited positive rela tion betwee n 
populist attitudes  and the use of Facebook ( A3 -H3a). The results supporte d the assump-
tion. The like lihood to usi ng the socia l network platform Facebook as a means for politic a l 
information increa ses wit h increa sing populist attit udes. This result was also robust across 
countries as an estima tion of random effec ts for po pulist attitudes revea le d . 
Res ults Article IV  
The assumption that  populist citize ns ’ a re more incline d to use alterna tive media compa red 
to those not supporting populism (A4-H1) was test ed within Arti cle IV . The a rtic le had the 
objectiv e to examine predic tors to occasiona l and freque nt alterna tive news use. Populi st 
attitudes were among the predic tors that were assumed to rela te to frequent rather than 
occasiona l alterna tive news exposure.  The hypothe sis was inve stiga ted using a single coun-
try  surve y  study conduc ted online in Germany in the run -up to the federa l elec tion in Sep-
tembe r, 2017  (N=1346). The origina l artic le discl osed deta ile d  infor mation about the sam-
ple, measures , results, and further analy ses  (Appendi x  A ).   
The followi ng proce dure was followe d to compute the depe ndent variable. Twelve  alterna-
tive news outlets were included in the surve y that proved to be rela tive ly well -known 
among partic ipa nts of a pilot study  run in April 2017: Epoch Times, RT Deutsch, Junge Freiheit, 
Sputn ik, Tichys Einblick, Politica lly Incorrect, Compact, Infowars, Sezession, KenFM, Kopp Report, 
a nd  Breitb a rt . Depending on how often individuals’ indicated to use these brands, they were 
a ssign ed a score of 0 (non -users), 1 (occasiona l  users), or 2 (freque nt users) on  the depe nd-
ent variable. A multinomial logistic regression analysis was used for the categorica l depend-
ent variabl e using the gro up of non -users as the referenc e category. The model was con-
trolle d for severa l psyc hologi ca l, media use and demographi c varia b le s: AfD vote probabil-
ity, politic a l extremi sm , politic a l orienta tion, politica l interest, relative depriva tion,  the use 
of tabloid newspa pers, quality newspa pers, private TV news, public TV news, Facebook 
use, Twitter use, age, sex and educ a tion.  
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Results support the hypothe sis. The like lihood to be a freque nt alterna tive media user 
compa red to a  non -user of alterna tive news outlets increa ses with increa sing populist atti-
tudes  (b =.24, p < .05). In addition also the probabil ity to vote for the German p opulist party 
AfD positive ly rela ted to being a freque nt user of AMP ( b =.57, p <.001). No significa nt
effect for populist attitudes was found with regard to the contrast of non -users  versus  oc-
casiona l  users . This findi ng indic a tes compa rably strong approac h  tende nci es by populist 
citize ns with regard to partisa n media in Germany . 
Summary  
Chapter 5 presente d theor etic a l considera tions and finding s rega rding the news preferenc es 
of citize ns with populist attitudes. Applying the  socia l identity approac h to populist atti-
tudes, it was assumed that populist indiv idua ls pref er tabloid newspa pers and priva te TV 
news as well as Facebook and anti -elitist alterna tive news media to get politically informed. 
Moreove r, it was argued that po pulist citize ns could tend to avoid public TV news and 
quality newspa pers as those are categ orize d as out -group membe rs to the peopl e within 
populist identity framing. The presente d  analyses based on multi - and single -country surve y 
data partia lly confirm e d  the assumptions. As was expec ted, populist citizens show ap-
proac h tende nci es towa rd tabloid newspa pers, private TV news as well as Facebook and 
alterna tive news media when searching for inform a tion about politic s . However, the anal-
ys e s  did not provide ev ide nce for a systema tic  avoida nce tende ncy rega rding  quality news-
papers and public TV news although  these news genres are  often reproa ched by populist 
leaders as the enemy of the people, system media, or liars press and despite this dissertation 
found popu list attitudes to rela te to high level s of sceptici sm rega rding these news genres. 
This paradox as well as all other findings presente d in this dissertation deserve an extensive 
discussion  that will be presente d in Chapter 6. 
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C hapt er 6 : Main Fin di ng s, Discu ss ion  & Contr ibuti o ns  
This disse rta tion provide d various theoretica l and empirica l  investiga tions that aimed to 
respond to the question of how the populist ideol ogy as well as its spec ific relationship to 
the news media are reflected on the citize n le vel. This main question was divide d up into 
three more spec ific resea rch questions. The first resea rch question (RQ1) asked for a 
measureme nt for populist attitudes that can be applied to compa ra tive surve y resea rch. The 
second resea rch question (RQ 2) ask ed for micro level rela tionships betwee n populist atti-
tudes, media perceptions and public opinion perceptions in different countries. The third 
resea rch question (RQ 3) asked for rela tionships betwee n populist attitudes and news pref-
erenc es in different co un trie s. This chapter has three objectiv es . First, I summarize the 
main findings provided by this dissertation and evalua te, in how far the results help to re-
spond to the  resea rch questions. Second , the sum mary of findings will be enric hed by an 
extensive discussion of their societa l implic a tions what will include possible direc tions for 
future resea rch. And third, I will record all theoretica l and empirical contributions provided 
by this dissertation.  
Summary  and Disc uss ion of Main Findings  
The thesis started out wit h an  introduction to popu lism as a thin politic a l ideolog y (Chapter 
2). Follow ing an extensive litera ture revie w and a discussion  of previous approac hes to 
measure populist attitudes  a hierarchica l, three -dimensiona l measureme nt to populist atti-
tudes was introduce d  (Chapter 3).  The  measureme nt stric tly follows the theor etic a l consid-
erations rega rding the dimensional ity as well as the hierarchy of the components that con-
stitute the ideolog y . More spec ifica lly, the  measurement understands popul ist attitudes as a 
latent second -order factor with three distinct subdi men sions to wit, anti -elitism attitudes, a 
dema nd for popula r sover ei gnty, and a perce ptions of the peopl e as being homoge nous 
and virtuous. In addition, t he inve ntory captures whether individuals share populism’s 
Manichea n outlook that was identifie d as the superordinate posture within the populist 
belie f system. The different  features of populism are measured via 12 items  altoge ther. In 
multiple analyses t he inventory was tested using single - and mul ti -country surve y data, ap-
plying exploratory as well as confirma tory factor analy sis  and thereby passed severa l con-
struct validi ty check s . First, the model fit proved to be  very good and superior to one -
dimensional measures applie d in earlier studies  (interna l construct validi ty) . Second, the 
measureme nt  exhib ited  configura l, metric, and partia l scala r inva riance as was shown using 
a multi -group confirma tory factor analy sis across 11 western democra tic countrie s  (cross -
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na tion a l construct validi ty) . Third, i n all 11 countrie s  under inve stiga tion  the measure posi-
tive ly rela ted  to the proba bili ty of voting for left -, center, or right -wing populist partie s  
wherea s the IPA  related negatively to the probability of voting for  differen t  mainstrea m 
par ties . Moreove r, the analy ses established a  curvil ine a r rela tionship betwee n the IPA and  
left -right -wing -politic a l orienta tion . That the measure did rela te to either left - or right -wing 
politic a l orienta tion or voting for either lef t - or right -wing populist partie s indic a tes that it 
is indeed a measure tappi ng for thin populis m . In addition, the measureme nt has been im-
plemented in all subseque nt analy ses of this thesis as well as in additiona l studies not part 
of this theses (P. Müll er et al., 2017; Wirz, 2018a, 2018b; Wirz et al., 2018). In these studies, 
the measure proved to relate to severa l further conce pts according to the respec tive theo-
retica l expecta tions. These analy ses lend further credi bili ty to the IPA  (external construct  
validi ty) . To this date, t here is no other populist attit ude scale that has fared simila rly well in 
these or compa rable psychometric tests  and applic ations . Against this background, th e IPA 
itsel f is the answer to RQ 1 as it is a valid measurement for pop ulist attitudes that can be 
applie d to compa rative surve y resea rch . 
Af ter its  int roduction the IPA was rela ted to media rela ted variables with the aim to ex-
plore the populist belie f system going beyond its core . Chapter 4 revea le d, that populist 
attitudes are strongl y associ a ted  with  ONE  hostile media perceptions and  TW O  congruent  
public opinion perce ptions  in a four country surve y data set s . These rela tionships now 
found to be systema tic had thus far only been suggested by anec dotal evidence and within 
theoret ic a l work. Moreover, the analy se s found that THRE E  the persua sive press infer-
ence mecha nism according to which indiv idua ls infer public opinion from what they ob-
serve in the media is inactiv e for populis t citize ns. T hese rela tional patter n s represent the 
answer to RQ 2 as they were also established in different country conte xt. In addition to 
these findings, Chapter 5 revea le d that populist citize ns also have a very partic ula r news 
diet. Populist attitudes were found to be associ a ted with FOUR  a preferen ce for tabloid 
newspa pers, private TV news, Facebook and alterna tive online media as source s for politi-
cal information. However, populist attitudes were FI V E  not found to rela te to an avoid-
ance of quality newspa pers or public TV news as this was expec ted. As these results were 
also established in multip le country conte xts they offer the response to RQ 3. In the fol-
lowing I will discuss potentia l conseque nces t hat the outcomes ONE to FIVE  can have for 
libe ral democraci es.  
ONE , hostile media perce ptions were shown to be associ a ted with  an  unwilli ngne ss to 
accept democra tic decisions (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005), increa sed resentment  against minori-
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ties (Tsfati, 2007), decreased politic a l partic ipa tion (Feldman, Hart, Leisero w itz, Maibach, 
& Roser -Renouf, 2015; Moy, Torres, Tanaka, & McCluske y, 2005) , acceptance of incivil ity 
in discourse (Post, 2017), as well as with  correc tive actions that potentia lly  result in opinion  
pola riza tion (Rojas, 2010). All these reactions can be expec ted for populist citize ns  as well, 
given their strong hostile media perce ption s that were revea le d within this stu dy . Moreove r , 
and very important in the present conte xt, perce iving the media in gene ral as an out -group 
could bias the perce ption of their reporting (Reid, 2012). This point s  to a vicious circle in 
which populist citize ns (and with them society) are caught. Once popul ist citize ns catego-
rize the mainstrea m news as an out -group they are prone to perce ive content sprea d by 
these outlets as hostile, what will not help these outlets  – no matter what and how they 
report – to convince populist citize ns of their quality. The r elationship betwee n populist 
citize ns and the mainstrea m news would henc e lastingly be damag ed . I would like to point 
out  that the compl ete  rejec tion of the media as an institution based on swee ping accusa-
tions goes far beyond a healthy skeptici sm or even distrust  that can potentia lly  be dis-
solve d . If populist leaders as Donald Trump trans form mainst rea m news institutions via 
spee che s and t wee ts into ‘enemies of the people’ and if populist citize ns as in -group mem-
ber s of the peopl e interna liz e respectiv e  cu es, it will be diffic ult to impossible to dissolve 
these group boundaries.  
TW O , to belie ve that the own opinion has majority status can reinforce the willi ngne ss to 
spea k out the own opinio n in public  (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanaha n, 1997; Matthes, Knoll, & 
Sikorski, 2018) . If the wil ling ness to spea k out is enha nce d for only one group in a given 
conflic t, public opinion formation  can be shaped by that group . More spec ifica lly, this 
loude r group will potenti a lly be perce ive d as representing a public majority (Noelle -
Neuma nn, 1974). This  does not have to be but  can be problema tic, partic ula rly if the group 
that exerts such influenc e is a group  that actua lly constitutes a societa l minority (Moscov ic i 
et al., 1985). One consequenc e could be that the actua l majority turn s  sile nt  in light of the 
loud  minority (Noelle -Neumann, 1974) . In the introduction  of this thesis , vote shares for 
populist partie s were displa ye d for the coun trie s under inve stiga tion in the prese nted stud-
ies . Although these parties were exceptiona lly succe ssful within the past five years  they 
almost never reache d 50 perce nt of the vote share.  However, o nly should this be the case  
these partie s and their follow ers could rightfully insist on the majority claims  that they 
make . As was clea rly demonstra ted within the analy sis of thi s the sis, populi st citize ns per-
ceive majority status despite the fact that elec tora l results continuously prove them wrong. 
This false consensu s could lead populist citiz ens to spea k out their views in public and set 
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off a spiraling process in which’s consequence populist citizens are perceived to be the 
maj ority and in which non -populist citize ns are percei ve d to be a minority. This spiral ing 
proce ss can  further be reinfo rced by the mass media should they focus their reporting on 
populist intrigues, sensations and emotions to meet the market’s demands (Mudde, 2004). 
In the worst case, the politic a l field adapts to the  thereby distorted public opinion and in-
troduce s measure s that suit the taste of the minority without the (silent) majority opposing 
against it.  
THRE E , as was outline d alrea dy in Chapter 4, in the case of populist attitudes these two 
perce ptual biases (hostile media perce ptions and cong ruent public opinion per ce ptions) 
collide within an analy sis of the per sua sive pres s inf erenc e. Studies as provided by Al Gun-
ther and collea gues have  (as has the present study) shown, that both, hostile media effect 
and projec tion effect can co -occur and are hence not mutua lly co ntra dic tory. However, 
these studies also found significa nt correla tions  betwee n hostile media and public opinion 
p erceptions and with that demonstrated “simultaneous influences of personal opinion and 
perce ptions of news coverag e on estima tes of public opi nion” (Gunther & Christen, 2002, 
p.  186). More spec ifically, it was shown that  if the news coverage is percei ved unfavora ble, 
public opinion estimates were to a significa nt  extend adjusted into the same direc tion. Even 
though , the projection effect was still considera ble, it was challe nged via the persua sive 
press inferenc e. Individuals in previous studies henc e appea red to attribute mass media a  
persua sive potentia l and to see other peopl e as susce ptible to media effects . Foll owing the 
findings provided within this study, these mecha nism s  do not seem to hold for populist 
citize ns. In the presente d model the  path going from media perceptions to public opinion 
perce ptions was absolutely insign ifica nt . Although this can only have symbol ic meaning as 
the effect was, as state d, insign ifica nt, the b -value  was even  tilted into a negative direc tion. 
Moreove r, a  compleme nta ry analy sis reveale d that the contrast or differenc e between hos-
tile media perce ptions on the one hand and cong ruent  public opinion perceptions on the 
other hand even increa ses, with increa sing populist attitudes. According ly, if there is any 
rela tion betwee n the perception of the media tone and public opinion in the case of popu-
list citize ns , it is a negative rela tions hip that stands in contrast to what has thus far been 
found in studies on the persua sive press inferenc e. The more hostile the media are being 
perce ive d  by populist citize ns , the more cong ruent towa rd the own opinion will they esti-
mate public opinion. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this finding is that to 
populist citize ns the media no longer serve as a referenc e for public opinion estima tions. 
Follow ing Tsfati (2003) , who found simila r patterns for indiv idua ls who are highly media 
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ske ptic,  this can be read as a sign of rigidity in that populist citize ns stoica l l y  ignore the 
public opinion cues presente d within the mass media  and henc e, no longer share the hori-
zon provided by the media. An additiona l analy sis indic a ted that this touc hes espe ci a lly 
upon conte nt shared by public TV news and quality newspa pers. A questio n that direc tly 
follows these conclusions is what informs populist citizens’ horizon if it is no longer the 
mass media. A part of thi s answer is given by the strong projec tion ef fect discussed above.  
What populist citizens percei ve of as public opinion essentia lly resembl es their very own 
and persona l horizon of attitudes, value s, and experie nce s.  However, t he further analy se s 
of this thesis indic a ted that these perceptions might be bolstered by populist citize ns news 
preferenc es.  
FOUR , populist citize ns strongl y rely on tabloid newspa pers, private TV news, alterna tive 
online news providers as well as Facebook to get politic a lly informed. This media diet is 
partic ula rly problema ti c for different reasons. Focusing on tabloid newspa pers and priva te 
TV news first, these news genres are often also label ed as soft news media as their report-
ing is charac terize d by episodic reporting, the displa y of in divi dua l conseque nce s of events, 
and  persona l and emotiona l style (e.g., sensationa lism, scanda ls, and drama tiza tion) more 
so than it is charac terize d by thema tic reporting, a focus on societa l conseque nce s of 
events, and an impersona l and unemotiona l style , with the latter features being cha rac teris-
tic for hard news (Reinema nn et al., 2016; Reinemann, Stany er, Scherr, & Legna nte, 2012). 
T abloid newspa pers were also shown to displa y populist strategi es and populist style s to 
stronge r degrees as compa red to other news genres (Hamele ers et al., 2017c; Klein, 1998; 
Wettstein, Esser, Büche l et al., 2018; Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018). These features 
within communic a tion were shown to increa se politic a l cynici sm (Boukes & Boomga a rden, 
2015) or to increa se  popu list attitud es (Hamele ers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018; P. Müller et al., 
2017). This can also be expe cte d from the conte nt that is offered to the populist audie nce 
on Facebook as well as on the websites of alterna tive news providers. Facebook page s of 
populist movements, parties and candidates were shown to “constantly mobilize against 
the Altparteien  a nd percei ved out -groups” (Stier, Posch, Bleier, & Strohma ie r, 2017, p.  1382) 
and to “advocate for the people and blame or criticize elites” (Ernst et al., 2017, p. 1358). 
A l ternative news providers “explicitly position themselves outside of or against the political 
and media mainstream” (Bachl, 2018, p. 259). The news preferenc es revea led by populist 
citize ns in this study are henc e grea t cause for concern. As Article III con cludes, “ ba sed on 
what is known about the effects of soft news, it is diffic ult to imagin e how this media 
choice can increase the low political trust levels that characterize populist citizens”. Moreo-
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ve r, exposure to the own worldview will likel y lead to r einforce prior attitudes what can 
result in a radic a liz a tion of  persona l  opinion s  (Iyenga r &  Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008). On 
the aggrega te level, the news audie nces of tabloid newspa pers, private TV news, Facebook, 
and alterna tive news media were found pola rized in the present analy ses as they are more 
populist than non -populis t. These media genres or platforms are prefer red  to a significa nt 
stronge r  degree  by citize ns who have strong populist attitudes  in compa rison to those with 
lower populist attitude s. I consider this alarming  for the reason s state d above  but there is 
no reason for immedi a te conc ern. At this point, it is too early to conclude, that today’s 
new s audie nce s are compl ete ly polarize d. This conclusion would only be reasona ble , if the 
same p atterns were found with rega rd to public TV news and quality newspa pers, yet , of 
course,  in to the other direc tions with populist citize ns using those to less er degrees as 
compa red to non -populist citiz ens.  
FI V E, the analy ses presente d within this thesis di d not suppor t  fears as to a compl ete au-
dience pola riza tion. In contra st to the expec tations  presente d in Chapter 5 , populist atti-
tudes were not associ a ted with an avoida nce tende ncy of these hard news provide rs.  Popu-
list citize ns selec ted public TV news an d quality newspa pers to the same degree as non -
populist citize ns. On first sight, this finding offers hope rega rding two frequently discussed 
conc erns with rega rd to the prosperity of libe ral democra tic societie s. First, the results can 
comfort all those w ho fear that societie s are falling a part due to the unprec edente d media 
choice in today’s media environments. In line with other resea rch on news audie nce frag-
menta tion, filter bubble s, a balka niza tion of news audie nce s  or echo chambers, also this 
study did not provide support for the idea that high -choice media environments lead to 
increa sing news audie nce fragme ntation  or pol ariza tion  (Fletche r &  Nielsen, 2017; 
Gentzk ow &  Shapiro, 2011; Trilling & Schoenba ch, 2013; Weeks, Ksiazek, & Holbert, 
2016; Zuide rvee n Borgesius et al., 2016). The results of this study rather indic a te that 
populist citiz ens have not left the mainstrea m tracks of news reporting to settl e in essentia l-
ly opinion -cong ruent news environments. To the contra ry, they still approac h informa tion 
provided by mainstrea m news institutions to the same degree as do citize ns who do not 
support the populist ideolog y. This is all the more true, as also tabloid newspa pers and pri-
vate TV news can be conside red part of the mainstrea m. It can henc e be pr esumed  that 
there still is a shared publi c agenda and sufficie nt degree of societa l integ ration preva ilin g in 
the inve stiga ted countries if news preferenc es are examined along the dimension of popu-
list attitudes. Second , in turning to news genres that pote ntial ly  offer counte rattitudina l 
information as well as to genres  that support the own view , populist citize ns exhibit a fair 
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deg ree of cross -cutting news exposure . This can be considered good news for advoc a tes of 
delibe rative democra cy who  argue that cit iz ens exposed to viewpoints opp osed to their 
own devel op certain beneficia l democ ratic attitudes (for an overview see Friess & Eilders, 
2015, p. 332). Indeed, exposure to non -like -minde d information is argued to increa se the 
awareness  for politica l  perspec tives that diverge from the own (Castro Herrero, Nir, & 
Skovsga a rd, 2018; Mutz, 2006; Price, Cappel la, & Nir, 2002) and, if not consumed to ex-
treme but to  modera te extent, exposure to disagr ee ment also increa ses the like lihood of 
voting (Castro Her rero & Hopmann, 2018). Against the background of the  increa sing vote 
share reported for populist partie s, i t is  worth noti ng that populist citize ns s howed higher 
levels of cross -cutting news exposure than  did  non -populist citiz ens  in this study . However, 
e xposure to the oppo site viewpoint can also decrease politic a l interest and hamper politic a l 
partic ipa tion (Mutz, 2006) especially in the case of strong partisa nship (Torcal & Maldona-
do, 2014). This empha siz es what has been well put by Kelly Garret , namely , that “ indiv idu-
als’ tolerance toward (and occasional appetite for) counter-attitudina l  politic al news should 
not be confused with dispa ssio nate deliberation” (Garrett, 2013, p. 249). On the contrary, 
the motive s that underlie  exposure  t o  the opposing view  might not be bene f ic ia l at all for 
neither delibe ration n or societa l integ ration. I will discuss what I mean by that in more de-
tail in the followi ng . 
If the indiv idua l findings  presente d in this study are reflec ted as a whole, they appea r para-
dox and sur prising to a fair degree. P opulist citizens keep selec ting into news by providers 
against which they  actually  hold significa nt levels of distrust  and skeptici sm and which are 
within the populist narra tive define d  as enemies of the peopl e. The socia l identity approac h 
to populist attitudes applie d in this study suggests that these media are perceive d of as an  
out -group to the peopl e , maybe even as enemies and certa inly as liars . I argue, that t he res-
erva tions  that populist citi ze ns must have about the se media resulting from this categoriz a-
tion are unlik ely to  go togethe r with an impartia l approac h or a neutral reception of the 
conte nt  provided by these media . It is therefore diffic ult to imagine  that  the indivi dua l em-
braces the counte rattitudina l view encountered via exposure to the out -group source  in a 
sense that could —in any way —be constructiv e  for democ ratic delibe ration  or that could 
contribute to societa l integra tion .  
At this point, it is import a nt to acknow le dge that the analy se s  that provided these findings 
are studies of self -repor ted media use that come  with many pitfa lls. Most importa ntly, the 
analy se s did not offer insigh ts into the  motive s and grat ifica tions that always surround  
news consumption.  In fact, there is very little evidenc e, that especia lly  partisa ns are moti-
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va ted to form balance d opinions (Garrett, 2013).  Studies revea led that the approac h to 
counte rattitudina l conte nt can be function a l  to defen d the own position (Bre nes Peralta, 
Wojcieszak, Lelkes, & de Vreese, 2017; Valentino, Banks, Hutching s, & Davis, 2009)  or to 
surve ille the oppone nt (Garrett &  Stroud, 2014; Knobloc h -Westerw ic k & Kleinma n, 2011) . 
If such motive s are at work , counte rattitudina l news exposure can a lso occur despite high 
levels of distrust. In  the presenc e of other motiva tions trust becomes less rel ev a nt as a fac-
tor for news selec tion (Tsfati &  Cappel la, 2005) . As even  more trivia l reason s could expla in 
the turn towa rd non -like -minde d information (e. g., the need to pass time or habits) it is not 
self -evident at all if populist citizens’ use of public serv ic e news and quality newspa pers is 
at all bene ficia l for democ rac y . Although , persuasion can result from cou nterattitudina l 
news exposure  (Albarra cín & Mitche ll, 2004)  and mistrus tful audie nce s are not totally im-
mune to media influences (Tsfati, 2003) , reactions such as counte r arguing or the confirma-
tion of the own views, tha t is, that the mainstrea m media lie and conspire with the politic a l 
elite against the people are at least as like ly . Subsequently, exposure to the other side would 
result  in a reinforce ment of the own opinion as would exposure to the own view. Taken 
togethe r, as long as resea rch has not examined motive s and gratific a tio ns that could expla in 
the use of media genres that populist citize ns decidedl y reject , their exposure to public TV 
news and quality newspapers cannot be interprete d as the shee t -anchor against all other 
conc erning findings discussed above.  
Indee d, taken t oge ther, the findings presente d are very conseque ntia l  when they are seen in 
interpla y . Conce rn also arises in view of the role that the mass media play, or ought to play , 
in democ ratic societie s. A ccording to traditiona l conc eptions, o ne of the fun ctions the me-
dia are thought to fulfill within democ racie s is the function of social integ ration 
(Ronne berge r, 1985).  In so cietie s that are increa singl y heterogene ous  an d  compl ex , for 
example,  followi ng globa liz a tion  or interna tional wars , this function becomes e ver more 
important.  A  plethora of interest groups needs to get organiz ed to avoid conflict  that can 
threa ten modern  societies’ prosperity . According to idealist positions on the role of the 
media in democ rac ies  (e.g., Haberma s, 1989) , an integ ration  of interests  can only succ eed if  
media provide a public sphere in which citize ns learn  about the dive rsity preva ilin g in the 
societie s that they live in.  That is, they are to learn to conc ei ve society as a whole that goes 
beyond their own persona l horizon  and in which various gro ups exist  that have own ways 
of life , worldview s  and inte rests and that these gro ups are, despite their diff erenc es inter-
depe ndent from each other  (Maletzke, 1980) . In such plural istic context s , the medi a are  not 
only  understood as  factors necessa ry for societa l integ ration but in some cou ntrie s the me-
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dia  are even oblig ed to contribute to societa l integra tion by state treaties  or compa rable 
charters  (e.g., Rundfunkstaa tsve rtrag, 2016) . Alt hough this shall not be  a matter of deba te 
here, it is  worth noting that these norma tive criteria and the expec ta tion s  that they come 
with are discussed to be extreme ly challeng ing and diffic ult to meet by media institutions 
(e.g., Jarren, 2008; Nielsen, 2017).  
But assuming that the  mass  media hav e an impact in the sense of societa l integ ration, it 
appea rs considera bly trouble some to imagin e one spec ific group to turn away from this 
institution . Finding s prov ide d within this dissertati on mutua lly indic a te that citize ns with 
populist attitudes are p rone to do just that  and as a conseque nce , end up to live in a parallel 
unive rse, sepa rated from and lost for society as a whole . Acc or d ing to the line of argument 
presente d herei n, this  sepa ration carrie s out in  severa l steps. One , populist ci tize ns show 
strong genera l hostile media perce ptions  and skeptic ism direc ted partic ula rly against those 
news genres, that like ly contribute to integ ration most by followi ng their public servic e 
remit, that is, public TV news . T w o , in rejec ting the mass media, pop ulist citiz ens rejec t the 
media ted public of opinion, that is, the horizon shared by the media for all citize ns to ac-
cept what shall bring abo ut tolera nce and empa thy betwee n groups with diffe rent interests. 
Three , populist citize ns crea te their own horizo n by projec ting their own opinion onto 
public opinion that is  four , likely  amplified by their preferenc e for news that support the 
own worldview.  
Against this background, it can  only be a small glimmer of hope  that populist citize ns have 
not (yet ) complet ely turned away from quality news. However, as was discusse d , the value 
of the consumption of hard news by populist citizens has still to be determined as it could 
be a function to defen d and amplify the own view. The findings and conc lusions derive d 
suggest that populi sms repercussion on the indiv id ua l level and spec ifica lly the herei n in-
vestiga ted rela tionship s  betwee n populism and the media have a great potentia l to enda nge r 
the prosperity of libe ra l democ rac ie s by pola rizing society into a populist and non -populist 
camp.  I will close this discussion and this disser tation further below after ha ving summa-
rize d the main  contributions of this dissertation.   
Display of Main Contri butions  
The present e d  study  is loca ted within the resea rch  on dema nd side populism. This litera-
ture is currently occupie d with two main objec tives. First, a measureme nt to populist atti-
tudes is being searched and second, schol a rs attempt to understand and map the wider 
populist  worldview going beyond populist attitu des. In devel oping a valid hierarchic al 
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three -dimensional meas urement to populist attit udes  and in establishing  links  between 
these attitudes and media perceptions , public o pinion percep tions  and news prefer-
ences  this  dissertation offered a serie s of empirical contributions  to both of these fields . 
The spec ific applic a tions of the instrument  were unprec ede nted within the resea rch on 
dema nd side populism. Moving beyond anecdota l evide nce and theoretica l conside rations, 
it was shown for the firs t time that populist citizens systema tica lly reject the mainstrea m 
news and that they perceive their own view to be a majority view. Moreove r, this study 
provided the  first inve stiga tion of populist citizens news use with regard to mainstrea m 
news providers, socia l media platforms as well as alterna tive online news. With rega rd to 
the empirica l contributions it remai ns to be said, that  a ll studies but the last one had a 
comparative characte r  to live up to the fact that populism  preva ils in many countrie s.  
In addition to the empirica l contributions, this stu dy also provide d  abundant  theoretical 
an d  conc eptua l devel opments . First, it proved to be partic ula rly fruitful to  understand pop-
ulism as a political  belief system  for at least two different reasons. On the one hand , this 
notion offered a wider  framew ork or structure within which the presente d investiga tions 
could be located what also helped to structure the thesis. I  started out with an inve stiga tion 
of the core of the belie f system and sub seque ntly, followe d a path outwa rds into a direc tion 
partic ula rly important for communic a tion resea rch. On the other hand , the notion of a 
wider system implie s that only spec ific as pec ts of the populist belief system were examined 
within this the sis, while other aspec ts have been inve stiga ted by other schol a r s or not yet at 
all. I am suggesting, that this framew ork is also applic a ble to other demand side studies that 
aim to understan d the wider populist worldview. To offer examples, populis t citize ns atti-
tudes rega rding federa l courts, immigra nt s, conspi rac y belie fs, academi a, or even, should 
this ever be releva nt, cats can be inve stiga ted as further idea -eleme nts within the populist 
belie f system. Second, to expla in for why and how different idea -eleme nts rela te to one -
another  I introduce d a social identity approach to populist atti tudes  that proposed an 
interpla y of populist identity cues and socia l psycholog ic a l reactions to cause the detected 
rela tionships. In the developme nt of this approac h  I consulted the broade r litera tures of 
socia l psyc holog y and communica tion effects as well as the more narrow fields on the hos-
tile media effect, false consensus, persua sive press inferenc e , a nd selec tive exposure. In 
doing so, theory and approac hes  from different socia l sciences were integ rated into a larger 
interdisci plina ry framew ork that proved to be particula rly helpful to understand underly ing 
mecha nisms potentia lly causing populist citiz ens’ medi a  perceptions and media use. In do-
ing so , it was also shown how viable communica tion theory is for making sense of con-
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tempora ry populism across Western Democ rac ie s and vice versa, how research on popu-
lism can inform theories and approac hes in comm unic a tion scienc e. For example, the per-
suasive press inferenc e mecha nism was found to be annulle d for populist citize ns. It is  well  
worth considering if the socia l identity approach applie d  herei n points to new modera tors 
that could play a role for the per sua sive pres s infere nce  mecha nism . The mecha nism might 
depe nd upon levels of in -group identific a tion, identity salie nce, or other factors impor tant 
within the socia l identify perspec tive.  
The socia l identity approac h to populist attitudes was not put to a n empirica l test what 
opens ample  poss ibilities  to future research . Content analy ses and media effect studies 
rega rding the preva le nce and influence of populist identity cues on per ceptions, attitudes 
and behaviour will be necessa ry to establish the approac h empirica lly. Moreove r, the theo-
retica l reasoning implie d causa litie s to stronge r degrees than this would have been permis-
sible against the  backdrop of the cross -sectional data th at was used for the analy ses . L ongi-
tudina l studies are dema nded to learn about the causa litie s behind the rela tionships found 
herei n.  
C losing Personal Rema rk  
In his famous study of the nature of belie f systems in mass pub lic s, Converse showed  that 
belie f systems proofed to reproduce  well  on the level of elites or among the highly educ a t-
ed wherea s they did not reproduc e at all among the more common citize ns. In his view, a 
certa in level of sophistica tion is needed for indiv idua ls to understand and inte rnali ze belief 
systems in all their depth and compl ex ity. Survey responses provided by lower educa ted 
citize ns were at times so inconsistent that Converse conc lude d that flip ping a coin could 
have provided  the same results . Against the background of his findings he closes to de-
scribe society with the follow ing metaphor:  
“[F]or the  famili a r belie f systems that, in view of their historic a l  im porta nce, 
tend most  to attrac t the s ophistica ted  observe r, it is like ly that an adequa te 
mappi ng of a society (or, for that matter, the world) would provide a jumbled  
cluster of pyramid s or a mounta in  range, with shar p deline a tion and  differenti-
a tion in belie fs from  elite apex to elite apex but with the mass bases of the pyr-
amids overlappi ng  i n such  profu sion that it would be impossible  to decide 
where one pyramid end ed and another bega n ” (1964, p. 66).  
It is  difficult to envision a pola riza tion of the mass to be possible  among thi s overlappi ng 
mounta in range  pictured by Converse . Against  the background of  the findi ngs provided 
within this dissertation , this might be different for the case of the populist belie f system. 
   92  
   
The ideolog ie s ’ thin -characte r makes it partic ula rly accessible t o all parts of the popula tion, 
it’s Manichean outlook is simple and easy to digest, it is appea ling to everyon e through the 
identity claims that it makes . The worldview that populism promotes sepa rates society into 
two groups, one that is good and one that  is bad, that is, it envision s  two ste ep mounta ins 
with  a deep valle y in -betwee n. This disser tation provided evide nce  for a reperc ussion of 
this worldview on the ind ivid ua l level. Those who agree to the populist ideas are prone to 
sepa rate from the rest of  the popul a tion, leading socie ty into pola riza tion.  
Populism is discus sed as being also bene fici a l for democ rac ie s  as long as it acts withi n  the 
democ ratic system . It can ide ntify  disconte nt  and , according to some autho rs, even inte-
grate  segments of the pop ula tion into the politic a l proce ss that have been ove rlooked with-
in the past decades (Laclau, 2005). Populism  can broaden the politica l agenda and in gen-
eral, “amend the shortcomings and the broken promises of the representative system” 
(Abts &  Rummens, 2007, p.  405). As findings of thi s study showed, the poten tial that pop-
ulism pola rize s (rather than  that it  integ rates societie s  as argued by Laclau)  is fairly signifi-
cant  and this potentia l is carrie d out in ways that are not obvious at a ll but that are hidde n 
and snea ky and in that sense quite perfidious. If populism is unlea shed within the public, it 
might  all to quickly give up on its merits to revea l a face that is full of scorn and ridicule 
rega rding all that is important to libe ral d emoc racy. I am discl osing my persona l view here 
at last because I strongly agree to Matthijs Roodujin when he says that, “academics must 
speak out and warn about where we are heading” and that we have “a moral obligation to 
protect liberal democracy” (2016, p. 317) as this system provides us as scientists with the 
circumstanc es under which our resea rch  can thrive . As there is no question that this system 
also provides all type s of free dom to us as citize ns  this oblig a tion multipli es.  
To reitera te one more time, without the aim to dramatiz e more so than would be necessa ry, 
I point out that the findings provided in this thesis are deeply concerning. It is the job of 
socia l scientists  to carefully observe societa l developments  tied to populism , to work on 
solu tions in all fields and to spea k up against and deconstruct the evil that populism en-
closes.   
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Abstract
Theoretically, populism has been conceptualized as a political ideology with three sub-
dimensions: anti-elitism attitudes, a preference for popular sovereignty, and a belief in
the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people. However, empirical research to date
has treated populist attitudes as a unidimensional construct. To address this issue, we
propose to conceptualize populist attitudes as a latent higher-order construct with
three distinct first-order dimensions. A 12-item inventory was developed using two
survey studies conducted in Switzerland in 2014 and 2015. Exploratory and confirma-
tory factor analyses were used to test the construct validity of this measure of populist
attitudes. The measurement that is proposed allows for a fine-grained study of popu-
list attitudes in the general public.
In the national elections of 2014, 2015, and 2016, the citizens of European countries
such as Sweden, Finland, Poland, Denmark, and Austria have shown strong support
for populist parties and/or their candidates, as indicated by the proportion of voters
who sympathized with the Swedish Democrats (12.9%), the Finns (17.7%), the Law
and Justice Party (51.5%), the Danish People’s Party (21.1%), or the Freedom Party
of Austria (49.7%). Many authors are trying to identify the reasons for this growing
success of populist parties (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008a; Me´ny & Surel, 2002;
Mudde, 2004). Voting for specific parties that are a priori categorized as populist has
lately been connected with a set of populist attitudes. These attitudes have been found
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to correlate positively with support for populist parties and movements (Akkerman,
Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde, 2012; Hawkins & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2014). In research to date, populist attitudes have been conceptualized
as a unidimensional measure. However, we argue that a unidimensional model fails to
adequately describe populist attitudes, as it does not account for the different political
ideas that have been identified as distinct yet correlated facets of a populist ideology
(Mudde, 2004). Therefore, the present study proposes and tests a three-dimensional
hierarchical measurement of populist attitudes. Such a three-dimensional model is not
only able to identify populist attitudes in its entirety (i.e., attitudes indicating strong
support for all three dimensions) but can also distinguish between different varieties
of populist support (i.e., attitudes strongly supporting only one or two dimensions).
Populism as an Ideology
Authors frequently argue that populism is a ‘‘notoriously vague term’’ (Canovan,
1999, p. 3), which entails a certain ‘‘conceptual slipperiness’’ (Taggart, 2000, p. 1).
Most recently, populism has been defined as a communication style (Jagers &
Walgrave, 2007), a political strategy (Weyland, 2001), and a political ideology
(Mudde, 2004). This study takes the last perspective, defining populism as a ‘‘thin-
centred ideology’’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 544) comprising a ‘‘set of political ideas’’
(Hawkins 2010, p. 5) about the structure of power in society (Albertazzi &
McDonnell, 2008b). More precisely, according to the populist ideology, society has
a Manichean structure, as it is ‘‘ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’’’ and politics is noth-
ing but ‘‘an expression of the general will of the people’’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). With
that, populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology, which can become a thick-
centered ideology when it is combined with more complete ideologies, such as nativ-
ism—right-wing populism—or socialism—left-wing populism (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser 2013). From this definition, we extract three political ideas that together
form populism: (1) an anti-elitism approach, with elites seen as corrupt, betraying,
and deceiving the people; (2) a belief in unrestricted popular sovereignty that leaves
the power to the people; and (3) an understanding of the people as being homogenous
and virtuous (Wirth et al., 2016). When populism is conceived of as a set of political
ideas or as a multidimensional construct, researchers should operationalize and meas-
ure populist attitudes accordingly. In the following section, we argue that this has not
been followed with sufficient diligence in prior research on populist attitudes among
the general public.
Aside from two early attempts at the end of the twentieth century to identify
populist attitudes within the United States (Axelrod, 1967; Farrell & Laughin,
1976), it has only been recently that populist attitudes have received significant at-
tention from researchers. Akkerman et al., (2014; see also Hawkins et al., 2012) de-
veloped a one-dimensional conceptualization of populist attitudes. This measure
reflects two of the three key elements of populism identified above: popular sover-
eignty and an antagonism toward what is perceived to be an evil political elite. This
instrument has been tested in the United States (Hawkins et al., 2012), the
Netherlands (Akkerman et al., 2014), Chile (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014),
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and recently also in Flanders (Spruyt, Keppens, & van Droogenbroeck, 2016). The
inventory comprises six items measuring populist attitudes (e.g., ‘‘The politicians in
Congress need to follow the will of the people’’). These researchers used principle
component analysis to demonstrate that populist attitudes form a single dimension
distinct from elitist and pluralist attitudes toward democracy. The successful replica-
tion of the model in three different countries leads to the conclusion that ‘‘populist
attitudes are widespread and latent’’ (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014, p. 5). In a
construct validity test, the authors correlated the populism measure with demo-
graphic, social, and political indicators. In the Chilean case affiliates of leftist parties
showed stronger populist attitudes compared with partisans of rightist parties.
However, populist attitudes were unrelated to demographics (Hawkins & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2014). In the Netherlands, populist attitudes were correlated with support
for parties that are often categorized as populist (i.e., the Socialist Party and the Party
for Freedom) (Akkerman et al., 2014). Additionally, it was shown that in the United
States, populist attitudes correlate positively with strong affiliations to either liberal or
conservative ideologies (Akkerman et al., 2014). A strength of these papers was to
show that populism is a concept that is distinct from other political ideologies, such as
elitism and pluralism. However, two problems with this conceptualization remain.
First, it lacks to depict the idea of the people as a homogenous group that is wise
and virtuous. Homogeneity and virtuousness are essential to the definition of popu-
lism as used in this research as well as in prior studies. Taggart (2000) stresses the
importance of this idea by declaring the people as ‘‘the defining feature of populism’’
(p. 91; emphasis in original). Following his explications and those of others, this
central feature of populism encloses more than the demand for popular sovereignty.
This aspect of people-centrism entails an understanding of a monolithic people that is
altogether good, honest, and upright. In this vein, the people share the same values
and interests. In addition, the people is seen as a coherent entity ready to withstand
any external threats (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008a; Mudde, 2004). A measurement
that fails to consider this dimension is unable to fully grasp thin-centered populism.
Second, because of this conceptualization’s unidimensionality, it is impossible to
detect varieties of populist attitudes, such as the branch of populist thinking that
predominantly promotes the notion of a reified popular will and is less intensely
attached to the notion of a conspiring elite.
A Three-Dimensional Construct
Building on the prior research outlined in the preceding section, the present article aims
to develop a more finely grained inventory with which to measure the concept of
populism. Previous reasoning on populism suggests that the populist ideology is built
on three main political ideas. If we wish to measure the degree of individual support of
populism, an instrument is needed that delineates between support for each of these
three ideas. When a full populist is assumed to hold strong anti-elitism attitudes, a
strong belief in unrestricted popular sovereignty, and an understanding of the people
as being homogenous and virtuous, then populist attitudes can be conceptualized as a
second-order factor made up of these three distinct sub-dimensions as first-order factors.
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There are several reasons to suggest a three-dimensional structure of populist at-
titudes. First, the empirical measurement of a construct of interest should reflect all
facets that are derived from the underlying theory. When populist attitudes are
defined by three elements, then it is reasonable to expect three dimensions that are
part of a higher-order latent construct that represents populist attitudes. If one di-
mension was to be missing from the operationalization, the measurement would not
reflect all facets of populist attitudes, but rather an incomplete version of the ideology.
Second, if populism is conceptualized as a three-dimensional construct, then these
attitude dimensions can be activated in varying degrees in an individual mind. For
example, although there may be many people who hold anti-elitism attitudes, not all
of them favor popular sovereignty or perceive the people as a homogenous and vir-
tuous group. This reality is not reflected in a one-dimensional measure, which treats
individuals scoring high on one dimension as both, similar to individuals scoring high
on another dimension and to individuals scoring moderately on all dimensions.
Applying this logic, people who hold anti-elitism attitudes but who do not see
direct democratic procedures as a solution to compensate for the wrongdoings of
the political elite would be indistinguishable from individuals who show the opposite
pattern of attitudes—that is, who do not see the political elite as corrupt, but who
favor direct democracy. In treating populist attitudes as a single dimension, re-
searchers cannot distinguish between these two different views on politics. In contrast,
a three-dimensional measurement would enable the researcher to detect these different
attitude patterns.
The third advantage of a three-dimensional measurement is the more precise pre-
dictions it allows researchers to make. In the example given in the preceding para-
graph—describing people who hold anti-elitism attitudes yet who do not demand
popular sovereignty—the degree of populism within a given society could easily be
overestimated if a one-dimensional measure was used. Such an instrument could
identify individuals as populists even if they were in fact only dissatisfied with the
work of the current government. In contrast, an instrument based on a three-dimen-
sional conceptualization would require that individuals score sufficiently high on all
three dimensions to be considered to hold populist attitudes. Therefore, our assump-
tion is that populist attitudes are a latent second-order construct made up of three
lower-order dimensions: anti-elitism attitudes, a preference for unrestricted popular
sovereignty, and a belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people. We will
test this assumption on the basis of two separate data sets using exploratory and
confirmative factor analysis. To provide further evidence of construct validity, we
will include measures of elitist and pluralist attitudes into our analysis and contrast
these to the three populist attitude dimensions proposed before.
Method
Data and Procedure
To develop a scale for the three-dimensional structure of populist attitudes, two
surveys were conducted over the course of 6 months. The first study was an
online survey conducted in December 2014 on a nation-wide sample of Swiss re-
spondents (N ¼ 400). The second survey was conducted online in April 2015, but
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based on a Swiss sample only taken from the city of Zurich and its surrounding
regions (N ¼ 1,260). In both studies, samples were recruited from online access
panels, applying a quota procedure with regard to age and gender. These samples
approach the population of interest’s characteristics in terms of age (national sample:
M ¼ 43.71; SD ¼ 15.57; regional sample: M ¼ 51.86; SD ¼ 13.80) and gender
(national sample: 50% female; regional sample: 47.1% female).
Measurement
We examined populist attitudes by measuring three sub-dimensions: anti-elitism at-
titudes, demand for popular sovereignty, and belief in the homogeneity and virtuous-
ness of the people. The initial item pool comprised 21 items that were assumed to
reflect the three dimensions. Most of these items were taken from previous studies
and, thus, depicted anti-elitism and people’s sovereignty (Akkerman et al., 2014;
Hawkins et al., 2012; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014). A literature review and
a preliminary analysis of news coverage containing populist communication led to
additional items tracing these two dimensions. This resulted in nine items reflecting
anti-elitism attitudes (anti) and another six items reflecting a demand for popular
sovereignty (sov). After consulting literature on the perception of in-group homogen-
eity and entitativity (Carpenter & Radhakrishnan, 2002; Lickel at al., 2000; Quattrone
& Jones, 1980), six items were chosen to assess the belief in a homogeneous and
virtuous people (hom). Across all three dimensions, various items depict the
Manichean perspective of populism by setting the entity of ‘‘the people’’ against
the entity of ‘‘the politicians’’ or the ‘‘government.’’ Survey participants rated all
items using 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 ¼ strongly disagree to 5 ¼ strongly
agree (see Supplementary Tables A1 and A3 for question wording in English and
German).
Elitist attitudes were measured relying on three items that were taken from the
existing literature (Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014).
Partially, these items were rephrased to consistently refer to the idea that the political
elite (i.e., ‘‘the government’’ or ‘‘politicians’’) is in charge of important decisions and
not educated experts (i.e., ‘‘independent experts’’ and ‘‘successful business people’’).
Pluralist attitudes were measured using four items. Two indicators were taken from
previous studies (Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014), and
two items were added to also depict acknowledgment of minority views and opposing
views in society (see Supplementary Table A2 for question wording).
Results
The 21 items from the populism scale were submitted to an exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) using the promax rotation method. The results of the factor analysis relying on
the data from the national sample revealed a three-dimensional structure. To optimize
the solution, items were excluded when communalities or factor loadings were too low
or when items loaded on more than one factor. This process was then stopped before
factors reached an item number lower than four. At the end of this process, 15 items
remained: five items that reflect an anti-elitism attitude, four items that refer to the
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sovereignty of the people, and six items that expressed a belief in a homogeneous and
virtuous people. These items share variance to a high degree (KMO ¼ 0.89). The
three factors together account for 55% of the variance (Factor 1 ¼ 35%; Factor 2 ¼
12%; Factor 3 ¼ 8%, eigenvalues ¼ 5.68, 2.26, 1.59, respectively). Factor loadings
ranged between .632 and .896. Homogeneity items loaded strongly on the first factor,
anti-elitism items on the second factor, and sovereignty items on the third factor. No
serious cross-loadings occurred, and reliability was satisfactory for all three factors (see
Supplementary Table A1, also for communalities, mean values, and SDs). Using the
data from the regional sample, the analysis was replicated and resulted in the same
factor structure (Supplementary Table A2). Thus, preliminary exploratory factor ana-
lyses support the assumed three-dimensional structure of populist attitudes.
Interestingly, these analyses led to the exclusion of some of the items used in previous
studies (Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2012, 2014); these items were all
replaced by new items. However, four of six items (items 2, 5, 8, and 9) used in
prior studies were retained in the updated version of the measure.
To test the robustness of this factor structure, the dimensionality of populist atti-
tudes was further examined in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using the R 3.2.0
package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). This was done for both the national and regional
sample. Populist attitudes were modeled as a second-order factor with three proposed
distinct sub-dimensions. Items were permitted to load only on the factors they were
expected to load on. A first test of a three-dimensional second-order factor model
with the national data indicated an acceptable fit (2¼ 210.7, df ¼ 87, p  .001;
comparative fit index ¼ 0.954; root mean squared error of approximation ¼ 0.06).
To improve model fit, modification indices were examined. The output indicated that
three items caused problems (i.e., high covariation with other items on their factor
and even with items across factors). These three items were excluded from the ana-
lysis. The resulting model showed a better fit to our data (Table 1, Panel A). All
items load substantially (loadings higher than .5 in all cases) on their hypothesized
latent factors. Furthermore, the latent first-order factors show significant loadings on
the proposed second-order factor that represents populist attitudes (Table 1, Panel B).
This result is in line with the hypothesis that populist attitudes are a latent higher-
order construct made up of the three lower-order dimensions of anti-elitism attitudes,
a preference for unrestricted popular sovereignty, and a belief in the homogeneity and
virtuousness of the people.
To further corroborate the validity of this conceptualization of populist attitudes,
two additional steps were taken. First, the three-dimensional second-order factor
model was compared with two one-dimensional models of populist attitudes. The
first single-factor model included the six items from Akkerman et al. (2014). As we
have implemented the full six-item set only in the national survey, the model could
only be estimated for this data set. The second one-dimensional model used the 12-
item set introduced above. This model was estimated on the basis of both available
data sets. These one-factor models assume that the covariance among the items can be
accounted for by a single latent variable, as implied by existing operationalizations of
populist attitudes (Hawkins et al., 2012). The fit statistics in Panel A of Table 1
indicate that a hierarchical multidimensional model of populist attitudes is superior to
all three one-dimensional models.
R E S E A R C H N O T E 321 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijpor/article-abstract/30/2/316/2993904 by Oxford University Department for Continuing Education user on 10 August 2019
Second, we used 12 populism items from the regional data set to test whether
populism, elitism, and pluralism are distinct constructs. This analysis resulted in five
factors, each of which always only comprised items of one specific construct with
loadings higher than .539 and cross-loadings lower than .2 (see Supplementary Table
A2). Finally, CFA yielded that both, elitism and pluralism, correlate negatively with
all three sub-dimensions that we have conceptualized (anti-elitism and elitism: r ¼
.15, p < .001; anti-elitism and pluralism: r ¼ .04, p < .05; sovereignty and elitism:
r ¼ .35, p < .001; sovereignty and pluralism: r ¼ .03; p ¼ .07; homogeneity and
elitism: r ¼ .07, p ¼ .001; homogeneity and pluralism: r ¼ .09, p < .001; N ¼
1,260). In sum, the more participants agreed to either one of the three populism
dimensions, the less they endorsed elitist or pluralist attitudes. These results provide
evidence that the present threefold conception of populism is a valid construct that is
distinct from other conceptions of democracy, that is, elitism and pluralism.
Discussion
Research on measuring populism in public opinion surveys has grown in the past
decade because of the rise of populist parties in Western democracies. The present
article introduces a refined instrument for measuring populist attitudes. From extant
definitions of populism as a thin ideology, we inferred three dimensions: an anti-elitism
approach, the belief in unrestricted popular sovereignty, and an understanding of the
people as being homogenous and virtuous. A rigorous empirical test using different data
sets clearly demonstrates that a second-order model with three dimensions of populism
is superior to a one-dimensional conceptualization in a number of ways.
First, as our major goal was to create a theoretically sound and exhaustive instru-
ment to measure populist attitudes, we followed a deductive approach: operationaliza-
tion was strictly derived from a broadly accepted definition of populism, from which
the three most important notions underlying the theoretical concept were extracted.
Second, the robustness of the three-dimensional second-order factor model was suc-
cessfully tested using CFA. In prior studies, only exploratory factor analyses were
used. However, EFA is not suitable for construct validity testing. All items are
assumed to load on all factors, making CFA more appropriate for testing hypotheses
that incorporate the dimensionality of populist attitudes. The analysis revealed three
distinct dimensions that are positively correlated with each other and belong to one
higher-order latent construct—that is, populist attitudes. Third, the successful repli-
cation of the model in two independent samples—the findings from both the national
and regional samples confirmed the hypothesized model structure—further increases
the credibility of the present approach. Fourth, in a final step of validation, we
showed that all three populist attitude dimensions are also distinct from elitist and
pluralist attitudes.
Finally, looking at possible applications of this instrument in future research, this
tool allows researchers to investigate specific research questions. Researchers may
want to examine to what extent affiliation to populist parties stems from anti-elitism
attitudes, a general support of the idea of popular sovereignty, the perception of the
people as homogenous and virtuous, or a combination of these dimensions. Prediction
of vote choice can be further improved by adding a specific political ideology (i.e., left
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or right wing) as a fourth dimension to the model. The three dimensions measure the
thin-centered ideology of populism; yet, the model is flexible enough to be extended
to measure thick forms of populism as well. Furthermore, regarding a large corpus of
research dealing with populist communication in media content (Akkerman, 2011;
Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011; Rooduijn, 2014; Wirth et al., 2016), this
new instrument enables researchers to trace specific communication effects on the
three attitude dimensions, as not all populist statements found in the media will
influence all of the three dimensions in the same way.
The present analysis also carries limitations. Data were collected using online access
panels from only one country, and online surveys always carry a high risk of partici-
pants being distracted while filling out the questionnaire or quickly clicking through
the questions without paying real attention to the content. We therefore recommend
that future studies replicate the present findings using different samples and survey
modes. Furthermore, this study was conducted in Switzerland, where a direct dem-
ocracy is practiced. As this is exceptional among Western democracies, the instru-
ment—developed for international research—should be tested in other countries as
well. Moreover, we did not study how populist attitudes are related to vote choice or
sociodemographic variables. Thus, another avenue for follow-up research would be to
look at how the updated measure predicts vote choice or party affiliation, further
corroborating the construct validity of the present measure.
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Supplementary Data are available at IJPOR online.
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Abstract
This study aims to investigate the relationships between citizens’ populist attitudes, 
perceptions of public opinion, and perceptions of mainstream news media. Relying 
on social identity theory as an explanatory framework, this article argues that 
populist citizens assume that public opinion is congruent with their own opinion 
and that mainstream media reporting is hostile toward their own views. To date, 
only anecdotal evidence suggests that both assumptions are true. The relationships 
are investigated in a cross-sectional survey with samples drawn from four Western 
European countries (N = 3,354). Multigroup regression analysis supports our 
hypotheses: False consensus and hostile media perceptions can clearly be linked to 
populist attitudes in all four regions under investigation. Moreover, our findings show 
a gap between hostile media perceptions and congruent public opinion perceptions, 
which increases with increasing populist attitudes to the point that the persuasive 
press inference mechanism is annulled.
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Various European and U.S. elections of the past decade illustrate a rather great demand 
for populism at the citizen level. Populist parties gain a notable share of the vote in 
many Western countries, and their potential influence on liberal democracy is inten-
sively discussed (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Waisbord, 2018). These developments 
are paralleled by an increase in research devoted to populist attitudes, which reflect the 
support for populism on the individual level (Schulz et al., 2017). With the general aim 
to learn more about those who potentially vote for populist parties, studies have col-
lected information on populist citizens’ sociodemographics, general attitudes, and vot-
ing preferences (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Rooduijn, 2017; Schulz 
et al., 2017; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2017), as well as about their personality 
(Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016), their media preferences (Hameleers, Bos, 
& de Vreese, 2017a), and specific psychological dispositions (Elchardus & Spruyt, 
2016; Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2017). However, quite a lot remains unknown 
regarding the question of what unites populist voters, especially because most studies 
are single-country studies that focus on either left- or right-wing populism only 
(Rooduijn, 2017). Therefore, it is difficult to deduce comprehensive conclusions about 
the general character of populist citizens.
However, anecdotal evidence points to as yet unstudied characteristics that populist 
citizens may share. Specifically, news reports about populist politicians and populist 
citizens suggest that hostile media perceptions and false consensus beliefs could unify 
those who support populist ideas. For example, media reports document chants of “We 
are the people” at demonstrations for populist movements as well as attacks against 
the media by populist actors or their followers, calling them fake news or system 
media (e.g., Jamieson, 2017; Somaskanda, 2017). Additionally, theoretical work 
speaks to the possible importance of anti-media rhetoric (Krämer, 2018) and opinion 
majority claims (Taggart, 2000) for populism at the communicator level. In combina-
tion with the observations captured within anecdotal evidence, these theoretical 
accounts motivate the assumption that populism, hostile media perceptions, and false 
consensus beliefs can also be connected at the citizen level.
This article therefore focuses on the following three research questions. First, are 
hostile media perceptions and congruent public opinion perception constant compan-
ions of populist attitudes, or does anecdotal evidence distort the impression of the 
populist conception of these entities? Second, if these relations are systematic, do they 
also travel across country borders? Third, how can theory account for a co-occurrence 
of populist attitudes, hostile media perceptions, and false consensus beliefs? This arti-
cle is devoted to developing responses to all three questions. While the last question 
will be addressed on a theoretical level, the first and second question will undergo 
empirical testing.
To find a theoretical explanation for the posited relationships between populist atti-
tudes, congruent public opinion beliefs, and hostile media perceptions, this article 
builds on a social identity approach to populist attitudes. Specifically, we will discuss 
the proposed relations as consequences of identification with the in-group of the peo-
ple. Thereby, we develop a theoretical framework that relies on a large body of studies 
dedicated to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), false consensus (Ross, 
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Greene, & House, 1977), and hostile media perceptions (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 
1985). Moreover, we will also draw on previous research devoted to populist commu-
nication (e.g., Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017), which is 
discussed as the provider of cues regarding the specific understanding of the in-group 
and out-group(s).
With this approach, we aim to integrate the investigation of populist attitudes into 
research that is at the core of communication science. Interestingly, for example, our 
assumptions contrast findings regarding the persuasive press inference. While several 
studies show that public opinion is often inferred from media tone perceptions as a 
function of beliefs in media effects on others (cf. Gunther, 1998; Gunther & Chia, 
2001), we argue below that this mechanism might not be applicable for populist citi-
zens. We will use the social identity approach to populist attitudes to explain this 
potentially unique relationship between hostile media perceptions and false consensus 
beliefs in the case of populist citizens.
Research on both false consensus and hostile media perceptions has identified a 
large number of critical consequences that these perceptions may have for liberal 
democracies. For example, hostile media perceptions relate to the unwillingness to 
accept democratic decisions (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005), increased minority alienation 
(Tsfati, 2007), decreased political participation (Feldman, Hart, Leiserowitz, 
Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2015; Moy, Torres, Tanaka, & McCluskey, 2005), accep-
tance of incivility (Post, 2017), and corrective actions that may result in opinion 
polarization (Rojas, 2010). The most profound consequence of false consensus 
effects may be that members of groups that rely on false consensus have a stronger 
willingness to express their own opinions (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997; 
Matthes, Knoll & von Sikorski, 2018). This may make their group appear stronger 
in number than it actually is, which has respective implications for public opinion 
formation processes (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). If hostile media and false consensus 
perceptions co-occur with populist attitudes, their potential threat to liberal democ-
racy could multiply.
To address the two empirical aims mentioned above, we rely on survey data 
gathered in four European greater regions: Berlin, Zurich, Paris, and London, as 
well as their respective surrounding rural areas. Populist attitudes are treated as a 
predictor for opinion and media perceptions in a multigroup regression analysis. 
Our correlational findings demonstrate that the hypothesized perceptual pattern is 
stable in all four countries: as a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, the public 
opinion climate is perceived to be more congruent with their own opinion and 
the mass media’s tone is perceived to be more incongruent with their own opin-
ion. Moreover, we established evidence for a gap between hostile media and 
congruent public opinion perceptions that increases with increasing populist 
attitudes to the extent that the persuasive press inference mechanism is annulled 
for those with strong populist attitudes. The social identity framework for popu-
list citizens’ perceptions of media and public opinion offers ideas for underlying 
psychological mechanisms that could cause these perceptions. In the following, 
this approach will be introduced.
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A Social Identity Approach to Populism
Researchers have argued that populism (Krämer, 2014; Reinemann et al., 2017), hos-
tile media perceptions (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013; Reid, 2012), and public opinion 
perceptions (e.g., Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson, & Copper, 1992) are related to social 
categorization and social identity. Hence, social identity theory provides a fruitful 
framework within which links between populist attitudes, public opinion, and media 
perceptions can be established.
Social identity and self-categorization theories base their argument on the human 
need for a positive social identity (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; cf. 
Turner, 2000). Social identity accompanies personal identity as components of the 
human self-concept and defines the self as a member of different social groups. Within 
the process of social categorization, individuals identify with different groups. If a 
specific group membership is made salient, the desire to achieve, maintain, or enhance 
a positive value linked to this group membership is triggered (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
This process involves social comparisons that serve to identify in-group superiority 
over respective out-groups. Specifically, the salience of a group membership sets the 
individual’s perceptions to accentuate intragroup similarities regarding positive attri-
butes that the in-group shares (in-group favoritism) and to emphasize intergroup dif-
ferences regarding negative attributes that the out-group shares (out-group 
discrimination) (Kelly, 1989; Rubin & Badea, 2007; Turner, 2000; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).
Central to the process of social categorization is the mechanism of depersonaliza-
tion. When following group prototypes, individuals no longer perceive people as dis-
tinctive individuals but as better or worse approximations of the group prototype. The 
perception of others and the perception of the self are depersonalized. Depersonalization 
has a notable effect on the self, as it causes “thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and 
behavior to conform to [the] prototype of the in-group” (Hogg & Reid, 2006, p. 10). 
Salient social categorizations—the offer of social categories to which one can adhere—
causes these social identity mechanisms to unroll. In the following, we will link 
insights from research on populism to the ideas of social identity theory to show that 
populism is just this kind of offer.
Social Categories Established by Populism
This article follows an ideational approach to populism that has been strongly applied 
in the fields of political science (e.g., van Kessel, 2015) and communication science 
(e.g., Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; Wirth et al., 2016). 
According to this approach, populism is understood as a thin political ideology. This 
ideology understands society to be split into two homogeneous groups: the pure peo-
ple and the corrupt elite. The former is assumed to be defrauded by the latter in that the 
latter does not follow the principle of popular sovereignty as the ideology indicates it 
should (Mudde, 2004). Populism can develop into a thick ideology (e.g., right-wing or 
left-wing populism) as soon as full ideologies such as fascism or socialism are added 
to it (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015).
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However, independent of how the ideology is enriched, the antagonistic relation 
between the people and the political elite always is a key element of populism. This is 
acknowledged by different definitions of or operationalization approaches to populism 
(e.g., Canovan, 1981; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; March, 2017; Müller, 2016; 
Reinemann et al., 2017; Weyland, 2001). This distinction is also particularly relevant 
for the upcoming argument.
The antagonism between the people and the elite is often illustrated by the phrase 
“us versus them.” Thereby, the “us” stands for the pure people and the likeminded, 
such as the populist politician, that is, the in-group. “Them” refers to out-groups, most 
notably, the political elite currently running the government, but minorities such as 
immigrants or religious groups are also often named in this respect (e.g., Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007; Wirth et al., 2016). The populist ideology thus sketches a very defi-
nite social structure that consists of merely two groups: one that is good and one that 
is bad (also “Manichean outlook” of populism; for example, Mudde, 2004, p. 544). 
With that populism follows a form of “identity politics” (Müller, 2016, p. 3): It offers 
clear social categories along which self-categorization can unfold.
For populism to exert this potential, its ideas must be publicly diffused. The means 
for this diffusion is populist communication, which is employed mainly by populist 
political actors (e.g., Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017) but also occurs 
within media coverage (Krämer, 2014). Populist communication is defined as a set of 
features or elements of communicative messages that resonate with the populist ideol-
ogy. Its core messages are therefore related to the people, to the political elite, and to 
popular sovereignty (March, 2017; Reinemann et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016). They 
directly mirror the thin definition of the populist ideology and together promote the 
populist division of society: the social categories of the good people and the evil politi-
cal elite. As populism is defined to be adaptable to other concepts, we argue that popu-
list communication must also be addressed as an extendable concept. For example, in 
order to describe more distinguished shapes of populism, it might seem useful to 
regard exclusionist messages (cf. Reinemann et al., 2017), opinion majority claims (cf. 
Taggart, 2000), and anti-media rhetoric (cf. Krämer, 2018) as additional elements of 
populist communication. This idea will be further addressed below.
Populist Attitudes and the Identification to the In-Group of the People
Citizens who support the core ideas of populism are identified as those who hold 
populist attitudes (Akkerman et al., 2014). More specifically, they hold anti-elitist 
attitudes, believe in a homogeneous and virtuous people, and show a high demand 
for popular sovereignty (Schulz et al., 2017). They have internalized the Manichean 
divide of society that is promoted within populism and self-categorize as group 
members of the people. Accordingly, they view the political elite as malicious and 
the people as a virtuous unity and feel that they belong to the latter. Prior research 
has shown that populist attitudes can be reinforced by the core messages of populist 
communication (Müller et al., 2017). Moreover, repeated exposure to media repre-
sentations of the societal divide promoted by populism is argued to trigger 
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identification with the in-group of the people and foster the “development of schema-
based in-group or out-group bias in the perception and evaluation of social phenom-
ena” (Krämer, 2014, p. 55).
To date, the literature on populism still lacks a profound discussion of the poten-
tial consequences of identification to the in-group of the people—that is, to what 
degree this specific identification can stimulate generalized attitudes, biased percep-
tions, or comprehensive categorizations regarding diverse societal entities. In this 
context, several authors have referred to the term “populist worldview” or have 
described populism as a “mental map” to express the idea that populist attitudes do 
not come alone but their internalization by the individual has consequences for the 
perception and comprehension of political and social reality (Elchardus & Spruyt, 
2016; Hawkins, 2010; Krämer, 2014; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015).
By tracing populist citizens’ perceptions of public opinion and the media, we will 
investigate elements of this populist worldview in greater detail. We argue that false 
consensus and perceptions of a hostile media follow group psychological mechanisms 
triggered by an identification to the people. Moreover, populist communication is 
argued to specify in-group and out-group prototypes. Specifically, opinion majority 
claims and anti-media rhetoric employed by populist leaders are discussed to accentu-
ate in-group and out-group characteristics. Drawing on the approaches of false con-
sensus and the hostile media effect, we outline below how the interplay of populist 
cues and in-group identification with the people makes way for these biased percep-
tions to unfold.
We Are the People! Populist Attitudes and False Consensus Perceptions
The concept of the people is central to populism (Taggart, 2000). According to the 
populist ideology, the people is a homogeneous and virtuous group, a coherent entity 
of a generally good character that shares the same values and interests (Mudde, 2004; 
Wirth et al., 2016). By defining the people as such, populism constructs a homoge-
neous in-group to which individuals can adhere. However, this alone does not explain 
why individuals who identify with the group of the people should project their own 
opinion onto the whole population and believe that their opinion has a majority status, 
as anecdotal evidence currently suggests.
Definition of the in-group in populism. We argue that opinion majority claims, as an addi-
tional feature of populist communication, contribute to this perceptual bias. In general, 
an in-group’s self-understanding is promoted by prototypical in-group members (Hogg 
& Reid, 2006; Mols, 2012; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). To populism, these are the 
“charismatic leaders” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 5). In their reference to the 
people, they spread an understanding of the people as being virtuous and homoge-
neous. This claim to people-centrism has been identified as a fundamental element of 
populist communication (Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2010; Reinemann et al., 
2017; Rooduijn, 2014; Wirth et al., 2016).
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However, the populist narrative is not limited to this message alone. The populist 
actor further defines the people as a “silent majority” (cf. Taggart, 2000, p. 92) whose 
opinions are not heard but suppressed by the ruling political elite. We argue that these 
majority cues to a more fine-grained self-understanding of the people are easily inter-
nalized by those who have identified as in-group members of the people. This argu-
ment is supported by the notion that individuals “learn their biases” from role models 
(Wilder, 1986, p. 292). Indeed, the identification with a group increases the persua-
siveness of attitudes or group norms promoted by in-group leaders. A reason for this is 
the individual motivation to accord behavior and attitudes with those of other, espe-
cially prototypical, in-group members through the process of depersonalization (Hogg 
& Reid, 2006). Therefore, if a person self-categorizes as a member of the people, he or 
she should be more likely to adopt populist opinion majority claims and accordingly 
believe in the numerical superiority of the own group.
False consensus as a response to in-group threat. In general, research has shown that 
individuals very quickly overrate congruency of their own opinions with a majority 
(see research on false consensus, for example, Ross et al., 1977; projection hypothesis, 
for example, Holmes, 1968; looking glass perception, for example, Fields & Schuman, 
1976). This distortion has a functional value for the individual in that humans gener-
ally like to be right (Festinger, 1954). Certainty regarding the correctness of one’s own 
attitudes increases when they are seen to be shared by others (Holtz & Miller, 1985). 
False consensus is therefore a means by which “one can be reassured of the normality 
and appropriateness of one’s positions” (Hoorens, 1993, p. 130).
While humans generally tend to believe that others share their views, different cir-
cumstances have been identified under which this bias is even more likely to occur. 
For example, false consensus perceptions are elicited by attitude strength (Wojcieszak 
& Price, 2009) or by low perceived in-group status. Regarding the latter, members of 
groups with minority status regard themselves as being in the unbearable position of 
their opinions being under attack by stronger out-groups. In this situation, false con-
sensus helps members of low-status groups to self-enhance: it fosters the feeling of 
in-group strength and allows group members to understand themselves as part of a 
cohesive social whole (see also in-group homogeneity effect; Kelly, 1989; Lee & 
Ottati, 1995). As a consequence, opinions held by the own group appear more power-
ful to in-group members (Spears, van der Pligt, & Eiser, 1985). Finally, individuals 
who are part of minority groups also tend to overestimate consensus for their position 
out of a need for social support, while those with majority positions rather underesti-
mate consensus (Marks & Miller, 1987; Sanders & Mullen, 1983).
According to the populist narrative, the people is also a group under threat by the 
evil political elite in that it is constantly suppressed with no access to power. In com-
parison to the political elite, the people’s group status is thus low on the dimension of 
power. Furthermore, many opinions held by populist actors and parties, for instance, 
those regarding issues such as migration or homosexuality, are often delegitimized as 
being immoral, reactionary, politically incorrect, or extreme by other actors in the 
public debate (Herkman, 2015; Koopmans & Muis, 2009; Taggart, 2002). Therefore, 
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there is no doubt that populist standpoints are under attack. Moreover, research on 
populist attitudes shows that populist citizens hold high levels of collective relative 
deprivation (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Hameleers et al., 2017a). This feeling results 
from the perception of belonging to a group with low status. Against this background, 
individuals who have strongly internalized this vision of the people could be prone to 
projecting their own opinion onto others in order to strengthen their in-group’s status 
and confirm their impression of having legitimate yet suppressed positions.
Accordingly, the in-group of the people fits a precondition of false consensus per-
ceptions regarding the feeling of being under threat. Thus, in addition to the influence 
of populist majority claims, these psychological mechanisms also likely have the 
potential to explain false consensus perceptions by populist citizens. We thus formally 
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): As a person’s populist attitudes become stronger, he or she 
becomes more likely to perceive public opinion as congruent with his or her own 
standpoint.
You Are Fake News! Populist Attitudes and Hostile Media Perceptions
The relevant out-group to thin populism is the political elite, that is, the politicians 
currently running the government. Whether on national or supranational level, the 
political elite is blamed for all types of problems and—most of all—is blamed for 
depriving the people in that they ignore its will. However, depending on the specific 
form of populism, other societal actors with an elitist status are also construed as a 
burden to the people. For instance, intellectuals, administrations (Jagers & Walgrave, 
2007), or, as predominant within left-wing populism, the wealthy (Wirz, 2018) are 
often defined to be accomplices of the establishment politicians. Another actor 
against whom populist actors vent their anger on is the mass media. Donald Trump’s 
reproach to CNN, calling the outlet “fake news,” can serve as a primary example of 
hostile media attitudes expressed by a populist actor (Jamieson, 2017). In the fol-
lowing, we will discuss how accusations such as these can contribute to a perception 
of the mass media as being an out-group to the people. Afterward, we will rely on 
research devoted to the hostile media effect and discuss how these elite cues on 
media bias may facilitate self-categorization processes that further pave the way 
toward hostile media perceptions.
Definition of the out-group in populism. The attribution of blame to elites is another core 
element of populist communication (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017b, 2017c). 
Judged from a self-categorization perspective, this delineation of out-groups is central 
to the definition of the in-group (Turner et al., 1987). Moreover, contrasts between in-
group and out-groups are emphasized when out-groups are depersonalized and seen as 
homogeneous (Wilder, 1984). For populist communication to be successful, the cre-
ation of despicable out-groups is thus as important as the accentuation of appealing 
features of the in-group.
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The mainstream media are not randomly chosen by the populist leader as an oppo-
nent to the people. Theoretical work on populism offers clear ideas on where the main-
stream media stand within populisms’ relational network. The mainstream media can 
be understood as a specific interpretation of the elite (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and 
specifically, as a conspiring agent of the established politicians (Mazzoleni, 2003). 
The media are blamed for biased reporting in favor of the political elite and are 
reproached for not fulfilling their democratic function as the Fourth Estate. This per-
spective on the media—in which they are considered a part of an elite conspiracy—
has been coined “anti-media populism” (Krämer, 2018).
To the best of our knowledge, only two empirical studies to date investigate anti-
media populism on the content level. In an analysis of Belgian political parties’ broad-
casts, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) showed that only the “all-out populist party” (p. 
331) Vlaams Blok, led an anti-media discourse, whereas other parties did not engage 
in such criticism. Additionally, Holt (2016) recorded representatives from Swedish 
alternative media expressing the deep conviction that the mainstream media lie and 
have joined forces with the elite.
With messages of this type, populist actors declare the mainstream media to be a 
dangerous out-group to the people. Importantly, this declaration is all-encompassing, 
as it includes all mainstream media, not only particular outlets. The media as an insti-
tution form a group from which one must dissociate in order to keep one’s own social 
identity positive. Audience members who self-categorize as members of the people 
should easily internalize this additional message and understand it as a view that is 
generally held by the in-group (cf. Hogg & Reid, 2006). Accordingly, citizens with 
populist attitudes should categorize the media in general as part of their out-group. 
This categorization can have significant effects on how content spread by these media 
is perceived. Research devoted to the hostile media effect describes and investigates 
precisely such mechanisms.
Hostile media perceptions as a response to in-group threat. According to this line of 
research, strong partisans tend to perceive media reports that address issues of per-
sonal importance as hostile (Vallone et al., 1985). A self-categorization explanation for 
this effect was introduced by Reid (2012), who showed that hostile media perceptions 
occur only if partisan identities are salient and when the message source belongs to the 
out-group. This effect is stronger as individuals’ identification with the in-group 
becomes stronger (Arpan & Raney, 2003). In addition, low in-group status, especially 
if perceived as being illegitimate, was found to amplify hostile media perceptions 
(Hartmann & Tanis, 2013). Following this line of research, low status is already threat-
ening per se, and accordingly, members of low-status groups are especially sensitive 
to any additional threat imposed, for example, by media coverage. Hostile media per-
ceptions are also reinforced by individuals’ belief in strong influences of media mes-
sages on others (Gunther & Storey, 2003). In the context of the hostile media effect, 
especially high-reach media are presumed to have the ability to shape public opinion 
in a direction that is favorable to the out-group, which would pose a clear threat to the 
status of the in-group (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013).
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Taken together, there are at least four reasons why populist citizens likely show 
hostile media perceptions. First, anti-media rhetoric employed by populist actors 
declares the mainstream media to be an out-group to the people; this expression could 
serve as a cue to those who have internalized the populist ideology and turn them into 
highly skeptical consumers of mainstream news. Second, the populist identity could 
be made salient as soon as a news item is devoted to mainstream political affairs, inde-
pendent of particular political issues, because populism is directed against the political 
establishment in general. Individuals with strong populist attitudes should thus react 
very sensitively to any news content that features established political actors. Third, 
the perceived low political status of populist citizens could further prompt their per-
ceptions of the mass media in a hostile direction. Hostile media perceptions particu-
larly result if the low in-group status is perceived to be illegitimate, which should 
be—as outlined above—the case among populist citizens. Fourth, the declared enemy 
of the people is high-reach media outlets what could increase the presumed influence 
of these media on others. The threat that these media pose should accordingly be per-
ceived as quite momentous, and hence, hostile media perceptions should increase.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): As a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, he or she becomes 
more likely to perceive the mainstream media’s reporting as incongruent with his 
or her own standpoint.
The Gap Between Perceived Media Tone and Public Opinion
With the argument above, we postulate that as a person’s populist attitudes strengthen 
that person will more strongly perceive public opinion to be congruent and the media 
to be incongruent with his or her own standpoint. In combination, both these predic-
tions describe a gap between congruent public opinion perceptions and hostile media 
perceptions that should grow with increasing populist attitudes.
The general perceptual pattern described by this gap is in line with findings pre-
sented by a series of studies on individual media and public opinion perceptions. It 
was demonstrated several times that strong partisans show a strong positive rela-
tionship between their own opinion and perceived public opinion, which is 
explained by projection, as well as a strong negative relationship between their own 
opinion and perceived media opinion, which is explained by hostile media percep-
tions (e.g., Gunther & Chia, 2001; Gunther & Christen, 2002; Gunther, Christen, 
Liebhart, & Chia, 2001). In addition, these studies revealed a persuasive press 
inference, which describes the individual tendency to infer public opinion from the 
perceived media tone as a function of beliefs in media effects on others (Gunther, 
1998). While the persuasive press inference did not disband the projection of one’s 
own opinion onto public opinion, it offset projection at least to some extent (cf. 
Gunther & Christen, 2002).
As we suggest an increasing gap between perceived congruent public opinion on 
one hand and perceived incongruent media on the other, we also imply that the per-
suasive press inference might be weaker (if not completely neutralized) among 
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populist citizens. According to the social identity approach followed in this article, 
an explanation for this phenomenon could lie in populist citizens’ conception of the 
people as an in-group. This in-group is, following the populist narrative, very homo-
geneous and positively charged, which could translate into exceptionally strong per-
ceived communalities with the people among those that identify with this group. 
Correspondingly, research on presumed media effects on others has demonstrated a 
social distance corollary: as an individual perceives a group of others to be more 
similar to the self, this group will be perceived as less susceptible to media influ-
ences (cf. Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1995; Reid & Hogg, 2005; for a meta-analysis, see 
Sun, Pan, & Shen, 2008). Moreover, populism sketches the people as a very intelli-
gent group that acts according to common sense (Taggart, 2000). Thus, individuals 
who regard the people as their in-group should be motivated to believe in weak 
media effects on this group as a function of perceived similarities and because of the 
group’s intelligence, which should protect the group from simply believing the dis-
information spread by the manipulative enemy. For these reasons, the persuasive 
press inference mechanism is likely weaker for populist citizens, which should lead 
the gap between hostile media and congruent public opinion perceptions to widen 
rather than to shrink. We therefore assume the following:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): As a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, the difference 
between perceptions of congruent public opinion and of a hostile media increases.
Finally, we would like to determine whether the proposed relations travel across 
borders—that is, if false consensus and hostile media perceptions can be connected to 
populist attitudes in different countries. This research question will be approached 
using cross-country comparisons between four metropolitan regions. Specifically, we 
will compare the relation of populist attitudes, media, and opinion perceptions in 
Berlin, Zurich, London, and Paris. If the social psychological mechanisms are at work 
as proposed above, populist citizens in the chosen regions will likely classify public 
opinion and the mass media in the same ways, particularly because populist commu-
nication was demonstrated to play an important and influential role in the mediated 
political discourse in these four countries (Müller et al., 2017).
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Do the proposed relationships between populist atti-
tudes, public opinion perceptions, and media perceptions reflect general perceptual 
patterns that are employed by populist citizens in different countries?
Method
Data
This study is a secondary data analysis that relies mainly on the second wave of a two-
wave panel survey fielded in April 2014 (first wave) and March 2015 (second wave). 
The survey was conducted by a market research institute, and respondents were 
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recruited from an online access panel following a quota procedure regarding sex and 
age. Data were gathered in four European cities and their surrounding rural areas: 
Berlin and Brandenburg, Germany (N = 640); Paris and Île-de-France, France (N = 
640); Zurich and canton of Zurich, Switzerland (N = 1,250); and London and 
Buckinghamshire, United Kingdom (N = 824). Complete data were obtained for 
3,354 participants. Completion rates for the first panel wave range between 87.5% 
(Paris) and 92.8% (Switzerland). Due to panel mortality, which ranged between 37% 
in Zurich and 60% in Paris, the empirical distributions of age and sex slightly deviate 
from population data (Berlin: Mage = 45.9, SD = 13.1, 55% female; Paris: Mage = 
47.7, SD = 13.1, 61.9% female; Zurich: Mage = 51.8, SD = 13.8, 47.2% female; 
London: Mage = 51.5, SD = 13.2, 41.6% female). Thus, influences of age and sex were 
controlled for in all analyses.
Measures
Public opinion perceptions. Public opinion perceptions were measured via three items 
for which participants had to indicate how strongly they perceive their own opinion 
about a country’s politics to be shared by others. Items did not focus on opinions 
toward a specific policy or person but asked for opinions regarding a country’s politics 
in general. This approach was chosen because the populist ideology does not blame 
the political elite for a failure regarding a specific political issue but expresses a gen-
eral criticism of all politics run by the political elite. Values ranged from 1 (do not 
agree at all) to 5 (agree completely). Thus, high scores indicate that a person believes 
public opinion to correspond to personal views regarding a country’s politics in gen-
eral, whereas a low score indicates the opposite. The items were sufficiently reliable 
(Cronbach’s α = .84), allowing for the computation of a mean index. This index was 
normally distributed in all four country subsets (MBerlin = 3.17; SD = 0.82; MParis = 
3.18; SD = 0.89; MZurich = 2.99; SD = 0.79; MLondon = 3.15; SD = 0.84; see Tables 
A1 and A2 in the online appendix for a complete measurement report).
Media perceptions. The perceptions of the degree of congruency or incongruence 
between the mainstream media’s reporting and one’s own opinion was measured via 
four items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The measurement 
was taken from Matthes (2012, see also Eveland & Shah, 2003; Hwang, Pan, & Sun, 
2008) and adapted to the context of our study. Parallel to how the public opinion mea-
surement was established, we asked for an overall evaluation of the media coverage 
regarding a country’s politics and not regarding specific issues. Importantly, the mea-
surement tapped for opinion hostile media perceptions including the ego-perspective, 
which enables us to directly detect whether our respondents feel that the media are on 
their side (i.e., support their own opinion) or not. The measures are thus very adequate 
for the social identity approach to populist attitudes and populist perceptions that we 
follow within this article. The four items were consistent to a satisfactory degree 
(Cronbach’s α = .84), and a mean index was computed. To simplify the interpretation 
of the results, we reversed the index so that high values yield a congruent media 
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perception (as high values on the public opinion perception measure also indicate 
opinion congruent perceptions) and low values indicate incongruent media percep-
tions (MBerlin = 2.64; SD = 0.89; MParis = 2.50; SD = 0.73; MZurich = 2.94; SD = 0.84; 
MLondon = 2.57; SD = 0.79; see Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix for a com-
plete measurement report).
Perceptual gap. To depict the perceptual gap between media perceptions and public 
opinion perceptions, we computed a third dependent variable as a difference score for 
public opinion perceptions and media perceptions. Media perception scores were sub-
tracted from public opinion perception scores. As both original variables ranged from 
1 to 5, values of the gap variable range from −4 to +4. A score of −4 occurs if a person 
perceives public opinion to strongly diverge from the personal view (score of 1 on the 
public opinion variable) and if that person simultaneously perceives the media to 
report very much in line with his or her personal view (score of 5 on the media percep-
tion variable). A score of +4 occurs if a person perceives public opinion to correspond 
to the personal view (score of 5 for the public opinion variable) and if that person 
simultaneously perceives the media to report very incongruently with his or her per-
sonal view (score of 1 for the media perception variable). In both cases, the difference 
in perceptions of the media and public opinion will be at its maximum. Coming from 
both ends of the scale, the perceptual gap decreases toward the scale midpoint of 0. A 
score of 0 indicates that a person does not perceive a difference between how media 
reporting leans and how public opinion leans with reference to his or her own opinion 
(MBerlin = 0.53; SD = 1.35; MParis = 0.69; SD = 1.25; MZurich = 0.05; SD = 1.2; 
MLondon = 0.57; SD = 1.21).
Populist attitudes. Populist attitudes were measured using a 12-item scale that was 
introduced by Schulz et al. (2017). In sets of four items, the scale depicts three facets 
of populist attitudes: anti-establishment, popular sovereignty, and the homogeneity 
and virtuousness of the people. Survey participants rated all items using 5-point Lik-
ert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), which are 
reflected by a higher order factor of populist attitudes. The z scores of that higher order 
factor were used for the analyses (see Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix for a 
complete measurement report).
Controls. We included political orientation, political extremity, political interest, age, 
sex, and education as controls in our analyses. In the countries under investigation, the 
strongest populist force comes from the right of the political spectrum, with the Alter-
native for Germany in Germany, the Front National in France, the Swiss People’s 
Party in Switzerland and the UK Independence Party in Great Britain (van Kessel, 
2015). We therefore expect right-wing political orientation, measured via a single item 
scaled from 1 (left) to 11 (right), to better relate to our outcome variables than left-
wing political orientation. Furthermore, as research has shown that strong attitudes or 
involvement enhance false consensus (Wojcieszak & Price, 2009) and hostile media 
effects (Vallone et al., 1985), we included political extremity as a control to rule out 
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the possibility that relationships between populist attitudes and our dependent vari-
ables are due only to strong populist attitudes. To investigate the role of political 
extremity, we recoded the political orientation measure so that its outer ends now 
indicate political extremity (value 6), while its former midpoint now represents mod-
erate political attitudes (value 1). Additionally, political interest could function as 
involvement and reinforce both hostile media perceptions and congruent public opin-
ion perceptions. Hence, this variable, measured via a single item from 1 (not at all 
interested) to 5 (very interested) was also inserted. These controls, as well as age, sex, 
and education, were added to all models in order to assess the relative strength of the 
relationship between populist attitudes and the respective outcome variables and to 
control for bias due to samples that are not fully representative (see Table A2 in the 
online appendix for a complete measurement report and Table A3 for bivariate correla-
tions between all variables).
Analyses
First, we conducted a principal axis factor analysis (PAF) to check whether populist 
attitudes can be empirically distinguished from public opinion and media perceptions. 
Second, we run three multigroup regression analyses using the 1.1-12 version of the 
lmr4-package for R, which can be used to fit linear mixed-effects models (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). The three different outcome variables were 
regressed onto the same predictor variables within varying-intercept models (Gelman 
& Hill, 2009). Slopes were fixed to take into account that respondents are nested 
within different countries. To determine whether the proposed relations are equal in 
the regions under investigation, we freed the slopes for populist attitudes and com-
pared this model to the varying-intercept model.
Results
Within a preparatory analysis 19 items (three on opinion perceptions, four on media 
perceptions, and 12 measuring populist attitudes) were entered into a PAF using the 
promax rotation method. The analysis clearly demonstrates that the relevant constructs 
are empirically distinct both across and within the separate regions (see Table A1 in 
the online appendix).
The first multigroup regression is run with public opinion perceptions as an out-
come in order to test for H1. The results are summarized in Table 1. Populist attitudes 
are significantly—and in this case, positively—related to congruent public opinion 
perceptions (β = .31; p < .001). Accordingly, as a person holds stronger populist 
attitudes, that person will more strongly perceive public opinion to be in line with his 
or her own opinion. This result confirms H1. In addition, political orientation, educa-
tion, and sex are found to significantly relate to public opinion perceptions. The results 
show that congruent public opinion perceptions are also explained by female sex 
(β = –.05; p < .001), low education (β = –.07; p < .001) and, to a comparably strong 
degree, by right-wing political orientation (β = .24; p < .001). As a person leans more 
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strongly toward the political right that person will more strongly perceive public opin-
ion to be congruent with his or her own opinion.
Our second hypothesis stated that populist citizens perceive the media reporting to 
be hostile toward their own opinion. Table 1 shows that this hypothesis is confirmed. 
We find a strong negative and significant relation between populist attitudes and media 
perceptions. That is, as a person holds stronger populist attitudes, that person will 
perceive the media to be less congruent (β = –.32; p < .001). Political interest (β = 
–.04; p < .05) and political orientation (β = –.04; p < .05) also proved to be signifi-
cant predictors of media perceptions.
Our final hypothesis investigated the gap variable, that is, the difference score 
between media perceptions and opinion perceptions as an outcome. The hypothesis 
said that the difference in perceiving the media as incongruent toward one’s own 
standpoint and perceiving public opinion to be congruent to one’s own standpoint is 
greatest for those with strong populist attitudes. The results are summarized in Table 
1. This hypothesis is also confirmed, with populist attitudes being the strongest predic-
tor for the gap variable (β = .41; p < .001). As a person more strongly supports popu-
list ideas, his or her evaluations of media and public opinion will diverge more. Thus, 
to very populist citizens, these two entities are considered to be in strong opposition.1 
After populist attitudes, political orientation is again the second strongest predictor 
included in this analysis (β = .18; p < .001). Furthermore, low education (β = –.05; 
p < .01) and stronger political interest (β = .05; p < .01) are related to the gap as well.
For all three outcome variables, we find that populist attitudes are the strongest 
predictor.2 As a person more strongly supports populist ideas, he or she more strongly 
perceives the media’s reporting as hostile toward his or her personal standpoint and 
more strongly perceives the public opinion to be in line with his or her own standpoint. 
Following populist attitudes, right-wing political orientation holds the next greatest 
share of explained variance for media perceptions, public opinion perceptions, and the 
gap. This can be connected to the dominance of right-wing populist forces in the 
regions under investigation (van Kessel, 2015). However, it is remarkable that populist 
attitudes, which represent only the core of the populist ideology and depict no ten-
dency toward either the political left or the political right, explain the greatest share of 
variance in public opinion and media perceptions. To ascertain whether the observed 
relationships are not caused merely by populist citizens’ strong attitudes, political 
extremity was included as a control. Yet, political extremity did not relate to any of the 
three outcome variables (Table 1).3
Finally, we freed the slopes for populist attitudes in the model that uses the gap 
variable as an outcome to determine whether the detected perceptual patterns are equal 
in all four regions under investigation (RQ1). The results show that random effects for 
populist attitudes are very similar in strength and range between 1.12 in Paris and 1.37 
in Berlin. Thus, populist attitudes remain the strongest predictor for the gap variable in 
all four country samples. The comparison of the varying-intercept model with the 
varying-intercept varying-slope model via Akaike’s information criterion reveals no 
notable changes (Table 1).4 Hence, we find the detected populist perceptual patterns 
are parallel in the four regions.
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Discussion
Across Europe, populist parties are gaining influence. Their supporters have filled the 
streets and online comment forums, claiming to hold majority status and behaving in 
a hostile fashion—in words and actions—toward politicians and the media. So far, no 
studies have investigated whether these observations are systematic, that is, whether 
anti-media attitudes and opinion majority beliefs can be empirically linked to populist 
attitudes. This study set out to provide an extensive theoretical framework and empiri-
cal evidence of a relationship between populist attitudes, false consensus and hostile 
media perceptions in four countries.
We find clear systematic patterns. First, as a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, 
he or she is more likely to sense a similarity between his or her own opinion and public 
opinion. Second, a person’s perceptions of the media turn increasingly hostile as his or 
her populist attitudes strengthen. Moreover, the difference in perceiving public opin-
ion to be congruent with one’s own standpoint and perceiving the media to be hostile 
increases with increasing populist attitudes. This pattern was demonstrated in all four 
country samples.
These results and the social identity framework for populist attitudes developed in 
this article can help us to better understand populist citizens and the social dynamics 
connected to populism and populist communication. As noted by Rooduijn (2017), the 
extant literature on populist attitudes lacks evidence about commonalities among pop-
ulist citizens since most studies have been set in single countries and have focused on 
either left- or right-wing populist attitudes. By applying a measurement for populist 
attitudes that traces support to the thin ideology of populism and that links this mea-
sure to media and public opinion perceptions in four countries, we demonstrated that 
hostile media perceptions and false consensus perceptions are unifying characteristics 
of populist citizens. These perceptions are potentially driven by social identity mecha-
nisms, as suggested by our theoretical analysis.
Additionally, our findings contribute to basic communication research. As shown 
by our analysis, the persuasive press inference mechanism seems to be annulled if 
hostile media perceptions and congruent public opinion perceptions are each driven by 
populist attitudes. We argued that this finding might be connected to the fact that the 
people, who constitute public opinion, are conceived of as the in-group by populist 
citizens and the in-group is seen as less susceptible to media messages (cf. Reid & 
Hogg, 2005). However, this finding does not imply that populist citizens do not gener-
ally make persuasive press inferences. Conversely, populist citizens might well infer 
opinions of others from perceived mediated opinions, but only if those others are not 
the people (i.e., the in-group). Clearly, further research is needed to learn more about 
populist citizens’ beliefs in media effects on others.
Limitations and Future Research
Naturally, this study has limitations, and the findings must be read in light of these 
shortcomings. First, the social identity mechanisms that were proposed to underlie the 
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observed relations were not tested in this study. Future research should gather empiri-
cal information about populist communication that refers to the people as the majority 
or to the media as agents of the political elite. Media effects studies should test how 
such messages affect citizens’ public opinion and media perceptions through the pro-
cess of in-group identification. As long as these avenues are not pursued, the social 
identity approach to populist attitudes and its consequences as outlined herein will 
remain only a possible explanation for the identified perceptual patterns. Furthermore, 
for this exploration, we had to rely on cross-sectional data and no question of causality 
can hence be approached. Future research will have to follow up on the ideas pre-
sented in this article with either longitudinal or experimental designs in order to detect 
eventual causalities between populist attitudes, hostile media and false consensus per-
ceptions, as well as the relationships between these factors and their assumed predic-
tors: exposure to populist communication and identification with the people.
Moreover, clarification is needed regarding the psychological foundations of 
demand-side populism. Within this article, we have inter alia referred to this as a men-
tal map or worldview without fully resolving what these concepts are psychologically. 
We assume that—in the broadest sense—the populist worldview serves as a cognitive 
and affective framework that influences how incoming information about different 
societal entities is processed. This study has identified hostile media perceptions and 
opinion majority beliefs as elements of this worldview, however, further conceptual 
efforts are needed to carve out the concepts specificities and borders.
Further limitations concern our sample. The survey was run in four Western European 
regions. In all these countries, populism is strongly linked to the political right. The 
observed patterns should therefore also be investigated in countries where the dominant 
populist force comes from the political left. If the concept of thin populism has empirical 
value, populist citizens should show the same perceptual patterns, regardless of the polit-
ical context in which they live. The fact that the proposed relationships were found to be 
similar in all four country samples while controlling for political orientation can be inter-
preted as a first indicator of their general significance. It also has to be acknowledged 
that the sample is not fully representative. Respondents were recruited from online 
access panels, preventing those who do not have Internet access from participating. 
Moreover, we used data from the second wave of a panel survey, and dropouts from the 
first wave are likely systematic. However, we found the distributions of age and sex to 
remain close to population data, and we controlled for them and other relevant variables 
in all the analyses. At last, we have data from four metropolitan areas rather than national 
data. While we can argue that respondents’ backgrounds are diverse because we have 
surveyed both city districts and surrounding rural districts, metropolitan areas should not 
be regarded as petri dishes for nation states. Rather, we can assume that polarization 
crystallizes in these regions. It should be recognized that the relations discovered herein 
might differ in contexts characterized by consensus rather than polarization.
Finally, we did not focus on citizens with low populist attitudes. However, our find-
ings should motivate future research to investigate this group as well. Most intriguing 
might be the question of whether the mediated populist schema also triggers self-cat-
egorization processes among non-populist citizens. It could be possible that these 
Schulz et al. 19
citizens also start to employ the “us versus them” frame and view those who support 
populism as members of an out-group. This thought is supported by Müller et al. 
(2017), who found reactance effects among non-populist citizens when their media 
diet was saturated with populist messages. That populist supporters are often stigma-
tized as angry and uneducated can count as anecdotal evidence for out-group hostility 
following self-categorization as a non-populist citizen.
Conclusion
Despite its limitations, the present study contributes to an improved understanding 
of populist citizens in three ways. First, this study is the first to demonstrate a sys-
tematic link between populist attitudes, congruent public opinion perceptions, hos-
tile media perceptions, and the distance between the two latter. Populist attitudes 
proved to be the strongest predictor compared with a series of control variables, such 
as political orientation or political extremity. Second, these perceptual patterns were 
found in four metropolitan areas, which indicates that they are not linked to a coun-
try-specific discourse but might rather be part of a general populist attitude syn-
drome. Third, the article introduced a social identity approach to populist attitudes, 
which proved to be a useful explanatory framework for populist citizens’ false con-
sensus and hostile media perceptions.
Overall, we described a dangerous interplay between citizens’ identification to the 
in-group of the people and their respective responses to populist claims and mecha-
nisms, as described by research on false consensus and hostile media effects. The 
societal consequences of these biased perceptions still deserve discussion and further 
investigation. The populist mistrust in the mainstream news media in terms of the abil-
ity to report fairly and accurately about politics is likely followed by a turn toward 
alternative media (Downey & Fenton, 2003; Tsfati & Peri, 2006) and a growing dis-
trust in democracy as a whole (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005). Importantly, whereas media 
skepticism has always been linked to reporting about specific issues or conflicts, it has 
become a general accusation among populist citizens. Accordingly, political argu-
ments for different positions will hardly be listened to by populist citizens, which may 
challenge an inclusive democratic discourse (cf. Sunstein, 2002).
The false consensus that was demonstrated among populist citizens likely leads 
these individuals to overestimate their status in society. This can have great value for 
minorities, who can increase their influence via this mechanism (cf. van Avermaet, 
Mugny, & Moscovici, 1985). By projecting their own opinion onto others, populist 
citizens gain the impression of large social support for their opinions, which also lends 
reassurance regarding their position’s appropriateness. One of the most important 
sources that could correct this belief—the mass media—is disqualified as a lying agent 
of the disdained political elite.
Given the growing success of populist parties in almost all modern democracies 
combined with outrage against political and media elites, further research in this 
domain is highly important. More specifically, the dynamics of a potentially rein-
forcing spiral between populist attitudes, false consensus and hostile media 
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perceptions should be explored in more detail. A deeper analysis will enable 
researchers and practitioners in the domains of media and politics to develop a bet-
ter understanding of how populist citizens make sense of the world. Ultimately, this 
insight should help to develop measures that prevent further societal polarization in 
populist and anti-populist camps.
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Notes
1. The results presented so far point to the question of whether populist citizens still infer 
public opinion from their perceived media tone perceptions, as presumed by research on the 
persuasive press inference (cf. Gunther & Chia, 2001). If social identity mechanisms drive 
hostile media tone perceptions and congruent public opinion perceptions, then maybe, the 
persuasive press inference is switched off among populist citizens. In order to offer a test 
for this particular question, we run a mediation analysis. The analysis confirms the results 
of Hypotheses 1 and 2 and shows no significant relation between media perceptions and 
public opinion perceptions. This finding indicates that indeed, populist citizens do not seem 
to make persuasive press inferences (see Online Appendix Table A4 for detailed results).
2. This remains true if we use indicators for populist attitudes that no longer contain the 
dimension that is most conceptually similar to the respective outcome. For the first model, 
we omitted anti-elitist attitudes so that only the homogeneity and the popular sovereignty 
dimensions account for variance in media perceptions. For the second model, we excluded 
the homogeneity dimension so that only anti-establishment and popular sovereignty were 
linked to public opinion perceptions. In both cases, the results remain almost completely 
equal. Most importantly, the coefficients for populist attitudes remain by far the strongest 
by comparison.
3. To better evaluate the influence of political extremity, we run all models including political 
extremity but excluding populist attitudes. The results show that political extremity exerts 
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a significant influence on hostile media perceptions when populist attitudes are excluded 
(b = −0.02; t(3354) = −2.28; p < .05) but still political extremity does not relate to the 
other two outcome variables (see also the bivariate correlations in Table A3).
4. This is also the case for model comparisons of the other two models.
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ABSTRACT
This article presents a secondary analysis of two multi-national
cross-sectional surveys conducted in 2015 (11 countries, N =
10,570) and 2017 (4 countries, N = 2165) to examine the
relationship between populist attitudes and media use. The results
indicate that populist citizens are more likely to consume news
than non-populist citizens. Speciﬁcally, populist citizens exhibit a
preference for commercial television (TV) news, as well as a
tendency to read tabloid newspapers. While they use fewer
quality newspapers, public TV news are not systematically
avoided. Regarding the online news environment, populist
citizens prefer Facebook over Twitter as a source of political
information. This selective pattern will be discussed in light of the
debates on news audience polarization and political polarization.
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Anti-media populism (Krämer, 2018) is emerging in Europe and the United States – a
phenomenon that is reﬂected in populist politicians’ politics but also in citizens’ attitudes
toward the media. To populist citizens in particular, a healthy form of media skepticism
seems to have been replaced by a perception of the media as an element that is lying and
working against the people (Schulz, Wirth & Müller, 2018). It is an open question, if these
perceptions are related to news choice. Based on the research on selective exposure and
media skepticism (cf. Stroud, 2008; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003), one could assume that popu-
list citizens turn away from those news media, which they reproach to lie and to stand
close to the political elite. This could be the case for public television (TV) news or
quality newspapers (Mazzoleni, 2008). However, initial empirical eﬀorts in the study of
populist citizens’ media use provide mixed evidence regarding this assumption. A study
conducted in the Netherlands revealed that reading a quality newspaper is positively
related to anti-establishment populist attitudes, whereas reading a tabloid newspaper is
not (Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017a).
The current article extends prior work in that it provides an extensive investigation of
media preferences of populist citizens across the United States and 10 European countries
at diﬀerent points in time (2015 and 2017). Relying on two large multi-national cross-sec-
tional survey studies, populist citizens’ exposure to news in general and speciﬁcally, to
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quality and tabloid newspapers, public and commercial TV news shows is investigated.
Moreover, no analysis of populist citizens’ online news use has thus far been undertaken.
This study ﬁlls this research gap by examining the associations between populist attitudes
and the use of diﬀerent online news sources (e.g., social media). Importantly, both surveys
incorporate exhaustive yet similar measures regarding exposure to news and populist atti-
tudes. Thus, the data provide the unique opportunity to test and directly replicate a
number of hypotheses regarding populist citizens’ media use across countries at
diﬀerent points in time.
The present study contributes to two urgent societal and scholarly debates. One is about
the consequences of today’s high-choice media environment and whether or not the
expansion in media choice may lead to audience polarization (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017;
Webster, 2005). The second is about the role of populism in today’s societies. While for
a long time, societies were ideologically categorized along a left-right or liberal-conserva-
tive dimension, a new cultural cleavage is discussed to have emerged between populists
and cosmopolitan liberals (Inglehard & Norris, 2016; cf. Kriesi, 2010). Studies on
demand side populism support this notion and provide evidence for the importance of
populist attitudes to individual perceptions (e.g., Castanho Silva, Vegetti, & Littvay,
2017; Schulz et al., 2018) and political behavior (e.g., van Hauwaert & van Kessel,
2017). As it has hence become relevant where citizens stand on the populist attitude con-
tinuum, this attitude is potentially important to news use as well.
Populist attitudes and the polarization of news audiences
It has been observed for many years that populist parties are gaining ground in Europe and
the United States. As the German, Austrian, and Czech national elections in 2017 have
recently demonstrated, this process is not receding. Although populism is argued to
have potential corrective functions, it severely challenges the eﬀectiveness and persistence
of liberal democracies (Waisbord, 2018). One of the most concerning threats posed by
populist forces is based on their power to polarize societies (Müller et al., 2017). This
polarization is rooted in the notion that populism is a political ideology that ultimately
separates society into two homogeneous groups: the pure people and the evil political
elite. The latter defrauds the former of nothing less but the power over decisions, that
is, popular sovereignty (Mudde, 2004; Wirth et al., 2016).
Populist citizens are those who support the political vision expressed within this ideol-
ogy (Schulz et al., 2017). In particular, populist citizens show anti-elitism attitudes and
reproach the ruling political class to have, for example, lost contact to the people.
While this attitude overlaps with political eﬃcacy or political cynicism (cf. Bos, van der
Brug, & Vreese, 2013), it is also unique in that it explicitly speaks to the antagonistic
relationship between the people and the political elite. Further, populist citizens
demand unrestricted popular sovereignty. In its extreme form, this implies to limit
liberal democratic elements and/or minority rights to impose unrestrained majority
rule. Finally, populist citizens also have a very speciﬁc perception of the people. In particu-
lar, they believe the people to be a homogeneous and virtuous group, a coherent entity that
is honest, inherently good, and moreover, shares the same values and interests. With this
information in mind, a very comprehensive deﬁnition of populism and populist attitudes
in particular is oﬀered here, which speciﬁcally excludes the political elite. Other theoretical
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accounts to populism (e.g., Jagers &Walgrave, 2007) refer to additional groups that can be
excluded, either on a vertical level (e.g., the rich or the media), or horizontally (e.g.,
immigrants).
Although much is known about populist citizens’ political attitudes (Akkerman,
Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014), public opinion perceptions (Schulz et al., 2018), psychological
dispositions (Spruyt, Keppens, & van Droogenbroeck, 2016), and character (Bakker,
Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016), research on their media use is still in its infancy.
This is surprising when considering the prevailing and important debate on fragmented
and polarized news audiences and the inﬂuence of online and alternative media not only
on electoral outcomes but with respect to the integration of society as a whole (Fletcher
& Nielsen, 2017; Katz, 1996; Nelson & Webster, 2017; Webster, 2005). For reasons to be
discussed herein, populist citizens could show systematic preferences for some news
media types over others. That is, some media types are expected to have strong populist
audiences while the opposite is predicted for other news media types. More speciﬁcally,
using a selective exposure framework it is argued below that populist citizens should
show preferences for tabloid newspapers, commercial TV news as well as for digital
born news and Facebook. Further, avoidance tendencies are expected for quality news-
papers and public TV news as those are increasingly attacked by populist actors as lying
agents of the political establishment. A pattern like this would indicate polarized news
audiences on the level of media types. Before looking into the use of these speciﬁc
news media types, the article investigates news avoidance by populist citizens.
News avoidance
News avoidance and its possible polarizing consequences are identiﬁed to be among the
major challenges to democracy that arise in times of high-choice media environments
(van Aelst et al., 2017). Where the overall amount of mediated content strongly increases
but the share of political information decreases, the complete abstention from any type of
political information becomes easier (Aalberg, Blekesaune, & Elvestad, 2013; Prior, 2007).
For individuals to resist distracting content, political interest becomes a key motivation for
news exposure. Hence, when political interest is low, it is even less likely that individuals
will seek political information (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre, & Shehata, 2013). If populist citi-
zens are by and large not interested in politics, they could also be among the news-avoi-
ders. However, studies exploring the relation between populist attitudes and political
interest are surprisingly rare and provide mixed evidence (e.g., Rooduijn, 2017; Spruyt
et al., 2016).
Possibly, populist attitudes are comprised of beliefs and sentiments that stand in alter-
ing relation to political interest. On one hand, the populist demand for unrestricted
popular sovereignty, a form of democracy that is based on participation, as well as the pro-
nounced attitudes regarding the political elite could increase the attentiveness to every-
thing related to the (wrong) doings of the established politics and thus also general
news exposure. This is consistent with the research on political cynicism, where it was
determined that cynics do not turn away from news, but rather, are found to be associated
with more news exposure compared to less cynical individuals (Cappella & Jamieson,
1997).
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On the other hand, however, populist citizens are also characterized as a group that is
“reluctantly political” (Mudde, 2004, 547f.), that is, a group that must be mobilized rather
than one where members take their own initiatives. Indeed, populist attitudes are related
to feelings of anomia and a lack of political eﬃcacy (Spruyt et al., 2016), all of which
involves a certain degree of alienation from politics. From this, a disinterest in politics
as well as a general avoidance of information about politics could emerge. This avoidance
tendency could be reinforced by the frequent reproaches against the mass media voiced by
populist actors who claim, inter alia, that media are in an alliance with the political elite
against the people (Krämer, 2018). If this is internalized by populist citizens, they might
turn away from mainstream news because they are no longer trusted. If, besides, alterna-
tive information sources are not accessible, generally lower news exposure rates for popu-
list citizens could result. Against the theoretical background presented above, it is diﬃcult
to derive a hypothesis on populist citizens’ general news exposure. Hence, a research ques-
tion is investigated:
RQ1. To what extent is news avoidance associated with populist attitudes?
Preference for tabloid newspapers and commercial TV news
Though it is diﬃcult to make assumptions about populist citizens general news exposure,
assumptions about populist citizens’ preferences for certain types of news are well
founded. In general, these ideas follow the reasoning that individuals select content that
aligns with their own beliefs, worldviews and expectations to avoid or reduce cognitive dis-
sonance (Festinger, 1957; Stroud, 2008).
Populist citizens are said to prefer entertainment or soft news media, such as predo-
minantly found in tabloid newspapers or commercial TV news (Reinemann, Stanyer, &
Scherr, 2016) over other types of news sources (e.g., quality newspapers) as the former
are generally better at speaking to the populist worldview and thus might appeal more to
those who share it (Mazzoleni, 2003). For example, while quality or hard news outlets are
envisioned as closely representing the established elites, the soft news media are assumed
to do the opposite. As such, soft news media declare themselves to be the mouthpiece of
the people and thus engage in strong criticism regarding established party politics
(Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017b). In doing so, these media align with the beliefs of
those who favor the populist ideas. Moreover, soft news media are argued and found
to represent the societal order of us versus them, which is a core idea of populism
(Klein, 1998; Krämer, 2014). Populist citizens who have internalized this worldview
likely receive reports that build on this antagonism to be agreeable and easily adaptable
to their own views and, subsequently, they should be attracted to this respective media
type (Hameleers et al., 2017a). Another and more subtle populist appeal within soft news
is created by the strong market orientation of respective outlets. To gain readership,
content is produced to suit the tastes of the mass market (Mazzoleni, 2003). These
types of media are, therefore, receptive to the scandals, emotions, dramatization, and
inﬂammatory rhetoric that are styles typically employed by populist politicians (Alber-
tazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Bos et al., 2013). Accordingly, populist politics ﬁnd a reliable
and proﬁtable stage in the mass market media (Mudde, 2004). Following selective
exposure logics, populist citizens likely select those media in which their preferred
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politicians, as well as the issues and positions they as citizens hold, are frequently
represented.
Only two studies have investigated the link between populist attitudes and exposure to
soft news outlets. One study found that voters of populist parties watch more soft news
programs in comparison to voters of non-populist parties (Bos, Kruikemeier, & Vreese,
2014). While the second study did not ﬁnd a link between anti-establishment populist atti-
tudes and tabloid exposure, it did identify a link between the attitudes and preferences for
entertainment and populist media content (Hameleers et al., 2017a). The present study
examines these links by way of a comparative analysis. As, according to theoretical
accounts, tabloid newspapers and commercial TV news are those who most dominantly
promote people centrism (Mazzoleni, 2008) and as these media types are further found
to frequently employ diﬀerent soft news dimensions (Reinemann et al., 2016), the follow-
ing hypotheses are posited:
H1a. Populist attitudes are positively associated with tabloid newspaper use.
H1b. Populist attitudes are positively associated with commercial TV news use.
Avoidance of quality newspapers and public TV news
The same causes that could prompt populist citizens toward soft news outlets could also
result in an objection to hard news providers, such as quality newspapers and public TV
news (cf. Reinemann et al., 2016). Most importantly, these hard news media are associated
much more than other media with the political establishment (Mazzoleni, 2008).
It is argued that the internalization of the populist worldview in addition to populist
communication attacking the media leads individuals to categorize these quality media
types as belonging to the evil elitist out-group (Schulz et al., 2018). In fact, it was recently
determined that this perception is indeed present at the individual level (Palmer, 2017).
These beliefs about the quality media extend far beyond the critical approach to infor-
mation that should guide news consumption according to normative standpoints (cf.
Austin & Pinkleton, 1999). Rather, hard news media are sweepingly accused of biased
and intentional false reporting despite the observation that these news outlets include
high degrees of elite criticism (Akkerman, 2011). As it has been previously concluded
that higher levels of media skepticism negatively relate to mainstream news exposure
(Tsfati & Cappella, 2003), the much stronger disapproval of public service news media
and quality newspapers demonstrated by populist citizens could produce a comparable
or even more pronounced reaction. Stated more directly, if quality newspapers and
public TV news shows are the declared enemy of all those who support populism,
contact should be prohibited. Thus, it is posited that:
H2a. Populist attitudes are negatively associated with quality newspaper use.
H2b. Populist attitudes are negatively associated with public TV news use.
Exposure to online news sources
A third set of hypotheses investigates populist citizens’ engagement with news sources that
can only be accessed online. These sources are often referred to as alternative media
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(Atton, 2006). Given the high distrust that populist citizens hold regarding the mainstream
news media, it is conceivable that they, more than others, turn to alternative news sources
(Tsfati & Cappella, 2003). While alternative media also exist oﬄine, the online environ-
ment oﬀers a particularly wide variety of easily accessible news providers from which
populist citizens can proﬁt in the very sense of selective exposure. Among these online
alternatives are social media platforms, political blogs, websites of parties, and digital
born news. As the urge to approach attitude-congruent content is remarkably strong
(Stroud, 2008) it is proposed that:
H3. Populist attitudes are positively associated with the likelihood of only using digitally born
news outlets.
Among all the online sources that oﬀer political information, social media platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter are of particular interest to researchers of populism
(Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). While all political parties develop and disclose
social media strategies, populist politicians especially rely on the media that oﬀer an unﬁl-
tered link to the electorate (Moﬃtt, 2016). However, as recent research has revealed, popu-
list politicians use diﬀerent platforms to diﬀering degrees to spread their ideologies.
Speciﬁcally, populist communication is found to be more dominant on Facebook than
on Twitter (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017). Assuming that populist citi-
zens prefer outlets that strongly and frequently represent their own positions, it is posited
that:
H3a. Populist attitudes are positively associated with using Facebook for political
information.
H3b. Populist attitudes are negatively associated with using Twitter for political information.
Patterns of populist media use across countries
The populist moment is prevalent in almost all Western Democracies and is omnipresent
in all national and international public debates. Likewise, the transition from low-choice to
high-choice media environments aﬀects about all media systems. It is hence plausible to
expect similar links between populist attitudes and media choice across countries. Conse-
quently, the ﬁnal aim of this research article is to examine the associations between popu-
list attitudes and media use predicted above across countries.
RQ2. Are the proposed relationships between populist attitudes and media use robust across
diﬀerent countries?
Overview of studies
Two multi-national cross-sectional surveys provide ample data to investigate the hypoth-
eses. The surveys were administered online in 2015 (Study I) and 2017 (Study II) and cover
some of the same countries. Both surveys tapped for exposure to news in widely compar-
able ways. Thus, Study II serves as a conceptual replication of Study I for most of the
hypotheses. Only the hypotheses regarding populist citizens’ online news use are depen-
dent on Study II because Study I did not provide the necessary measures.
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Study I
Data
The ﬁrst survey was conducted in May 2015 and gathered data from 11 countries: Austria,
Bulgaria, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzer-
land (German and the French speaking part), and the United States. Respondents were
recruited via email invitation by an ISO-certiﬁed market research institute and received
a 0.50 Euro incentive for every 10 minutes of successful participation. A quota procedure
with respect to age, sex, and education was applied. This procedure resulted in 1000
respondents per country. Twenty-seven percent of those invited successfully completed
the interview with response rates ranging from 7% in the United States to 53% in
Austria. The average length of interview was 20 minutes. Cases were excluded in the
event of missing data for predictor variables. As a result, 447 cases were deleted, leaving
10,570 cases for the analyses. Detailed sample characteristics are reported in Table A12
in the online appendix.
The country selection oﬀers insights into populist news media use in eastern, northern,
southern, and western European countries and the United States. Whereas the countries
vary with regard to their media and political systems, they also share many similarities.
Importantly, all countries provide access to a variety of tabloid and quality newspapers,
as well as an oﬀer of diﬀerent public and commercial TV news shows. Furthermore, popu-
list parties and/or movements of diﬀerent political color ﬁnd support in all countries (van
Kessel, 2015).
Measures
Exposure to news
News exposure was measured using an extended version of the list-frequency technique
(Andersen, Vreese, & Albaek, 2016). Principally, news media exposure was tapped in
three stages: the media-stage, the list-stage, and the frequency-stage. During the media-
stage respondents could choose between one and ﬁve diﬀerent media via which they
received political information during a week. The options included TV, printed newspapers,
radio, Facebook and/or Twitter, and news online. The ﬁrst three items referred to news
exposure via the non-digital ways (i.e., TV set or printed newspaper). Access to traditional
news media via websites or apps was categorized as online news in this survey. Only those
respondents who chose TV and/or printed newspapers were ﬁltered to stage two of the
exposure measure, the list-stage. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the use of
diﬀerent media types refers only to the use of these types via the non-digital way whereas
digital access possibilities are disregarded. This was handled diﬀerently in Study II.
In the list-stage, country-speciﬁc lists of TV and newspaper outlets were oﬀered. The
outlet lists were presented on separate survey pages depending on the media type they
referenced, that is, TV or newspaper. Respondents were asked to select all news outlets
that they used at least once a week. The third stage, the frequency-stage, presented all
prior selected outlets and asked how often respondents accessed these news outlets over
the course of a week. The response alternatives ranged on a 7-point Likert scale from 1
(1 day per week) to 7 (7 days per week). The exact question and item wording as well as
country and survey speciﬁc lists of news outlets are reported in Table A8 online.
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To compute the dependent variables, the news exposure measure was recoded decisi-
vely. To measure news avoidance, the media-stage variables were transformed into
a binary variable. Those who did not chose a single medium, news avoiders, were
assigned the value of 1 (N = 292). If at least one medium was selected, a value of 0 was
assigned (N = 10,278).
Exposure to the diﬀerent news media types was measured with variables from the list
and frequency stages of the exposure measure. In a ﬁrst step, the outlets that were pre-
sented in the list-stage were categorized as belonging to one of four categories, namely,
tabloid press (also enclosed free and commuter press), quality press, public TV news,
and commercial TV news. The categorization of TV news outlets was guided via
channel ownership, that is, public or private. The categorization of newspapers as either
tabloid or quality was pursued with the help of international experts who were queried
to verify and/or discuss the categorization prepared by the author (see Table A9 online
for outlet categorization).
In a second step, open answers that were added to the bottom of each outlet list were
recoded as belonging to one of the four media types. As the amount of data was substan-
tial, this was only conducted for respondents who did not select any outlet from the pre-
pared lists and only used the open answer ﬁeld to identify their news diet (N = 834). The
majority of open replies referred to high-reach media from foreign countries.
Finally, the media type exposure variables were computed. Out of the many options to
compute these variables, two diﬀerent approaches were chosen to add robustness to the
analyses. The ﬁrst media type exposure variable carried information about the sum of
selected outlets on the list-stage. This resulted in four count variables: public TV sum
(ranged from 0 to 9), private TV sum (ranged from 0 to 10), quality newspaper sum
(ranged from 0 to 10), and tabloid newspaper sum (ranged from 0 to 7). For example,
if someone watched BBC News at Six and BBC News at Ten, a score of 2 on the public
TV sum variable was assigned.
The second media type exposure variable relied on the frequency-stage variables and
contained information about the mean frequency of contact with the respective media
type per week. This resulted in another four dependent variables: public TV frequency
(M = 2.51, SD = 2.41), private TV frequency (M = 2.78, SD = 2.48), quality newspaper fre-
quency (M = 1.35, SD = 2.03), and tabloid newspaper frequency (M = 1.37, SD = 2.13, N =
10,570).
Importantly, cases that were ﬁltered out during the media-stage of the exposure
measure for not having chosen TV or printed newspapers as a means to obtain political
information were assigned the value 0 on all eight media type exposure variables. Accord-
ingly, all analyses were based on the complete dataset, and results and interpretations refer
to the whole sample and are not limited to those individuals who watch TV and/or read
newspapers.
Populist attitudes
Populist attitudes were measured using a 12-item inventory that was based on a hierarch-
ical three-dimensional conceptualization of populist attitudes where four items were used
to measure each dimension (Schulz et al., 2017). The ﬁrst dimension captured attitudes
toward the political elite and the second dimension assessed the individual’s demand
for popular sovereignty. Items of both, ﬁrst and second dimension also refer to the
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antagonism between the people and the political elite. The third dimension measures the
perception of a homogeneous and virtuous people. These latent dimensions were reﬂected
by a higher order factor of populist attitudes whereby the factor scores of the higher order
factor were used as a predictor within the regression analyses. The reliability of the 12
items was very good with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 (see Table A14 online for a measure-
ment report).
Controls
A series of psychological, political, media related, and sociological control variables
were included in the attempt to demonstrate unique relationships between populist
attitudes and media use. Political interest has been positively linked to exposure to
all types of media (Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010) and has, in high-choice media environ-
ments, become one of the key motivations for seeking news sources (Strömbäck et al.,
2013). Need for cognition was included as the desire to think was shown to positively
relate to media use (Tsfati & Cappella, 2005). Political orientation has been found to be
a major driver of selective exposure to news media (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). However,
as news outlets were not categorized regarding their political leanings but rather,
regarding what news media type they belonged to, political orientation is not expected
to correlate with the dependent variables. Albeit, it is included as a control to isolate the
explanatory power of populist attitudes from the left- or right-political leanings of the
respondents. For similar reasons, media skepticism is included as a fourth control.
Because populist citizens hold negative attitudes toward the media (Schulz et al.,
2018) and as media skepticism is conﬁrmed to guide media use (Tsfati & Peri,
2006), it is important to separate out its inﬂuence on the dependent variables to identify
the unique inﬂuence of populist attitudes. By so doing, the logic usually presented
within selective exposure research is followed, that is, that political attitudes, and not
attitudes toward the media themselves, are related to media use. Importantly, this
article relies on a very concise deﬁnition of populism, which does not regard the
media as a constituent of the elite. In addition sociodemographic variables, namely
age, sex, and education, were included in all models (see Table A14 online for a
measurement report).
Analyses
Depending on the speciﬁcities of the dependent variables, diﬀerent types of regression
methods were employed. Among these methods were logistic regressions (news avoid-
ance), zero-inﬂated poisson regressions (sum of selected outlets per news media type),
and linear regressions (mean frequency of use per news media type). H1a to H2b
were each tested twice as two diﬀerent operationalizations for the use of each news
media type were available. To account for the fact that respondents are nested within
countries, all analyses contained ﬁxed-eﬀects components. To test for the robustness
of eﬀects across countries, mixed-eﬀects models were compared to the ﬁxed-eﬀects
models. The analyses were run in R 3.3.1 using the package lme4, version 1.1-17
(Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and the package glmmTMB, version 0.2.1.0
(Brooks et al., 2017).
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Results
Research question one asked the extent to which news avoidance is associated with popu-
list attitudes. The results of a ﬁxed-eﬀects logistic regression model showed that populist
attitudes were signiﬁcantly and negatively associated with news avoidance, suggesting
that populist citizens were more likely to use news than their non-populist counterparts
(b =−0.32, p < .05; Table 1). To learn more about this association, an additional analysis
was computed. The dependent variable was transformed to no longer contain individual
TV news use. As a result, the association between populist attitudes and news avoidance
became non-signiﬁcant (b =−0.01, ns; Table A1 online). Taken together, a correlation was
found between stronger populist attitudes and news exposure in general, but this relation-
ship was shown to be primarily driven by a heavy TV news consumption.
The ﬁrst set of hypotheses posited that people with higher populist attitudes would
exhibit stronger tabloid newspaper and commercial TV news use (H1a and H1b).
Fixed-eﬀects regression analyses conﬁrmed these assumptions. Populist citizens were
more likely to read tabloid newspapers and watch commercial TV news compared to
non-populist citizens. This ﬁnding held with respect to the mean frequency of their use
during a week (tabloid newspapers: b = 0.24, p < .001; commercial TV news: b = 0.44,
p < .001; Table 1) and the sum of outlets selected (tabloid newspapers: b = 0.14, p < .001;
commercial TV news: b = 0.14, p < .001; Table A2 online).
H2a and H2b predicted that high populist attitudes are related to less exposure to news
media types that most often provide hard news, such as quality newspapers and public TV
news. The results fully conﬁrmed H2a. The stronger the populist attitudes were, the lower
was the frequency of contact with quality newspapers during the week (b =−0.13, p < .01;
Table 1) and the lower was the number of quality newspapers the individual read (b =
−0.11, p < .001; Table A2 online). H2b, which assumed a decrease of public TV news
use with increasing populist attitudes, was not supported. There was not a signiﬁcant
association between populist attitudes and exposure to public TV news shows, neither
regarding the frequency of contact (b = 0.06, ns; Table 1) nor the sum of used outlets
(b =−0.04, ns; Table A2 online). Hence, populist citizens had a smaller quality newspaper
diet than non-populist citizens. However, they did not avoid public TV news. Rather, they
watched public TV news with the same intensity as non-populist citizens.1
To test for the robustness of eﬀects across countries (RQ2), random-eﬀects were com-
puted for populist attitudes. The resulting models’ quality was compared to the quality of
their counterparts with ﬁxed-eﬀects using the models’ Bayesien Information Criterion
(BIC). The model with the smaller BIC is to be preferred (Gelman &Hill, 2009). This com-
parison revealed that, all but in one case, the BIC of the ﬁxed-eﬀect models was smaller
compared to the BIC of the random-eﬀects models. This ﬁnding indicates that the
ﬁxed-eﬀects models better ﬁt the data and that hence, results can be interpreted as
robust across countries.
The only exception was found with regard to the models predicting the frequency of
tabloid newspaper use. The respective ﬁxed-eﬀect model had a BIC of 44,573 compared
to a BIC of 44,540 found for the random-eﬀects model. This indicates that the relationship
between populist attitudes and the frequency of tabloid newspaper use varies across
countries. Indeed, detailed analysis of country speciﬁc (random) eﬀects revealed interest-
ing country diﬀerences. Random eﬀects for populist attitudes were in some countries
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Table 1. Fixed eﬀects logistic and linear regressions predicting news avoidance and the mean frequency of news media genres use (Study I).
News avoidance Public TV news Commercial TV news Quality newspapers Tabloid newspapers
b SE z b SE t b SE t b SE t b SE t
Fixed eﬀects
Intercept 0.53 0.48 1.10 −0.89 0.27 −3.25** 1.01 0.33 3.01** −1.06 0.23 −4.68*** 0.03 0.26 0.10
Sex (female) 0.18 0.13 1.44 −0.14 0.04 −3.40*** 0.26 0.04 5.83*** −0.04 0.04 −1.01 −0.02 0.04 −0.61
Age −0.03 0.00 −6.45*** 0.05 0.00 33.40*** 0.02 0.00 17.20*** 0.01 0.00 11.91*** 0.01 0.00 6.00***
Education (high) −0.63 0.16 −3.96** 0.02 0.04 0.41 −0.32 0.05 −6.68*** 0.29 0.04 7.17*** −0.20 0.04 −4.63***
Need for cognition −0.25 0.07 −3.45*** 0.07 0.03 2.89** 0.05 0.03 1.69 0.18 0.02 7.89*** 0.07 0.02 2.91**
Political interest −0.81 0.06 −13.30*** 0.39 0.02 20.70*** 0.26 0.02 12.90*** 0.32 0.02 19.05*** 0.17 0.02 9.32***
Political orientation (right) 0.00 0.03 0.06 −0.02 0.01 −2.04* 0.07 0.01 8.86*** 0.00 0.01 0.58 0.05 0.01 6.99***
Media skepticism −0.08 0.09 −1.00 −0.07 0.03 −2.87** −0.08 0.03 −3.04** −0.04 0.02 −1.58 −0.02 0.02 −0.97
Populist attitudes −0.32 0.15 −2.10* 0.06 0.05 1.26 0.44 0.05 8.22*** −0.13 0.05 −2.81** 0.24 0.05 5.03***
R2 .17 .25 .22 .17 .15
Notes: N = 10,570. Unstandardized coeﬃcients. Random intercepts are reported in the Online Appendix Tables A1 and A3.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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positive (as the ﬁxed eﬀect had also indicated), in some countries, however, a negative
relationship was established. Contrary to what was hypothesized, tabloid newspapers
were used less frequently during the week the higher someone’s populist attitudes were
in Italy (b =−.38), the US (b =−.33), Poland (b =−.30), France (b =−.21), and
Germany (b =−.13). Hence, the signiﬁcant positive relationship between populist atti-
tudes and tabloid news use that was found via the estimation of ﬁxed-eﬀects was not
robust across countries.
The ﬁndings regarding the role of control variables lend conﬁdence to the validity of the
complete analysis. The strongest and, in all cases, positive and signiﬁcant predictor of news
exposure was political interest. Only news avoidance was associated negatively with pol-
itical interest. The same was true for need for cognition, which, but in one case, positively
related to news media type use and negatively related to news avoidance. When signiﬁcant,
education was positively related to the use of hard news and negatively related to soft news
use. If media skepticism was signiﬁcant, it was always associated with avoidance. Interest-
ingly, right-wing orientation was signiﬁcantly associated with lower use of public TV news
and with stronger exposure to tabloid newspapers and commercial TV news. Regarding
socio-demographics, men were more likely to watch news on public TV and women
were more likely to watch news on commercial TV. Age was often positively related to
media use.
Discussion
The results of Study I indicate that populist citizens in 11 countries are clearly not news
avoiders. Rather, news exposure is more likely to occur the stronger one’s populist atti-
tudes. This ﬁnding, however, is the result of a strong TV news diet among populist citi-
zens. More speciﬁcally, given that there was no relationship found between populist
attitudes and public TV news use, this heavy TV news diet is based on strong commercial
TV news reliance. Moreover, populist citizens, in general, were stronger users of tabloid
newspapers than non-populist citizens. However, this ﬁnding was qualiﬁed by a
country speciﬁc analysis, which revealed that in some countries populist citizens use
tabloid newspapers less often during a week than those with low populist attitudes.
Finally, as was assumed, citizens with strong populist attitudes tended to use quality news-
papers less than those with low populist attitudes. Hence, except for H1a and H2b, the
results generally conﬁrm the postulated role of populist attitudes in news media use.
Explanations for why populist citizens are just as likely to watch public TV news as
non-populist citizens will be developed in the overall discussion.
The positive relationship between age and media use across all news media types points
to a methodological limitation with this study. Exposure to all four news media types as
measured in this study only referred to exposure to these types via traditional ways.
However, there is no question that citizens also turn to mainstream news media via the
Internet using their Smartphones, tablets or PCs. This is probably the case for younger citi-
zens as they are the ones whomore often use the Internet (Büchi, Just, & Latzer, 2016), and
hence, older citizens may appear to be stronger news users in this study. Accordingly,
given that the operationalization of exposure to news media types was not optimal, a repli-
cation is warranted using a measure of news exposure that also considers digital ways to
access traditional news media. Replicating this study with the same list of predictors and
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slightly altered dependent variables would lend further credibility to the results, providing
a rationale for Study II.
Study II
Data
The second survey was conducted in April 2017 and included four countries, namely,
France (N = 540), Germany (N = 556), Switzerland (German speaking part; N = 551),
and United Kingdom (N = 550). Participants were recruited by the same survey
company that was commissioned for the ﬁrst study and identical recruitment and incen-
tive procedures were applied. Twenty-seven percent of those invited successfully com-
pleted the survey with response rates ranging from 20% in the United Kingdom and
32% in Germany. The interviews were 21 minutes long on average. Because of missing
data for predictor variables, 32 cases were deleted, which resulted in 2165 valid responses.
Sample characteristics are displayed in Table A13 online. Although Study II included
fewer countries than Study I, the four countries represented in this study were a part of
Study I. For those measures that were similar to Study I, Study II served as a conceptual
replication of Study I, that is, for the tests of RQ1, and H1a to H2b. H3, H3a, and H3b are
tested only in Study II.
Measures
Exposure to news
Study II used the three-stage news exposure measure that was introduced in Study I (see
Table A10 online for the complete instrument). Respondents identiﬁed their media use in
the media, list, and frequency-stage. However, two diﬀerences occurred. First, while Study
I strictly diﬀerentiated whether news outlets were accessed oﬄine or online, Study II expli-
citly determined that the way of access was irrelevant. In other words, it did not matter
whether respondents used news outlets via the TV, the printed versions of newspapers,
or online using the browser of the computer, smartphone or tablet apps. This instruction
was repeated on the diﬀerent pages of the questionnaire, and moreover, during the list-
stage and the frequency-stage, not only were the names of the news outlets presented
but their URLs were also given. Secondly, the news outlets listed on the list-stage of the
exposure measure diﬀered slightly. However, except for three outlets, all outlets that
were included in Study I were also included in Study II within the countries were this com-
parison was possible. Moreover, respondents had the option to write an open answer if
they did not ﬁnd their news outlets represented. As in Study I, open answers were only
recoded if the respondent did not select outlets from the prepared lists, but only indicated
they used another news show or another newspaper (N = 85).
With respect to the dependent variables, the media exposure measures were recoded
parallel to Study I. News avoidance was a binary variable. If no medium was selected in
the media-stage, the value 1 was assigned (N = 81). If at least one medium was selected,
a 0 was assigned (N = 2084). The meanings of these values are parallel to those of Study I.
Exposure to news media types was recoded via the list- and frequency-stage variables as
in Study I (see Table A11 online for the categorization of outlets in Study II). Eight
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variables resulted from this procedure: public TV sum (ranged from 0 to 14), private TV
sum (ranged from 0 to 6), quality newspaper sum (ranged from 0 to 9), tabloid newspaper
sum (ranged from 0 to 14), public TV frequency (M = 2.77, SD = 2.34), private TV fre-
quency (M = 2.39, SD = 2.45), quality newspapers frequency (M = 1.99, SD = 2.43), and
tabloid newspapers frequency (M = 1.64, SD = 2.24, N = 2165).
Exposure to online only news, which has not been measured in Study I, was computed
as a binary variable via the media-stage variables. A value of 1 was assigned to those
respondents who indicated they receive all of their political information via social
media or political blogs and/or specialized news sites only available on the Internet. In
other words, the value of 1 was assigned to those respondents who avoid TV news, news-
papers and radio news and choose to use only (alternative) online sources of information
(N = 28). All remaining cases were assigned a value of 0 (N = 2137).
Study II measured the use of Facebook and Twitter separately, which was not pursued
in Study I. If respondents in the media-stage indicated they used social media, e.g., Face-
book, Twitter or YouTube, as a source for political information (quoted byN = 1278), they
were guided to a follow-up question that asked which of the diﬀerent social media plat-
forms they speciﬁcally used. Among those were Facebook (quoted by N = 972) and
Twitter (quoted by N = 218). In the analyses, Facebook and Twitter users were not
contrasted to all remaining non-users in the sample but only to those, who had also indi-
cated to use online news but then did not indicate to use Facebook (N = 306) or Twitter
(N = 1060), respectively.
Populist attitudes
The measurement for populist attitudes paralleled that of Study I. In this study the 12
items reached a Cronbach’s alpha value of .85 across all four countries.
Controls
As in Study I, sex, age, education, need for cognition, political interest, political orientation
and media skepticism were included as controls. The operationalizations were the same
for all variables except for political interest and need for cognition, which diﬀered slightly
from respective measures in Study I. Means, standard deviations and exact item wordings
are available in Table A15 in the online supplemental ﬁle.
Results
Study II investigated the same research questions and hypotheses as Study I, ensuing with
the investigation of a relationship between news avoidance and populist attitudes. With
respect to research question one, populist attitudes were negatively related to news avoid-
ance (b =−0.47, p < .01; Table 2), and this relation dissolved when TV news use was
ignored (b =−0.17, ns; Table A4 online). As in Study I, populist attitudes were related
to news exposure at ﬁrst glance but upon closer examination, this relation was revealed
to be based primarily on heavy TV news use.
Second, exposure to tabloid newspapers and commercial TV news was examined. H1a
was partially supported. While populist attitudes positively related to the frequency of
tabloid newspaper use (b = 0.24, p < .001; Table 2), there was no signiﬁcant relationship
between populist attitudes and the sum of tabloid newspapers (b = 0.07, ns, Table A5
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Table 2. Fixed eﬀects logistic and linear regressions predicting news avoidance and the mean frequency of news media genres use (Study II).
News avoidance Public TV news Commercial TV news Quality newspapers Tabloid newspapers
b SE z b SE t b SE t b SE t b SE t
Fixed eﬀects
Intercept 4.16 0.98 4.24*** −0.58 0.42 −1.39 −1.94 0.47 −4.15*** −0.65 0.48 −1.37 −0.74 0.59 −1.24
Sex (female) 0.60 0.25 2.42* 0.05 0.09 0.50 0.08 0.10 0.83 0.03 0.10 0.27 0.17 0.09 1.88
Age −0.03 0.01 −3.36*** 0.05 0.00 14.80*** 0.02 0.00 6.15*** 0.02 0.00 5.82*** 0.00 0.00 −0.78
Education (high) −0.29 0.32 −0.88 −0.01 0.10 −0.10 −0.30 0.12 −2.58** 0.14 0.11 1.28 0.07 0.10 0.69
Need for cognition −0.32 0.09 −3.69*** 0.01 0.04 0.36 −0.01 0.04 −0.13 0.08 0.04 2.02* 0.06 0.04 1.67
Political interest −0.65 0.10 −6.65*** 0.35 0.03 10.50*** 0.18 0.04 4.80*** 0.40 0.04 11.17*** 0.24 0.03 7.33***
Political orientation (right) 0.00 0.06 0.04 −0.02 0.02 −0.84 0.13 0.02 5.73*** −0.01 0.02 −0.28 0.06 0.02 3.13**
Media Skepticism −0.02 0.09 −0.21 −0.14 0.04 −3.81*** −0.02 0.04 −0.55 −0.09 0.04 −2.14* −0.09 0.04 −2.32*
Populist Attitudes −0.47 0.17 −2.68** 0.06 0.07 0.80 0.54 0.08 6.67*** −0.03 0.08 −0.39 0.24 0.07 3.34***
R2 .23 .20 .11 .16 .21
Notes: N = 2165. Unstandardized coeﬃcients. Random intercepts are reported in the Online Appendix Tables A4 and A6.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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online). Compared to those with lower populist attitudes, populist citizens selected equal
numbers of tabloid outlets but read those more often during the week. H1b was fully sup-
ported as populist citizens exhibited a robust commercial TV news use regarding the mean
frequency (b = 0.54, p < .001; Table 2) as well as regarding the sum (b = 0.20, p < .001;
Table A5 online).
The hypotheses regarding the exposure to quality newspapers (H2a) and public TV
news (H2b) were both only partially supported. Populist attitudes negatively and signiﬁ-
cantly related to the sum of quality newspapers selected (b =−0.09, p < .05; Table A5
online), as well as to the sum of public TV news shows selected (b =−0.06, p < .05;
Table A5 online), which ﬁrst lend support to the hypotheses. However, no signiﬁcant
relationships were found between populist attitudes and the frequency of the use of
quality newspapers (b =−0.03, ns; Table 2), and public TV news (b =−0.06, ns; Table
2), which lead to a partial rejection of H2a and H2b. Hence, citizens with strong populist
attitudes selected fewer quality newspapers and fewer public TV news shows, but read or
watched those just as frequently during the week as did those with lower populist attitudes.
The third set of hypotheses examined the association between populist citizens and
online news sources. First, the likelihood of only using digital born news, that is, no tra-
ditional news media at all, did not increase with increasing populist attitudes (b =−0.02,
ns, N = 2137; Table 3). H3 was therefore not supported. However, when analyzing online
news use in more detail, interesting patterns emerged. Study II revealed that the likelihood
of using Facebook increased with stronger populist attitudes (b = 0.31, p < .01; N = 1278)
but that the likelihood of using Twitter decreased with stronger populist attitudes (b =
−0.28, p < .05; N = 1278). Thus, among those who used the Internet to get politically
informed, those with populist attitudes were more likely to use Facebook to obtain political
information, while those with lower populist attitudes preferred to use Twitter, supporting
H3a and H3b (Table 3).2
A model comparison was undertaken to test for the robustness of ﬁndings across
countries (RQ2). For Study II BIC values were always smaller for the ﬁxed-eﬀects
models and in no case random-eﬀects models were to be preferred. Findings reported
for this study are hence interpreted as robust across countries.
Table 3. Fixed eﬀects logistic regressions predicting online only news, Facebook and Twitter use (Study
II).
Online only news Facebook Twitter
b SE z b SE z b SE z
Fixed eﬀects
Intercept −4.22 1.57 −2.69** 1.83 0.57 3.19** −0.36 0.67 −0.53
Sex (female) −0.96 0.42 −2.29* 0.32 0.14 2.31* −0.65 0.16 −4.12***
Age −0.02 0.01 −1.35 −0.02 0.00 −3.38*** −0.02 0.01 −3.21**
Education (high) 0.06 0.47 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.85
Need for cognition −0.01 0.14 −0.06 −0.09 0.06 −1.43 0.06 0.07 0.90
Political interest −0.30 0.13 −2.37* −0.22 0.06 −3.92*** 0.16 0.06 2.64**
Political orientation (right) 0.04 0.08 0.50 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.31
Media skepticism 0.66 0.17 3.88*** −0.01 0.06 −0.19 0.04 0.06 0.68
Populist attitudes −0.02 0.32 −0.05 0.31 0.11 2.79** −0.28 0.12 −2.20*
Nagelkerkes R2 .11 .08 .06
N 2165 1278 1278
Notes: Unstandardized coeﬃcients. Random intercepts are reported in the Online Appendix Table A7.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Findings regarding the control variables largely parallel what was revealed in Study
I. Speciﬁcally, political interest was positively related to the use of all media types and
was negatively associated with news avoidance. Need for cognition was positively
related to quality newspaper use but not related to any other media type use. Higher edu-
cated respondents preferred quality newspapers, whereas lower educated respondents pre-
ferred commercial TV news. Right-wing political orientation coincided with the use of
tabloid newspaper and commercial TV news use. Media skepticism, if signiﬁcant, was
negatively related to the consumption of diﬀerent news media types. Sex was non-signiﬁ-
cant when it came to traditional news use, but males were shown to be more likely among
those that only used online news and Twitter. Importantly, age had mixed associations to
exposure to diﬀerent news media types, after online access possibilities to the diﬀerent
news media types were taken into account. Only the use of public service TV news was
consistently associated with an increase in age.
Discussion
The ﬁndings of Study II largely replicated the ﬁndings of Study I. Although the operatio-
nalization of the dependent variables diﬀered slightly, the broad pattern of results was the
same. First, populist attitudes were not related to news avoidance but rather, news avoid-
ance was signiﬁcantly less likely among those with stronger populist attitudes. Second,
populist attitudes were strongly associated with commercial TV news use. The stronger
someone supported the populist ideas, the more commercial TV news shows that
person watched. The association between tabloid press use and populist attitudes was gen-
erally positive but also not very robust. Speciﬁcally, while on average populist citizens used
tabloid newspapers more frequently during a week than non-populist citizens did, no such
relationship was established regarding the number of selected tabloid press outlets. Third,
in Study II, populist citizens watched fewer public TV news shows compared to non-popu-
list citizens to a small, but signiﬁcant degree. However, on average, those with populist
attitudes watched public TV news shows with the same frequency during the week as
did those with lower populist attitudes. The same pattern emerged for the relationship
between populist attitudes and quality newspaper use. While those with populist attitudes
used fewer quality newspapers compared to those with lower populist attitudes, they read
them just as frequently during the week.
Going beyond traditional news use, the results from Study II extended insights into
populist citizens’ media use regarding online news sources. The ﬁndings indicate that
populist citizens were no more likely than non-populist citizens to receive political infor-
mation only via speciﬁc online news sources. However, populist citizens were more
inclined to use Facebook and less inclined to use Twitter compared to non-populist
citizens.
Overall discussion
These two large-scale multi-national studies are the ﬁrst to systematically investigate
populist citizens’ media use in a comparative manner. What the ﬁndings reveal about
populist citizens media use is telling. First of all, the results indicate that populist citizens
are not news avoiders. Conversely, news exposure across media types is even more likely
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for those with stronger populist attitudes. Rather than avoiding news, populist citizens pay
attention to and follow political aﬀairs. At ﬁrst sight, this is a preferable outcome when
judged from a normative perspective, as it speaks against a far-reaching alienation from
the political process.
However, further analyses of this study call for caution. The strong relationship
between populist attitudes and news exposure is mainly driven by strong TV news diets
with a pronounced focus on commercial TV news. The second most prominent media
type within the populist citizens’ media diet is the tabloid newspaper. Even though this
ﬁnding was not established in all investigated countries of Study I, the majority of analyses
support this interpretation. Thus, populist citizens strongly rely on news types that are
often found to distribute soft news (Reinemann et al., 2016). No or negative relationships
were established between populist attitudes and the two hard news media types. This
suggests an overall worrisome news media selection exhibited by populist citizens
across Europe and the United States.
The two favored media types, tabloid newspapers and commercial TV news, are among
the most sensationalist, scandalized, and dramatized news sources (Reinemann et al.,
2016). In addition to this, tabloid newspapers focus on the divide between the people
and the elite (Klein, 1998), and moreover, contain a higher number of populist blame attri-
butions in comparison to quality newspapers (Hameleers et al., 2017b). While these
ﬁndings support the hypotheses regarding the appeal of popularized media outlets to
populist readerships (Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 2003), their potential consequences are
alarming. Though soft news is also discussed as a gateway into politics (Baum, 2002;
Norris, 2003), mounting evidence demonstrates that the link between soft news exposure
and political cynicism is robust also against inﬂuences of political knowledge and political
interest (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2015). Thus, based on what is known about the eﬀects of
soft news, it is diﬃcult to imagine how this media choice can increase the low political
trust levels that characterize populist citizens.
Against the backdrop of these ﬁndings, the study of media type use along populist atti-
tudes provides some evidence for polarized news audiences. Especially, commercial TV
news audiences appear polarized in that citizens with strong populist attitudes adhere
more to this news type than citizens with low populist attitudes do. As hence, populist citi-
zens primarily use a news media type that has the strong potential to reinforce their priors,
it is suggested that the new cultural cleavage between populist citizens and others not sup-
porting the ideology may widen in the future.
However, other analysis of this study reveal that against the expectations, populist citi-
zens do not exhibit a much lower public TV news exposure compared to those with lower
populist attitudes. Rather, the results indicate that across all countries, populist citizens are
just as likely as non-populist citizens to watch news produced by public service broadcas-
ters. Given the strong media skepticism voiced by populist actors and their followers
regarding this media type, this ﬁnding is surprising. Of course, regarding the dangers of
polarizing news audiences, this could be regarded as good news. Populist citizens are
not dropping out of the mainstream political discourse, but rather, they still share a
news agenda with non-populist citizens. This points to a bridging role of public service
TV (cf. Castro, Nir, & Skovsgaard, 2018). However, nothing is known about the motiv-
ation by which populist citizens approach these media, or how the received information
is processed. The literature oﬀers diﬀerent ideas for why one could turn to potentially
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counter-attitudinal news. Habitual news use or the wish to stay connected with society
could be named as reasons. Public broadcasters generally reach large audiences, and popu-
list citizens may just want to know what potentially many know. That also quality news
were shown to spread elements of the populist worldview could be another reason for
populist citizens to approach these outlets (Akkerman, 2011).
However, the hostile media attitudes held by populist citizens likely trigger speciﬁc
motives that could prevent them from completely turning away from these media
sources. As populist citizens perceive themselves to be suppressed by those in power,
they may not turn away from public TV news because they need to stay informed
about the actions of their opponents. In a similar vein, populist citizens may approach
the mainstream news media to conﬁrm their own opinions, that is, that the political
elite lies and that the media support it through negative reports about populist actors. Fol-
lowing this notion, hard news media may be to populist citizens what Tsfati and Cappella
refer to as “a source of support for their skepticism” (2003, p. 519). These motivational
layers are connected to what has been called defense motivation (Brenes Peralta, Wojcies-
zak, Lelkes, & & Vreese, 2017, p. 836) or surveillance (Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman,
2011, p. 171; cf. Garrett & Stroud, 2014) in other studies. Future research needs to examine
these drivers for exposure more closely. It is important to take into account why news is
approached and how it is processed.
The ﬁnal ﬁnding of this study can also be reﬂected in this light. Regarding online news
use, populist citizens prefer Facebook as a means to obtain political information. Future
research should investigate the speciﬁc news populist citizens garner from Facebook,
and just as importantly, how mainstream news is framed within social media. Discussions
or information shared online within reference groups or via alternative news outlets likely
shape the perception of mainstream news reports.
Limitations
This study carries several limitations that warrant discussion. First, as two cross-sectional
data sets were used no causal conclusions can be made. However, as it was the aim to
reveal patterns of populist media use and eventually detect polarized news audiences,
the chosen approach is considered adequate. Nonetheless, longitudinal analyses are desir-
able, as those could investigate the potential reinforcing spirals between media use and
populist attitudes (cf. Slater, 2007). Indeed, populist attitudes may also be an attitudinal
outcome of heavy commercial TV and tabloid news diets. The samples were also not
fully representative what limits the generalizability of the ﬁndings. However, the
regression approach allowed for the inclusion of many control variables to account for
potential sampling biases as well as for potential confounds to the investigated relationship
between populist attitudes and media use. The considered concepts reﬂect sociological,
psychological, political and communication science perspectives on media use. Despite
the presence of these controls, populist attitudes are still found to signiﬁcantly relate to
diﬀerent media type variables. However, future research should look closer into potentially
interesting interdependencies between the diﬀerent predictors using mediation and mod-
eration analysis and also further controls.
Further, it needs to be acknowledged that the news exposure measure is based on self-
reports, and thus, the responses may be biased. For example, social desirability could have
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led respondents to select hard news outlets as using such outlets may be perceived as an
educated behavior. However, the case may be diﬀerent with respect to populist citizens.
Taking their strong media skepticism into account, the socially desirable answer for a
populist citizen would be to dispute exposure to the suspected dishonest media. As popu-
list citizens claim, nonetheless, to use such outlets, social desirability may not have been an
issue in this study. Moreover, exposure to tabloid and commercial TV news should as well
be diﬃcult to admit as it is generally not socially desirable to use such news sources. Popu-
list citizens, however, also selected these outlets when ﬁlling out the questionnaire.
Other problems regarding the exposure measure may have emerged from people’s gen-
erally bad memories. To report on one’s own news exposure is a cognitively demanding
task and replies are likely imperfect (Andersen et al., 2016). However, with the approach
chosen for this study, every attempt was made to optimize the measurement. The lists con-
tained the most watched or read outlets per country as well as open replies. Furthermore,
respondents were asked to reﬂect on their use of news sources during the past week, a task
that is considered less demanding than reﬂecting on one’s general news exposure (Ander-
sen et al., 2016). Thus, while the implementation of tracking techniques is certainly inter-
esting for future research, the approach chosen here adhered to best practice examples.
Another limitation to this study lies in the categorization of news outlets to the four
identiﬁed media types. Indeed, the large scale of this study came at the cost of some
level of accuracy. However, despite the use of tabloid newspapers, ﬁndings were robust
and stable across countries, what can be interpreted as a post hoc validation of the
media type categorization. Nevertheless, future research should look into country diﬀer-
ences more carefully than it was possible within this large scale and initial comparative
study on populist citizens media use. Accounting for diﬀerences in media systems and
country speciﬁc market characteristics will clearly oﬀer additional insights into populist
citizens’ media use.
Final remarks
Populist citizens are certainly low on political trust and they are not just skeptical toward
the media but rather show sweeping accusations that allow for no exceptions. Without
much diﬀerentiation the media are accused to lie and conspire with the political elite to
the disadvantage of the people. There may be little hope that any news media type, be
it hard or soft news, will be able to rescind this critical judgement. Cappella and Jamieson
describe a cynic as one who “begins with mistrust and must be persuaded to the opposite
view” (1997, p. 141). It remains an open question how this can be accomplished against the
Manichean worldview of populist citizens. Their distinguished media diet with a focus on
commercial TV news, tabloid newspapers, and Facebook potentially helps to engrave the
new societal cleavage in populist citizens’ minds and therefore also on the level of society.
Notes
1. In an additional analysis, income was included as a further control to all models (see Table
A14 online for a measurement report). This did not change the results with regard to populist
attitudes. Income itself related positively to diﬀerent media use variables (i.e., sum and fre-
quency of quality press use, sum and frequency of tabloid press use, and sum of public
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TV news use). However, for this analysis, 10 percent of the participants had to be excluded
due to missing values on this variable. Therefore, income was not used within the hypothesis
testing.
2. The inﬂuence of income was tested in an additional analysis. No changes occurred regarding
the role of populist attitudes. Income was positively related to the sum and frequency of
quality press use, to the sum of tabloid press outlets used as well as negatively related to
news avoidance. The measurement for income is reported in Table A15 online.
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ABSTRACT
Alongside the recent rise of political populism, a new type of
alternative media has established in past years that allegedly
contribute to the distribution of the populist narrative. Using a
large-scale quota survey of German Internet users (n = 1346) we
investigate political and media use predictors of exposure to
alternative media with an aﬃnity to populism (AMP). Results reveal
substantial diﬀerences between occasional and frequent AMP users.
While both groups heavily use Twitter and Facebook for political
information, occasional AMP users exhibit hardly any speciﬁc
political convictions (except that they feel less personally deprived
than non-users). Contrary to that, frequent AMP exposure is related
to higher personal relative deprivation, stronger populist attitudes
and a higher likelihood to vote for the right-wing populist party
AfD. Against this background, frequent AMP use can be interpreted
as partisan selective exposure whereas occasional AMP exposure
might result from incidental contact via social media platforms.
These ﬁndings are discussed regarding the role of alternative and
social media in the recent populism wave.
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So called ‘alternative media’ possess the potential to constitute a counter-public to main-
stream political discourse (Downey & Fenton, 2003). While alternative media have long
lived in the shadow of scientiﬁc interest (Downing, 2003) scholars have more extensively
investigated their role in processes of political opinion formation and mobilization in
recent years. Research indicates that alternative media are often strongly connected
with the emergence of grassroots political movements such as the Arab Spring or Hong
Kong’s pro-democracy movement (Howard & Hussain, 2013; Leung & Lee, 2014).
Some authors even classify alternative journalism as a form of political activism (e.g., Har-
cup, 2011). One reason why alternative media have been gaining momentum in recent
years can be seen in the broad diﬀusion of the Internet that has greatly lowered the bar
for establishing a news outlet (Fenton & Barassi, 2011).
Besides such technical opportunity structures, a general dissatisfaction with main-
stream media is another important driver of an upsurge of alternative news providers.
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In recent years, a number of countries worldwide has witnessed an erosion of media trust
(Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2019, p. 21). Simultaneously, political
actors that are combining political populism with a right-wing political ideology have
risen (see, e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Populism’s main claim is that the will of the
people should have the highest priority in political decision-making (Mudde, 2004).
Studies indicate that support for a populist agenda is linked to low media trust (Fawzi,
2019) as well as stronger perceptions of mainstream media hostility (Schulz, Wirth, &
Müller, 2018). Against this backdrop, it does not come as a surprise that the populist
wave is as well accompanied by a number of alternative media which promote a discourse
that speaks to the populist narrative.
In recent years, scholars have started to investigate how these alternative media with an
aﬃnity to populism (AMP) relate to the social media channels of populist political actors
(Bachl, 2018; Haller & Holt, 2018; Holt, 2017). However, little is known about the users of
AMP (but, see, Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018). To clarify the
role AMP might play in the promotion of political populism, it seems important to better
understand which users are exposed to AMP – and why. This is the aim of the present
research. It sheds light upon this question using a large quota survey of German Internet
users. More speciﬁcally, we investigate whether political and media use predictors (as well
as a number of covariates) can help to diﬀerentiate between occasional and frequent
exposure to AMP.
What are alternative media with an aﬃnity to populism?
Many researchers have addressed questions of how to deﬁne and conceptualize ‘alternative
media’ (see, e.g., Atton, 2002; Bailey, Cammaert, & Carpentier, 2007; Hamilton, 2000). A
clear consent upon a single unequivocal deﬁnition of the term is however missing (Down-
ing, 2003). Rather, authors have stressed diﬀerent features of alternative media as deﬁning
elements, for instance their participatory potential (Fenton & Barassi, 2011; Hamilton,
2000), their political radicalism (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2003), or their societal impact
as a form of journalistic activism (Downey & Fenton, 2003; Harcup, 2011). Only very
recently, Holt, Figenschou, and Frischlich (2019) have criticized that most of these
deﬁnitions can only be applied to the context of progressive alternative media. However,
in recent years, emerging news outlets with a decidedly anti-mainstream stance have often
adopted rather reactionary political positions or have even been connected to spreading
disinformation. Therefore, the authors suggest to use ‘alternative media’ as a non-norma-
tive umbrella term describing, in a broader sense, all media outlets that position them-
selves (or are perceived as) non-hegemonic (Holt et al., 2019). In a second step, speciﬁc
subgroups of alternative media (such as AMP) can be identiﬁed.
In the German context, outlets like Epoch Times, Compact or RT Deutsch, harshly cri-
ticize the political elites and accuse the mainstream media to participate in an elite con-
spiracy against ordinary people. This is in line with the overall populist narrative.
Political populism is deﬁned as a thin-centered ideology, i.e., a rather narrow set of
ideas instead of a complete worldview (Mudde, 2004; Wirth et al., 2016). At its core it
argues that there is an unresolvable antagonism between the ruling societal and political
elite and the pure and honest people. The latter are deemed to be the legitimate sovereign
of any state. However, the people are depicted as being betrayed of their legitimate power
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by an elite conspiracy that spreads across all societal ﬁelds. Consequently, many populist
politicians attack established news outlets as participating in the alleged elite conspiracy
(Schulz, Wirth, et al., 2018). Within this setting, populist alternative news media have
the possibility to ﬁll a gap on the news market by addressing an audience which has
already internalized this kind of anti-media populism. In that sense, populist coverage
can be identiﬁed as a main mission of these outlets (for similar assessments see, Bachl,
2018; Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018; Haller & Holt, 2018; Holt, 2017; Storz, 2015).
However, systematic content analyses of AMP outlets are still lacking. Therefore, it
remains unclear how exactly populism manifests itself in their discourse. Research on main-
stream journalistic media has found that populism occurs as a fragmented ideology in media
coverage (Müller et al., 2017). This means that diﬀerent features of the populist ideology
(people-centrism, anti-elitism, and demand for popular sovereignty) are not equally distrib-
uted across media outlets. Similarly, it can be assumed that diﬀerent AMP outlets contain
their own speciﬁc combination of populist messages. This does not need to be limited to
thin populism. It has been argued that populism in many of its real-world occasions is com-
pleted by exclusionist ideas (Jagers &Walgrave, 2007). That says that the features that com-
prise thin populism are replenished with ideas as to a rejection of at least one other outgroup
next to the political elite. In forms of contemporary right-wing populism this outgroup is
being found in migrants. Thus, (xenophobic) exclusionism within alternative media’s dis-
course can also indicate a populist slant, if it is combined with other elements of the populist
ideology such as anti-elitism or people-centrism.
Who uses alternative media with an aﬃnity to populism?
While only a few authors have investigated the discourse of AMP outlets (Holt, 2017) or
their use as sources within the social media communication of populist political actors
(Bachl, 2018; Haller & Holt, 2018), research on the audiences of AMP is even more scarce.
Studies have investigated the media use of citizens with an aﬃnity to political populism
(Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017; Schulz, 2019). Moreover, it has been shown that social
media use is a signiﬁcant predictor of voting for right-wing populist politicians (Groshek
& Koc-Michalska, 2017). However, this research did not explicitly include AMP exposure.
First insights are oﬀered by analyses from the Reuters Institute Digital News Report (New-
man et al., 2018). For diﬀerent countries, the study ﬁnds that users of alternative and parti-
san news websites tend to hold more extreme positions on the political left-right spectrum,
strongly distrust established news media, and are predominantly male. For Germany in par-
ticular, also younger age was an important factor (Newman et al., 2018). These ﬁndings oﬀer
a valuable starting point for further investigations on predictors of using AMP. However,
further research is necessary to clarify whether the audiences of allegedly populist alternative
media do in fact have a strong relationship to political populism. The present endeavor fol-
lows this route by focusing on political predictor variables that are indicative for citizens’
aﬃnity to populism. Moreover, we consider the additional media use preferences of AMP
users that have been largely neglected thus far. Moreover, we account for potential diﬀer-
ences between occasional and frequent users of AMP.
The reason for diﬀerentiating between occasional and frequent use resides in the
important role played by SNS such as Facebook or Twitter in disseminating populist con-
tent (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; Krämer,
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2017). In comparison to established news outlets AMP have the disadvantage of not being
eminently known. It is thus of particular importance for them to extend their audience and
make new users aware of their existence. For this purpose, SNS can be a very important tool.
Users of these platforms do not only get to see the content that they actively selected but also
related contents that are recommended by other users and selected by the platforms’ algor-
ithms. This increases the likelihood for an un-established news outlet to gain new users.
Consequently, many alternative media heavily rely upon SNS for the distribution of their
contents (Fenton & Barassi, 2011). For AMP, this means that two diﬀerent groups of
users with diﬀerent predispositions could exist: (1) heavy users who are rather frequently
exposed to the messages of one or more AMP outlets as part of their usual news routine,
and (2) occasional users who stumble across information from AMP from time to time
via their SNS accounts (see, Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018).
Political predictors
Extant research points to the importance of individual cognitive predispositions, most
importantly political consciousness, in predicting alternative media exposure (Downing,
2003). For instance, political attitudes have been demonstrated to be closely linked to
using alternative media in a Hong Kong sample (Leung & Lee, 2014). This argument is
supported by research on selective exposure according to which individuals are predomi-
nantly drawn to content that has the potential to reinforce own views (Stroud, 2008). That
way, AMP might support populist actors in gaining electoral success. Especially frequent
AMP exposure could relate to voting for populist parties. To our knowledge, this relation-
ship has not been tested empirically yet. However, research shows that passive social
media exposure relates to preferences for the populist candidate Donald Trump during
the 2016 US presidential campaign (Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017). Since AMP heavily
rely upon social media as a distribution platform, this can be read as a ﬁrst support of our
notion. In Germany, where the present study was conducted, Alternative für Deutschland
(AfD) is the only major political party that has been unequivocally considered populist in
the research literature (Lees, 2018). Notably, this party combines populist anti-elitism with
a right-wing exclusionist political ideology – and so do their voters (Hansen & Olsen,
2019). Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1: Higher AfD vote probability will predict frequent AMP exposure.
Moreover, research has shown that there is a distinct set of ideas related to the thin
populist ideology – namely anti-elitism attitudes, a preference for popular sovereignty,
and a belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people – that form a common atti-
tudinal construct (Schulz, Müller, et al., 2018). These populist attitudes are an important
predictor of voting for populist parties (Rooduijn, 2014; van Hauwaert & van Kessel,
2018). It seems plausible to assume that they also promote the use of AMP. As this
again describes intentional rather than incidental exposure, we expect that populist atti-
tudes can particularly be found among frequent users of AMP:
H2: Populist attitudes will predict frequent AMP exposure.
As a thin-centered ideology, populism can be enriched with left- as well as right-wing
ideological components. Consequently, research has found populist attitudes in
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combination with both left- and right-wing political convictions among diﬀerent groups of
citizens (van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018). This supports the notion that political popu-
lism is neither distinctly left- or right-wing as is oftentimes claimed by populist politicians
and AMP alike. However, their discourse often features clear elements of either side. Con-
sequently, Newman et al. (2018) found that in some countries exposure to AMP (such as
Breitbart, Infowars, or Austrian unzensuriert.at) is related to a right-leaning political
orientation, some outlets such as US outlet Occupy Democrats or British Another Angry
Voice have a left-leaning audience. However, in some countries under consideration pol-
itical orientation of AMP users did not clearly diﬀer from that of other news outlets. This
leaves us with a certain ambiguity as to the role of political left-right orientation for using
AMP. Therefore, we ask:
RQ1: How is political left-right orientation related to AMP exposure?
An important factor in support for populist parties and the emergence of populist atti-
tudes seems to be the subjective perception of the current state of society. For instance,
Inglehart and Norris (2016) observed a conditional eﬀect of subjective economic insecurity
on voting for populist parties that depended on authoritarianism. A particular form of
societal dissatisfaction that is widely acknowledged as inﬂuential also in populism research
is the feeling of relative deprivation. This construct describes a feeling of resentment and
perceived lack of social recognition or resources that the self, as in individual relative
deprivation, or the self’s group, as in collective relative deprivation, deem to be entitled
of. Diﬀerent studies demonstrated that relative deprivation relates to populist attitudes,
voting for populist parties (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Spruyt, Keppens, & van Droogen-
broeck, 2016), or also selective exposure to populist content (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese,
2018).
Mostly, these studies have conceptualized collective, and not individual relative depri-
vation. This corresponds to the observation that populism as an ideology heavily employs
a social identity rhetoric (Krämer, 2014; Müller et al., 2017) and that collective rather than
personal relative deprivation has been found to trigger collective action (Walker & Mann,
1987). But also individual relative deprivation was shown to explain speciﬁc, individually
oriented coping strategies (e.g., Kawakami & Dion, 1995). Self-selecting into reinforcing
information oﬀered by alternative news platforms online can be regarded a passive and
not necessarily collective type of behavior. AMP exposure could thus very well be an indi-
vidually oriented strategy that people choose in order to cope with feelings of personal
relative deprivation, especially if it is conducted in a passive manner of mere consumption.
However, if users actively engaged with AMP, for instance, by commenting or sharing
news items, also collective relative deprivation could explain AMP exposure. Therefore,
we ask:
RQ2: How are personal and collective relative deprivation related to AMP exposure?
Media use predictors
Downing (2003) suggested that in order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of
alternative media’s users research should not only look at factors within the users but
also at the technological platforms that are being used to access news content. The
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study by Leung and Lee (2014) has shown that using SNS for news acquisition is a very
strong predictor of alternative media exposure. However, it appears worthwhile to further
diﬀerentiate this notion. A large body of research suggests that news exposure via SNS is
diﬀerent from other ways to access news (e.g., Costera Meijer & Groot Kormelink, 2015;
Glynn, Huge, & Hoﬀman, 2012; Schäfer, Sülﬂow, & Müller, 2017). Most notably, many
users are incidentally exposed to news via SNS (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018; Valeriani & Vac-
cari, 2016). We have argued that such incidental exposure to AMP content via SNS could
be an important explanation for occasional contact. In this case, individuals who do not
have strong attitudinal bonds to AMP and their contents would receive posts by AMP
from time to time through their SNS news feed, for instance because these posts were
liked, commented or shared by other users in their network. That way, SNS could help
AMP to broaden their audience beyond a strongly attached core group. Consequently,
we assume that:
H3: Using SNS for political information will predict occasional AMP exposure.
When it comes to diﬀerences between SNS platforms, research suggests that Twitter more
frequently leads to incidental news exposure than Facebook (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018).
However, research on the distribution of populist content on SNS indicates that Facebook,
rather than Twitter, is a central hub for the populist message (Ernst et al., 2017). This
means that for AMP outlets Facebook could play a central role as well. Supporting this
impression, populist citizens in Europe and the US are more strongly using Facebook
for news than non-populists (Newman et al., 2019, p. 42). Taken together, these ﬁndings
do not allow for speciﬁc hypotheses as to the role played by diﬀerent SNS for the distri-
bution of AMP’s content. Therefore, we ask an open-ended research question:
RQ3: Are there diﬀerences between using Facebook and Twitter for political information in
predicting AMP exposure?
Moreover, research suggests that populist citizens have certain media use preferences
that distinguish them from other individuals. Overall, populist citizens have a comparably
high exposure to political news, especially to entertaining news content from sources such
as tabloid newspapers and private television (Hameleers et al., 2017; Schulz, 2019). At the
same time, they do not seem to value quality newspapers (Schulz, 2019) which is in line
with anti-media populist sentiments. Contrary to that, Jackob (2010) found that alterna-
tive media users in Germany used television news less frequently than others but heavily
relied upon quality print media. Therefore, we ask:
RQ4: How is using traditional news sources (quality and tabloid newspapers, public and pri-
vate television) related to AMP exposure?
Method
Procedure and sample
In order to test our hypotheses and research questions we conducted a quota survey of
German Internet users in the week before the German federal election (24 September
2017) between 12 September and 19 September 2017. Participants were recruited from
an online-access panel of an ISO-certiﬁed commercial research company. Using a quota
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procedure for age, gender, and education the sample intended to reﬂect the German elec-
torate above 18 years of age in its basic demographic characteristics. The ﬁnal data set con-
sisted of n = 1346 completed interviews (age: M = 49.92; SD = 15.91; 50.7% female; 44.7%
with the highest German school degree ‘Abitur’). Participants answered a longer question-
naire on political and societal topics within which the measures for the present study were
embedded. The questionnaire was distributed among panel members via e-mail and was
answered online.
Selection of AMP outlets
This study examines the case of Germany where the AMP market has been comparably
large in recent years. It is important to note that in the German case the political landscape
has a stronger tendency towards right-wing populism. Consequently, also many AMP out-
lets that are relevant to a German audience appear to feature a nationalist and right-wing
exclusionist political agenda such as Junge Freiheit (von Nordheim, Müller, & Scheppe,
2019). However, certainly not all alternative media outlets in Germany that speak to
the populist narrative clearly contain right-wing standpoints. For instance, KenFM basi-
cally follows an anti-elitist agenda that is often also combined with left-wing issue pos-
itions (Storz, 2015). Moreover, also Russia and US based outlets such as RT deutsch,
Sputnik or Epoch Times are relevant to a German audience. These outlets mainly seem
to contain positions against German societal and political elites.
However, in lack of systematic content analyses, we had to rely on the outlet’s
self-descriptions and a variety of diﬀerent secondary sources in order to identify AMP
candidate outlets. For instance, PI News claims that its main topic is the manipulation
of the population by traditional media and politicians (PI News, 2019). A list of outlets
that we assumed to be contain populist ideas was pre-tested in a survey in April 2017.
The ﬁnal study was then limited to the 12 best-known outlets: Breitbart, Compact,
Epoch Times, Infowars, Junge Freiheit, KenFM, Kopp Report, PI News, RT Deutsch,
Sezession, Sputnik, and Tichys Einblick. While these outlets diﬀer in many respects (e.g.,
funding, organizational structure, professionalism, issue agenda, age, distribution strat-
egy), all of them oﬀer a discourse that features elements of populist anti-elitism and
people-centrism.
Measures
Exposure to AMP
Using a list-frequency technique (Andersen, de Vreese, & Albæk, 2016) we asked respon-
dents to report their frequency of exposure to AMP. They were presented with a list of the
selected AMP outlets for which they were asked to indicate whether they knew the outlets
at all and if so, how frequently they were exposed to them on a scale from 0 = never to 5 =
very frequently. In order to measure direct exposure through the outlets’ websites (or
printed versions) as well as exposure via SNS we only asked respondents to assess their
frequency of exposure to the content of the respective news outlets leaving open the mod-
alities of access to this content. The percentage of participants who stated to be exposed to
the respective outlets at least very rarely ranged between 8.2% and 15.3% (see Table 1). The
number of frequent or very frequent users ranged between 2.9% and 1.6%. For further
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analyses, answers on the diﬀerent AMP outlets were collapsed in a categorical variable. If
respondents answered they never used any of the selected AMP outlets they were coded 0
for this new variable (71.9% of respondents). If they stated to use one or more outlets at
least ‘very rarely’ but none of them ‘frequently’ or ‘very frequently’ they were assigned the
code 1 (12.6% of respondents). As soon as they indicated to use one or more outlets ‘fre-
quently’ or ‘very frequently’ they were assigned the code 2 (15.5% of respondents). This
was necessary in order to test whether AMP exposure is indeed related non-linearly to
some of the predictor variables under consideration.
AfD vote probability
The probability of voting for right-wing populist party AfD was assessed using a single
item that was embedded in a list of all major German parties. Individuals were asked to
indicate the likelihood of voting for the party in the upcoming German national election.
Answers were given on a seven-step scale from 1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely (M =
2.24; SD = 2.11).
Populist attitudes
Populist attitudes were assessed using an established three-dimensional 12-item inventory
by Schulz, Müller, et al. (2018). The scale includes four items for each of the three sub-
dimensions anti-elitism (e.g., ‘MPs in Parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary
people.’), demand for popular sovereignty (e.g., ‘The people should be asked whenever
important decisions are taken.’), and belief in a homogenous and virtuous people (e.g.,
‘Ordinary people share the same values and interests.’; for a full list of items, see Appendix
1). Answers were given on a seven-point scale from 1 = do not agree at all to 7 = fully agree.
For further analyses, a mean index was calculated from the 12 items (M = 4.86; SD = 1.12;
Cronbach’s α = .89).
Personal and collective relative deprivation
These constructs were measured with three items each (for a full list of items, see Appen-
dix 1). Drawing from Elchardus and Spruyt (2016), the items for personal relative depri-
vation estimated the perceived personal life-satisfaction in relation to the country context
or in relation to a normative judgment (e.g., ‘I, personally, never get what I in fact
deserve’). The items for collective relative deprivation view the perceived situation of
Table 1. Descriptive results for AMP exposure.
Outlet Do not know the outlet Know, but never use the outlet Use the outlet at least ‘very rarely’
Breitbart 954 (70.9%) 261 (19.4%) 131 (9.6%)
Compact 947 (70.4%) 193 (14.3%) 206 (15.3%)
Epoch Times 1119 (83.1%) 94 (7.0%) 133 (9.8%)
Infowars 1135 (84.3%) 86 (6.4%) 125 (9.3%)
Junge Freiheit 1014 (75.3%) 174 (12.9%) 158 (11.7%)
KenFM 1143 (84.9%) 83 (6.2%) 120 (8.9%)
Kopp Online 1050 (78.0%) 129 (9.5%) 167 (12.4%)
PI News 1087 (80.8%) 110 (8.2%) 149 (11.1%)
RT deutsch 1013 (75.3%) 152 (11.3%) 181 (13.4%)
Sezession 1165 (86.6%) 70 (5.2%) 111 (8.2%)
Sputnik 864 (64.2%) 281 (20.9%) 201 (14.9%)
Tichy’s Einblick 1133 (84.2%) 76 (5.6%) 137 (10.2%)
Notes: n = 1346. Values are absolute frequencies with relative frequencies in parentheses.
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the in-group in the societal context (e.g., ‘Whichever way you look at it, people like me
never get what they in fact deserve in this society.’). Answers were given on a seven-
step scale from 1 = do not agree at all to 7 = fully agree. As the items of the two constructs
have certain commonalities, we calculated a principal component analysis with varimax
rotation across all items to test the bipartite factor structure. The analysis extracted two
factors for personal and collective relative deprivation on which the items loaded as
expected. For data analysis, items were therefore merged into two separate mean indices
(personal relative deprivation: M = 3.00; SD = 1.71; Cronbach’s α = .90; collective relative
deprivation: M = 4.33; SD = 1.74; Cronbach’s α = .92).
Media use for political information
The use of media outlets was assessed with single items using a ten-step scale. Respondents
were asked to indicate whether they usually used a certain type of media never (=1), less
than once per week (=2), once (=3), twice (=4), up to seven times per week (=9), or several
times each day (=10) to receive political information. All items repeated that we were
interested in usage ‘for political information’. Items for the use of Facebook (M = 3.75;
SD = 3.32) and Twitter (M = 1.94; SD = 2.20) simply contained the names of the two plat-
forms. For quality (M = 3.72; SD = 2.92) and tabloid newspapers (M = 2.94; SD = 2.75) as
well as for public (M = 4.81; SD = 3.13) and private television (M = 6.56; SD = 3.07) the
items brieﬂy illustrated which type of media was meant using examples (e.g., ‘How
often do you use so called quality newspapers or their websites for political information
(e.g., FAZ/faz.net, Süddeutsche Zeitung,…)?’).
Covariates
For control purposes, a number of well-established political and socio-demographic con-
structs has additionally been measured. First, political orientation on the left-right axis was
assessed with a single-item measure on a scale from 1 = left to 10 = right (M = 5.14; SD =
2.00). These answers were re-coded into a ﬁve-step political extremism variable (M = 2.08;
SD = 1.27) where 1 indicates the lowest level of extremism (values 5 and 6 on the original
scale) and 5 the highest (values 1 and 10 on the original scale). Moreover, we measured
political interest using three items (e.g., ‘I get informed about politics on a daily basis’).
Answers were given on the same seven-point scale that was used for populist attitudes.
Again, a mean index was calculated for further analysis (M = 4.91; SD = 1.64; Cronbach’s
α = .87). Next to age (M = 49.92; SD = 15.91) and gender (50.7% female) also formal edu-
cation was assessed. Participants selected their highest educational degree from a list of
four options (no or lowest German secondary degree ‘Hauptschulabschluss’: 18.6%; med-
ium secondary degree ‘Realschulabschluss’: 36.7%; highest secondary degree ‘Abitur’:
20.2%; college or university degree: 24.3%).
Results
In order to account for the potentially non-linear nature of relationships under con-
sideration we used multinomial logistic regression for the categorical dependent
variable exposure to AMP. Zero exposure to AMP was treated as the reference cat-
egory. This leaves us with two contrasts predicting the likelihood of occasional and
frequent exposure to AMP in comparison to zero exposure (see Tables 2a and 2b).
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Before being entered into the regression model all (quasi-)metric variables were z-stan-
dardized in order to increase comparability of eﬀect sizes. After standardization, odd’s
ratio values indicate the increase or decrease in the likelihood of belonging to the
Table 2a. Multinomial logistic regression model explaining occasional AMP exposure.
B (SE)
95% CI for odds ratio
Lower eB Upper
Intercept −2.04 (0.24)***
Political predictors
AfD vote probability 0.19 (0.11) 0.98 1.21 1.50
Populist attitudes −0.01 (0.11) 0.80 0.99 1.23
Personal relative deprivation −0.25 (0.12)* 0.62 0.78 0.99
Collective relative deprivation 0.06 (0.13) 0.84 1.07 1.36
Media use predictors
Tabloid newspapers 0.09 (0.10) 0.90 1.09 1.32
Quality newspapers 0.13 (0.10) 0.94 1.14 1.39
Private television −0.08 (0.10) 0.75 0.92 1.13
Public television 0.01 (0.11) 0.81 1.00 1.23
Facebook 0.38 (0.09)*** 1.22 1.47 1.76
Twitter 0.24 (0.09)** 1.07 1.27 1.51
Covariates
Political left-right orientation −0.08 (0.10) 0.75 0.92 1.13
Political extremism 0.01 (0.10) 0.84 1.01 1.21
Political interest 0.17 (0.11) 0.95 1.18 1.48
Age −0.41 (0.10)*** 0.55 0.67 0.82
Formal education (=university vs. lowest school degree) 0.12 (0.29) 0.65 1.13 1.99
Formal education (=Abitur vs. lowest school degree) −0.22 (0.30) 0.45 0.80 1.43
Formal education (=middle vs. lowest school degree) −0.31 (0.26) 0.44 0.73 1.23
Gender (=male vs. female) 0.57 (0.19)** 1.23 1.77 2.54
Notes: n = 1346. Cox & Snell R2 = .21; Nagelkerke R2 = .26. Model χ2(36) = 307.54, p≤ .001.
*p≤ .05; **p≤ .01; ***p≤ .001.
Table 2b. Multinomial logistic regression model explaining frequent AMP exposure.
B (SE)
95% CI for odds ratio
Lower eB Upper
Intercept −2.55 (0.26)***
Political predictors
AfD vote probability 0.57 (0.09)*** 1.48 1.78 2.13
Populist attitudes 0.24 (0.11)* 1.02 1.27 1.59
Personal relative deprivation 0.22 (0.11)* 1.00 1.25 1.55
Collective relative deprivation −0.22 (0.12) 0.63 0.81 1.03
Media use predictors
Tabloid newspapers 0.10 (0.10) 0.92 1.11 1.33
Quality newspapers 0.31 (0.10)*** 1.13 1.37 1.65
Private television −0.15 (0.10) 0.71 0.86 1.06
Public television −0.17 (0.10) 0.69 0.85 1.04
Facebook 0.30 (0.09)*** 1.12 1.34 1.61
Twitter 0.43 (0.08)*** 1.31 1.53 1.80
Covariates
Political left-right orientation −0.07 (0.10) 0.77 0.94 1.13
Political extremism −0.01 (0.09) 0.84 0.99 1.18
Political interest 0.13 (0.11) 0.92 1.14 1.41
Age −0.26 (0.10)* 0.63 0.77 0.94
Formal education (=university vs. lowest school degree) 0.85 (0.30)** 1.30 2.34 4.21
Formal education (=Abitur vs. lowest school degree) 0.63 (0.31)* 1.03 1.88 3.43
Formal education (=middle vs. lowest school degree) 0.41 (0.27) 0.89 1.51 2.57
Gender (=male vs. female) 0.39 (0.18)* 1.04 1.47 2.09
Notes: n = 1346. Cox & Snell R2 = .21; Nagelkerke R2 = .26. Model χ2(32) = 304.37, p≤ .001.
*p≤ .05; **p≤ .01; ***p≤ .001.
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dependent group for an increase of one standard deviation from the mean of the pre-
dictor variable.
Results indicate that among the political predictors only personal relative deprivation
signiﬁcantly relates to occasional AMP exposure. However, the relationship is negative
indicating that occasional AMP users feel less personally deprived than non-users. For fre-
quent AMP exposure, a diﬀerent picture emerges. Frequent AMP exposure is related to
higher AfD vote probability (supporting H1), higher populist attitudes (supporting H2),
and higher personal relative deprivation. Political orientation and collective relative depri-
vation do not signiﬁcantly relate to neither occasional nor frequent AMP exposure.
H3 predicted that SNS use for political information relates to occasional AMP
exposure. Essentially, results support this assumption. The use of Facebook as well as
Twitter for political information are both comparably strong predictors of occasional
AMP use. However, this is also true for frequent exposure to AMP. Diﬀerences between
the two SNS can only be found in their relative importance. While occasional exposure
more strongly relates to Facebook usage, frequent AMP users more heavily rely upon
Twitter. Using traditional media outlets for political information is unrelated to occasional
AMP exposure. However, frequent AMP users use quality newspapers more often for pol-
itical information than the contrast group of non-users. For private and public television
as well as tabloid newspapers, no patterns are observed.
Concerning, the covariates, male gender and lower age consistently predict occasional
as well as frequent AMP exposure. However, age has a distinctly stronger relationship with
occasional than with frequent exposure. When it comes to formal education individuals
with no or the lowest German school degree (‘Hauptschulabschluss’) were used as the
reference category. In comparison to this group no other school degree signiﬁcantly pre-
dicts occasional AMP exposure. However, both the group with the highest school degree
‘Abitur’ and the group with a university degree have a signiﬁcantly higher likelihood of
frequent AMP exposure. Political left-right orientation, political extremism, and political
interest turn out to be unrelated to AMP exposure.
Discussion
The present research has explored political and media use predictors of frequent and
occasional exposure to alternative media with an aﬃnity to populism (AMP) for political
information. In doing so, this study is one of the rare contributions to the research litera-
ture on users of alternative media. With the continuous rise of political populism across
the globe, alternative media which promote this thin-centered ideology are likely to
experience increased attention from political communication research in the future (see,
e.g., Bachl, 2018; Haller & Holt, 2018; Holt, 2017; Holt et al., 2019). The present research
is able to provide insights into the audiences of AMP. More speciﬁcally, using a quota sur-
vey of German Internet users we have investigated how occasional and frequent AMP
users diﬀer from non-users in Germany. In line with our assumptions, the empirical
results describe two diﬀerent user groups.
Occasional users of AMP can hardly be characterized by a speciﬁc political leaning.
Although the data reveal some tendencies towards populist attitudes and voting for
AfD, these relationships are too small to reach statistical signiﬁcance. Personal relative
deprivation which has been linked to an aﬃnity to political populism (Elchardus & Spruyt,
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2016; Hameleers et al., 2018; Spruyt et al., 2016) was even negatively associated with
occasional AMP exposure. Instead, occasional exposure to AMP was strongly related to
using social networking sites (SNS) for political information. Both Facebook and Twitter
use were important predictors of occasional AMP exposure. Moreover, younger age,
which is an important factor in using social media for political information (Newman
et al., 2018), was a much more powerful predictor for occasional than for frequent
AMP exposure.
These ﬁndings can be interpreted in a way that occasional users of AMP are probably
not intentionally seeking alternative political information with a populist slant. Rather,
they could be incidentally exposed to such content via their SNS accounts as other
users in their virtual social surroundings share, like, or comment the respective content.
This stresses the notion that SNS as a technology could have helped populism gain
momentum. More speciﬁcally, SNS seem to provide AMP outlets with access to parts
of the audience that are not necessarily interested in their content by political conviction.
This seems to be especially true for younger, male individuals who, as judged by our
results, have a higher likelihood of occasionally using AMP. In the long run, occasional
AMP exposure via SNS could therefore help increase the potential voter bases of populist
parties and contribute to a populist societal polarization (Müller et al., 2017).
For frequent exposure to AMP, political predictors play a crucial role. AfD vote prob-
ability, populist attitudes, and personal relative deprivation were all related to frequent
AMP exposure with AfD vote probability being one of the strongest among all predictors
in the model. This speaks for frequent AMP use being a case of partisan selective exposure
(Stroud, 2008) and indicates a strong link between AMP and the recent success of AfD in
Germany. Diﬀerent to voting for populist parties, frequent AMP exposure seems to be
triggered by individualized feelings of societal ostracism rather than collective deprivation.
This could be read as a hint that diﬀerent to other, more participatory types of alternative
media AMP might not construct a sense of collective action among its frequent users.
However, additional research is necessary to shed more light upon this.
When it comes to their media diet, the data indicated that just as occasional AMP users
also frequent users heavily rely upon SNS for political information. SNS seem to play an
important role for any kind of AMP exposure. Besides, the media diet of frequent AMP
users also diﬀered from non-users in a way that they more frequently read quality news-
papers. This varies from what is known about populist citizens’ media use in general,
which is coined by a strong aﬃnity to entertaining political content from tabloids and pri-
vate television stations (Hameleers et al., 2017; Schulz, 2019). Moreover, while populist
citizens in general are older and have a lower formal education than non-populists, fre-
quent AMP users were younger and better educated in this study.
One could now argue that diﬀerent individuals within the sample are responsible for
the diﬀerent signiﬁcant results. The signiﬁcant results for education and quality newspaper
use do not necessarily mean that the same individuals also agree with the populist ideology
and vote for AfD. Instead, the AMP use of well-educated individuals could also be a case of
intentional cross-cutting exposure for monitoring purposes. However, while a group of
well-educated but not necessarily populist AMP users is likely to exist, it probably exists
in small numbers. The quite robust relationships between frequent AMP use and edu-
cation as well as quality newspaper use suggest that also among truly populist AMP fre-
quent users, education and quality newspaper use are higher than average. This would
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then indicate that frequent AMP users are a well-educated and information-oriented sub-
group among populist citizens. In order to ultimately clarify this and diﬀerentiate between
diﬀerent user groups more insights into frequent AMP users underlying motives would be
necessary.
Limitations and future research
There are, of course, limitations to the present study. First, we have only measured AMP
exposure but not users’ motives or evaluations of AMP content. Future research should
use these variables to distinguish between diﬀerent groups among the frequent AMP audi-
ence. This could help clarify whether populist users are simply accompanied by non-popu-
list but highly educated users who read AMP for monitoring purposes or whether frequent
AMP users are in fact a well-educated and information-oriented subgroup among populist
citizens.
Second, we relied upon cross-sectional data for this study. The present design is not able to
establish causality between AMP exposure and the predictor variables under consideration. It
can for instance be expected that frequent AMP users are not only drawn to AMP because
they hold strong populist attitudes but, vice versa, their populist attitudes might become
stronger as a consequence of their frequent AMP exposure. The same applies for all other
political as well as media use variables. Future studies using experimental or longitudinal
designs will thus have to further explore the dynamics between AMP selection and eﬀects.
Third, our ﬁndings are limited to Germany, a country where the AMP landscape has
witnessed increasing audience attention in recent years alongside the growing success of
the right-wing populist party AfD. In diﬀerent national settings with varying media and
political landscapes AMP users might be characterized by other attributes than in
Germany. This calls for a replication of the present research in other national settings
or with an internationally comparative perspective.
Fourth, we relied upon self-reported media use to determine frequent and occasional
AMP users. Measuring media exposure via self-reports is very common in political com-
munication research, yet, it can be aﬄicted with over-reporting bias (e.g., Prior, 2009).
However, for AMP exposure this could be diﬀerent. AMP users might be aware of the
fact that they constitute a minority among the media audience with views that are often
discussed as breaking the norm (Herkman, 2015). Thus, there could also be a social desir-
ability bias that leads to under- rather than over-reporting of AMP exposure. This ques-
tion should be addressed by future methodological research that compares self-reports of
AMP exposure with users’ log-ﬁla data.
Finally, for the present research we had to classify media outlets as featuring a populist
slant based on previous analysis and traces of information from diﬀerent sources. There is
yet no systematic content analysis of the German alternative media landscape that would
allow for an unequivocal classiﬁcation of outlets. This is an urgent gap in the research
landscape, not only for Germany but also for many other countries. It could be argued
that using ‘AMP’ as a label downplays the strong exclusionist and nationalist agenda of
some of the outlets under consideration. However, a clear right-wing stance cannot
necessarily be found among all AMP that were studied in this article. Nevertheless, this
should not lead to neglecting the diﬀerences between more and less right-wing extremist
AMP outlets.
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Conclusion
Despite these limitations, the present research has demonstrated that AMP are an impor-
tant factor in the current political communication landscape and that studying their users
contributes to explain the recent success of political populism. Our results indicated that
almost a third of German Internet users is regularly exposed to at least one AMP outlet
and that SNS use for political information increases the likelihood for this. Furthermore,
we found that frequent AMP users feel individually, but not collectively deprived, hold
stronger populist attitudes, and have a high likelihood of voting for right-wing populist
AfD. Interestingly, no such patterns could be observed for occasional AMP users who
even reported less personal relative deprivation than non-users.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that (1) AMP are important information sources
for individuals with strong populist convictions and (2) SNS might help them gain atten-
tion beyond this core group. This adds to a large body of research stressing the importance
of social media for the recent wave of populism across the globe (Alvares & Dahlgren,
2016; Ernst et al., 2017; Krämer, 2017). Not only do SNS provide populist leaders with
a direct communication channel to the electorate they also pave the way for accompanying
alternative media outlets which support the populist message with a seemingly indepen-
dent voice. This calls for future research on AMP, its audiences, and its relations to SNS
and political populism.
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Appendix 1. Items measuring populist attitudes, personal relative
deprivation, and collective relative deprivation
Item M (SD)
Populist attitudes
MPs in Parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people 5.57 (1.41)
The diﬀerences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the diﬀerences between
ordinary people
5.39 (1.58)
People like me have no inﬂuence on what the government does 4.68 (1.88)
Politicians talk too much and take too little action 5.73 (1.46)
The people should have the ﬁnal say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in
referendums
5.37 (1.77)
The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken 5.50 (1.69)
The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions 4.97 (1.81)
The politicians in Parliament need to follow the will of the people 5.66 (1.48)
Ordinary people all pull together 3.56 (1.77)
Ordinary people are of good and honest character 3.96 (1.78)
Ordinary people share the same values and interests 4.05 (1.70)
Although the Germans are very diﬀerent from each other, when it comes down to it they all think the same 3.82 (1.77)
Personal relative deprivation
I, personally, never get what I in fact deserve 3.27 (1.90)
I, personally, do not thrive in Germany 2.99 (1.91)
My whole living conditions are really poor 2.72 (1.82)
Collective relative deprivation
Whichever way you look at it, people like me never get what they in fact deserve in this society 4.33 (1.89)
In this society, people like me work really hard and do not receive anything in return 4.42 (1.89)
People like me are never spared in this society 4.23 (1.81)
Notes: n = 1346. All items were measured on a seven-step scale from 1 = do not agree at all to 7 = fully agree.
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(2017). The Polarizing Impact of News Coverage on Populist Attitudes in the Public. 
Evidence From a Panel Study in Four European Democracies. Journal of Communication, 
67(6), 968–992.  
2018 Best paper award of the annual conference of the “Communication & Politics” division 
for the German Communication Association (DGPuK) 
2017 Best paper award of the annual conference of the „Media Reception and Effects“ 
division for the German Communication Association (DGPuK)  
2011 Best paper award of the annual conference of the „Media Reception and Effects“ 
division for the German Communication Association (DGPuK)  
  
  
 
Publications 
 
Journal Articles (peer reviewed) 
 
12.  Bos, L., Schemer, C., Corbu, N., Hameleers, M., Andreadis, I., Schulz, A., Schmuck, D., 
Reinemann, C. & Fawzi, N. (in press). The Effects of Populism as a Social Identity Frame on 
Persuasion and Mobilization. European Journal of Political Research.  
11.  Wirz, D.S., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Ernst, N., Schemer, C. & Wirth, W. (in press). How 
populist crisis rhetoric affects voters in Switzerland. Studies in Communication Science. 
10. Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Buechel, F., Wirz, D.S., Schulz, A., Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Müller, P., 
Schemer, C. & Wirth, W. (2018). What Drives Populist Styles? Analyzing Immigration and Labor 
Market News in 11 Countries. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. Advance online 
publication. doi:10.1177/1077699018805408 
9. Schulz, A., Wirth, W. & Müller, P. (2018). We are the People and You are Fake News: A Social 
Identity Approach to Populist Citizens’ False Consensus and Hostile Media Perceptions. 
Communication Research. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/0093650218794854 
8.  Schulz, A. (2018). Where Populist Citizens get the News: An Investigation of News Audience 
Polarization along Populist Attitudes in Eleven Countries. Communication Monographs. Advance 
online publication. doi:10.1080/03637751.2018.1508876 
7.  Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Ernst, N., Esser, F. & Wirth, W. 
(2018). The Effects of Right-Wing Populist Communication on Emotions and Cognitions toward 
Immigrants. The International Journal of Press/Politics. Advance online publication. 
doi:10.1177/1940161218788956 
6.  Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S. & Wirth, W. (2018). News Media as Gatekeepers, 
Critics and Initiators of Populist Communication: How Journalists in Ten Countries Deal with the 
Populist Challenge. The International Journal of Press/Politics. Advance online publication. 
doi:10.1177/1940161218785979 
5.  Hameleers, M., Bos, L., Fawzi, N., Reinemann, C., Andreadis, I., Corbu, N., Schemer, C.,  
Schulz, A., Sheafer, T., Aalberg, T., Axelsson, S., Berganza, R., Cremonesi, C., Dahlberg, S., 
Vreese, C. H. de, Hess, A., Kartsounidou, E., Kasprowicz, D., Matthes, J., Negrea-Busuioc, E., 
Ringdal, s., Salgado, S., Sanders, K., Schmuck, D., Strömbäck, J., Suiter, J., Boomgarden, H., 
Tenenboim-Weinblatt, K. & Weiss-Yaniv, N. (2018). Start Spreading the News: A Comparative 
Experiment on the Effects of Populist Communication on Political Engagement in Sixteen 
European Countries. The International Journal of Press/Politics. Advance online publication. 
doi:10.1177/1940161218786786 
4.  Schemer, C., Wirth, W., Wettstein, M., Müller, P., Schulz, A. & Wirz, D. S. (2018). Wirkung 
populistischer Kommunikation. Populismus in den Medien, Wirkungen und deren 
Randbedingungen. Communicatio Socialis, 51(2), 118-130.  
3.  Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S., Engesser, S., & Wirth, W. (2017). 
The Polarizing Impact of News Coverage on Populist Attitudes in the Public. Evidence From a 
Panel Study in Four European Democracies. Journal of Communication, 67(6), 968–992. 
doi:10.1111/jcom.12337  
2.  Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2017). Measuring 
Populist Attitudes on Three Dimensions. International Journal of Public Opinion Research. Advance 
online publication. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edw037  
1.  Schulz, A., & Rössler, P. (2012). The Spiral of Silence and the Internet. Selection of Online 
Content and the Perception of the Public Opinion Climate in Computer-Mediated 
Communication Environments. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 24(3), 346–367. 
doi:10.1093/ijpor/eds022 
  
 
 
Books 
 
1.  Schulz, A., & Rössler, P. (2013). Schweigespirale Online. Die Theorie der öffentlichen Meinung und das 
Internet [Spiral of Silence Online. The Theory of Public Opinion and the Internet]. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos. 
 
Working Paper 
 
2.  Wirth, W., Esser, F., Wettstein, M., Engesser, S., Wirz, D. S., Schulz, A.,. . . Schemer, C. (2016). 
The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies, and Styles. A Theoretical Model and Research Design for Analyzing 
Populist Political Communication. NCCR Working Paper No. 88. Retrieved from NCCR democracy 
21 website: http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/pdf/wp_88.pdf  
1.  Wirth, W., Schemer, C., Schulz, A., Wettstein, M., Wirz, D., & Müller, P. (2016). A Multi-
Dimensional Measure to Assess Populist Attitudes in the Public in Eight Languages. NCCR Working Paper 
No. 87. Retrieved from NCCR democracy 21 website: http://www.nccr-
democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/wp87  
 
Book Chapters / Encyclopedia Entries 
 
4.  Schulz, A. (2017). Research Method Selection. In J. Matthes (Ed.), The Wiley Blackwell-ICA 
international encyclopedias of communication. The International Encyclopedia of 
Communication Research Methods (pp. 1–2). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
doi:10.1002/9781118901731.iecrm0213  
3.  Rössler, P., & Schulz, A. (2014). Public Opinion Expression in Online Environments. In W. 
Donsbach, C. T. Salmon, & Y. Tsfati (Eds.), The Spiral of Silence: New Perspectives on Communication 
and Public Opinion (pp. 101–118). New York, NY: Routledge. 
2.  Rössler, P., Schulz, A., & Mewes, M. (2012). Kumulation, Konsonanz und Netzwerkeffekte. 
Noelle-Neumanns Theorie der Öffentlichen Meinung unter Online-Bedingungen: Ansätze zu 
einer theoretischen Rejustierung der 'Schweigespirale' im Lichte des 'Social Web' [Cumulation, 
Consonance and Networkeffects. Noelle-Neumanns's Spiral of Silence Theory Online: A 
Readjustment Approach]. In O. Jandura, A. Fahr, & H.-B. Brosius (Eds.), Reihe Rezeptionsforschung: 
Vol. 25. Theorieanpassungen in der digitalen Medienwelt (1st ed., pp. 85–104). Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
1.  Schulz, A. (2012). Schweigespirale Online - Virtuelle Referenzgruppen in der Theorie der 
öffentlichen Meinung [Spiral of Silence Online - Digital Referencegroups in the Spiral of Silence 
Theory]. In S. Appenzeller, F. Flemming, & L. Küpper (Eds.), Düsseldorfer Forum Politische 
Kommunikation: v.2. Bürgerproteste im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Medien: Beiträge zur 7. Fachtagung des 
DFPK (pp. 85–104). Berlin: Frank & Timme. 
Presentations 
 
Competitive Conference Presentations (*full paper) 
 
33.*  Schulz, A. & Wirth, W. (2019, May). Populist Citizens’ News Choice: A Selective Exposure Study 
on the Extent of and Motivation behind Populist Citizens’ Pro- and Counterattitudinal News 
Exposure. Presentation at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association 
(ICA), Washington, DC. 
32.*  Müller, P. & Schulz, A. (2019, May). Who Uses Anti-Elitist Alternative Media? Exploring 
Predictors of Occasional and Frequent Exposure. Presentation at the annual meeting of the 
International Communication Association (ICA), Washington, DC. 
  
 
31. Schulz, A. & Wirth, W. (2019, January). Selecting Fake News. Eine Untersuchung der 
Nachrichtenselektion populistischer Bürger. [Selecting Fake News. An Investigation of populist 
citizens news selection]. Presentation at the annual meeting of the Media Reception and Effects 
division of the German Communication Association (DGPuK), Mainz, Germany.   
30.  Müller, P. & Schulz, A. (2018, November). Corrective Actions or Political Claims? Determinants of 
Audience Members' Reactions to the 'Fake News' Debate. Presentation at the 7th ECREA conference, 
Lugano, Switzerland.   
29. Schulz, A. & Wirz, D. S. (2018, November). Populist Citizens’ Willingness to speak out in 4 Countries. 
Presentation at the 7th ECREA conference, Lugano, Switzerland.   
28.*  Schulz, A. (2018, May). Populist Citizens’ Media Use in Eleven Countries. Presentation at the annual 
meeting of the International Communication Association (ICA), Prague, CZ.  
27.*  Hameleers, M., Bos, L., Fawzi, N., Reinemann, C. E., Andreadis, I., Corbu, N., Schemer, C., 
Shaefer, T., Aalberg, T., Axelsson, S., Balas, D.C., Berganza, R., Cremonesi, C., Dahlberg, S., 
Hess, A., Kartsounidou, E., Kasprowicz, D., Negrea-Busuioc, E., Ringdal, S., Salgado, S., Sanders, 
K., Schmuck, D., Schulz, A., Stepinska, A. M., Suiter, J., Tenenboim-Weinblatt, K. & Weiss, N. 
(2018, May). Start Spreading the News: A Comparative Experiment on the Effects of Populist Communication 
on Political Participation in 16 European Countries.  Presentation at the annual meeting of the 
International Communication Association (ICA), Prague, CZ. 
26.*  Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S. & Wirth, W. (2018, May). The News Media as 
Gatekeepers, Critics and Originators of Populist Communication. Presentation at the annual meeting of the 
International Communication Association (ICA), Prague, CZ. 
25.*  Wirz, D. S., Schulz, A., Schemer, C., Müller, P., Ernst, N., Esser, F. & Wirth, W. (2018, May). 
How Right-Wing Populist Communication Influences Cognitions and Emotions toward Immigrants: Evidence 
from a Cross-National Panel-Survey. Presentation at the annual meeting of the International 
Communication Association (ICA), Prague, CZ. 
24.  Wirz, D. S., Schulz, A. (2018, March). COST, Madrid, Spain.  
23.  Wirz, D. S., Schulz, A., Wettstein, M., Ernst, N., Schemer, C., Müller, P. & Wirth, W. (2018, 
January). Populistische Krisen-Rhetorik: Wie Emotionalisierung und Dramatisierung von populistischen Inhalten 
deren Wirkung verstärkt. [The populist Crisis-Rhetoric: How Emotionalization and Dramatization 
amplify the Effects of populist Communication] Presentation at the annual meeting of the 
Communication and Politics division of the German Communication Association (DGPuK), 
Fribourg, Switzerland.  
22.  Schulz, A. (2017, November). Media Exposure in Spite of Media Distrust: Populist Citizens’ Reactions to 
Hostile News. Presentation at the ECREA’s Political Communication Section Interim Conference, 
Zurich, Switzerland.   
21.  Schemer, C., Müller, P., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S., & Wirth, W. (2017, July). The 
Effects of Populist Communication in the News on Populist Attitudes in the Public. Presentation at the 40th 
Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), Edinburgh, 
Scotland.   
20.*  Schulz, A. (2017, June). The Populist's Worldview. How Populist Citizens Perceive Mainstream Media and 
Public Opinion.  Presentation at the Final Conference of the NCCR Democracy "Challenges to 
Democracy in the 21st Century", Zurich, Switzerland.  
19.*  Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Wirz, D., & Wirth, W. (2017, May). The 
Polarizing Impact of News Coverage on Populist Attitudes in the Public. Evidence from a Panel Study in four 
European Democracies. Presentation at the annual meeting of the International Communication 
Association (ICA), San Diego/CA, USA.*   
18.*  Schulz, A., Wirth, W., Wettstein, M., Wirz, D., & Müller, P. (2017, May). The Populist's Worldview. 
How Populist Citizens Perceive Mainstream Media and Public Opinion. Presentation at the annual meeting 
of the International Communication Association (ICA), San Diego/CA, USA.*   
  
 
17.  Schulz, A., Wirth, W., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., Müller, P., & Schemer, C. (2017, January). Die 
populistische Weltanschauung: Wie Anhänger populistischer Ideen die Medien und das öffentliche Meinungsklima 
wahrnehmen [The Populist's Worldview. How Populist Citizens Perceive Mainstream Media and 
Public Opinion]. Presentation at the annual meeting of the Media Reception and Effects division 
of the German Communication Association (DGPuK), Erfurt, Germany.   
16.  Ernst, N., Wirz, D. S., Schulz, A., & Engesser, S. (2016, June). Populist Communication Strategies in 
News Media in Four European Democracies. Presentation at the Preconference "Populism in, by, and 
against the Media" of the annual meeting of the International Communication Association (ICA), 
Fukuoka, Japan.   
15.  Schulz, A., Wettstein, M., Müller, P., Wirz, D., Schemer, C., & Wirth, W. (2016, June). News 
Media Use and Populist Attitudes. Is There an Unholy Alliance? Presentation at the Preconference 
"Populism in, by, and against the Media" of the annual meeting of the International 
Communication Association (ICA), Fukuoka, Japan.   
14.  Schemer, C., Schulz, A., Müller, P., Wirz, D., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2016, April). Validation 
of a Populist Attitudes Measure for Public Opinion Surveys. Presentation at the 5th COST Joint 
Management Committee & Working Group Meeting, Cracow, Poland.   
13.  Schulz, A., Müller, P., Wirz, D., Wettstein, M., Schemer, C., & Wirth, W. (2015, August). 
Measuring Populist Attitudes as a Multidimensional Concept. Presentation at the annual convention of 
the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Montreal, Canada.   
12.  Schulz, A., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2015, May). Der Induktionsschluss beim Publikum: Empirische 
Evidenz für die Extrapolationshypothese im Persuasive Press Inference Modell. [Empirical Evidence for the 
Extrapolation Hypotheses of the Persuasive Press Inference Model]. Presentation at the annual 
meeting of the German Communication Association (DGPuK), Darmstadt, Germany.   
11.  Wirz, D., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., & Wirth, W. (2015, January). Die 
unbeabsichtigte Komplizenschaft von Populisten und Boulevardmedien. Wirkung populistischer Appelle auf 
Zeitungsleser [The unintentional Complicity between Populists and Tabloid Media. Effects of 
Populist Communication on Newspaper Audiences]. Presentation at the annual meeting of the 
Media Reception and Effects division of the German Communication Association (DGPuK), 
Bamberg, Germany.   
10.*  Wirz, D. S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., Schulz, A., Wettstein, M., Engesser, S.,. . . Wirth, W. (2014, 
May). Populism and the Media Forming an Unholy Alliance: An Integrative Framework. Presentation at the 
annual meeting of the International Communication Association (ICA), Seattle/WA, USA.    
9.*  Schulz, A., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2014, May). All Hostile Media. Consonance of News Reporting 
as Moderator of the Hostile Media Effect. Presentation at the annual meeting of the International 
Communication Association (ICA), Seattle/WA, USA.   
8.  Schulz, A., Dingerkus, F., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2014, January). Konsonanz und Hostile Media 
Effekt: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung der Wirkung von Konsonanz auf feindliche Medienrezeption am 
Beispiel des Konflikts zwischen Schulmedizinern und Homöopathen. [Consonance and the Hostile Media 
Effect. An Experimental Test of the Effects of Consonance on Hostile Media Perceptions]. 
Presentation at the annual meeting of the Media Reception and Effects division of the German 
Communication Association (DGPuK), Hannover, Germany.   
7.*  Rössler, P., & Schulz, A. (2012, May). The Spiral of Silence and the Internet: Selection of Online Content 
and the Perception of the Public Opinion Climate in Computer‐Mediated Communication Environments. 
Presentation at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association (ICA), 
Phoenix/AZ, USA.   
6.  Rössler, P. & Schulz, A. (2012, May). The Spiral of Silence and the Internet Age: Challenges, 
Modifications, Limitations. Presentation at the annual meeting of the International Communication 
Association (ICA), Phoenix/AZ, USA. 
5.  Rössler, P., & Schulz, A. (2011, September). Vom Hasen Medienentwicklung, dem Igel Medienforschung 
und der Schnecke Methodenentwicklung. Oder: Sinn und Wahnsinn von Standardisierung am Beispiel eines 
Skalenhandbuchs für die Kommunikationswissenschaft. [About the Challenges to standardize Measures in 
  
 
Communication Science]. Presentation at the annual meeting of the Methods division of the 
German Communication Association (DGPuK), Hannover, Germany.   
4.  Schulz, A. (2011, June). Auf der Suche nach einem virtuellen Eisenbahnabteil. Die Theorie der öffentlichen 
Meinung vor dem Hintergrund computervermittelter Kommunikation. [Searching for the digital Train 
Compartment. The Spiral of Silence Theory in computer-mediated Communication]. 
Posterpresentation at the "Nachwuchskolloquium für politische Kommunikation“ (NapoKo), 
Dresden, Germany.   
3.  Rössler, P., & Schulz, A. (2011, June). Reden und Schweigen in Subspiralen. Öffentliche Meinung zwischen 
Differenzierung und Integration: Zum Erklärungswert von Noelle‐Neumanns Theorie in der Praxis des ‚Social 
Web‘. [Speaking and Silence in Subspirals: Public Opinion in between Differentiation and 
Integration]. Presentation at the annual meeting of the German Communication Association 
(DGPuK), Dortmund, Germany.   
2.  Schulz, A. (2011, April). Schweigespirale online. Social Media und die neue Rolle von Referenzgruppen in der 
Theorie der öffentlichen Meinung [Spiral of Silence Online: Social Media and the new Role of 
Referencegroups within the Theory of Public Opinion]. Presentation at the Düsseldorfer Forum 
für politische Kommunikation (DFPK), Düsseldorf, Germany.   
1.  Rössler, P., Schulz, A., & Mewes, M. (2011, January). Kumulation, Konsonanz und Netzwerkeffekte. 
Noelle-Neumanns Theorie der Öffentlichen Meinung unter Online-Bedingungen: Ansätze zu einer theoretischen 
Rejustierung der Schweigespirale im Lichte des 'Social Web'. [Cumulation, Consonance and 
Networkeffects. Noelle-Neumanns's Spiral of Silence Theory Online: A Readjustment Approach]. 
Presentation at the annual meeting of the Media Reception and Effects division of the German 
Communication Association (DGPuK), Munich, Germany.   
 
Invited Talks 
 
5.  Schulz, A. (2018, November). We are the People and you are Fake News: Populist Citizens’ Public 
Opinion and Media Perceptions. Invited Lecture at the Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques. 
University of Lausanne, Switzerland.  
4. Schulz, A. (2018, June). Measuring Populism across Nations: An Inventory of Populist Attitudes. 
Presentation. Workshop on «Populist Attitudes in a Comparative Perspective» at Bamberg 
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Bamberg, Germany.  
3.  Schulz, A., & Wirz, D. S. (2017, October). Die Untersuchung von Populismus in der Medienpsychologie. 
Forschungsfragen, Ergebnisse und Herausforderungen [The Investigation of Populism in Media 
Psychology. Research Questions, Results, and Challenges]. Ikmb Research Colloquium hosted by 
Prof. Dr. Silke Adam, University of Bern, Switzerland.   
2.  Schulz, A. (2017, September). Populismus, Medien und Konflikte [Populism, Media, and Conflicts]. 
Presentation. Workshop on "Media in Times of Conflict" at the Schader-Stiftung, Darmstadt, 
Germany.   
1.  Schulz, A., & Wirz, D. S. (2015, January). Populism in the Context of Globalization and Mediatization. 
Presentation at the COST network workshop "New Perspectives on Populist Political 
Communication“, Zurich, Switzerland.  
  
 
Research Collaborations  
 Dr. Linda Bos & Dr. Michael Hameleers (University of Amsterdam) Research on Populism 
(ongoing)  
 Prof. Dr. Marco Steenbergen (University of Zurich) Research on Populism (ongoing) 
 Prof. Dr. Christian Schemer & Dr. Philipp Müller (University of Mainz). Research on populism 
(ongoing) 
 Prof. Dr. Werner Wirth (University of Zurich). Research on media perceptions and populism 
(ongoing).  
 Prof. Dr. Patrick Rössler (University of Erfurt). Research on the Spiral of Silence (four 
publications). 
Service to Profession 
Conference Activity  
2015 
 
Organization of a panel on “Populist Attitudes in Contemporary Democracies” for the annual 
meeting of the ECPR General Conference, Montréal, Canada.  
2014 Organization of a panel on “The Appeal of Populist Ideas and Messages. Understanding 
Populism in the Context of De-Nationalization and Mediatization” for the annual meeting of 
the International Communication Association (ICA), Seattle/WA, USA.  
2012 Organization of a panel on “Noelle-Neumann’s Theory of Public Opinion in the Digital Age: 
New Directions in Theory and Methodology” for the annual meeting of the International 
Communication Association (ICA),  
Ad-hoc Reviewer 
Journals: Political Behavior (2); New Media & Society (1);  American Political Science Review (1); 
Communication Monographs (1); International Political Science Review (1); American Political Science 
Review (1) 
 
Conferences: European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA); European 
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR); International Communication Association (ICA); German 
Communication Association (DGPuK) 
Departmental and University Service 
2017 – ongoing  IKMZ Social Media Management as well as Website Management for the IKMZ 
Media Psychology and Effects Division 
2011 – 2013  Student Representative at the Department of Communication and Media Research, 
University of Zurich, Switzerland (student member of the faculty committee, 
department committee, appellate committee) 
2007 – 2009  Student Representative at the Department for Communication Science, University of 
Erfurt, Germany (speaker, student member of the faculty committee) 
Memberships 
European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA) 
Section: Political Communication 
Swiss Association of Communication and Media Research (SACM) 
Division: Audience, Media Reception, and Effects 
  
 
Working Group “Citizens and Populism” (chaired by Prof. Dr. Carsten E. Reinemann) of the COST 
Action “Populist Political Communication in Europe” (chaired by Prof. Dr. Toril Aalberg).  
Young scholar network of the Media Reception and Effects division of the German Communication 
Association (DGPuK: NaRezFo)  
International Communication Association (ICA) 
Divisions: Political Communication, Journalism 
German Communication Association (DGPuK) 
Divisions: Media Reception & Effects; Methods; Communication & Politics; Digital Communication 
Teaching 
Fall 2018 MA Lecture: Multivariate Analyseverfahren [Multivariate Statistics]  
with Dominique S. Wirz 
Spring 2018 BA Seminar: Populismus und Medien: Nutzungs- und Wirkungsaspekte 
[Populism and the Media: Media Use & Effects Research]  
with Dominique. S. Wirz 
Fall 2017 MA Lecture: Multivariate Analyseverfahren [Multivariate Statistics]  
with Werner Wirth and Dominique S. Wirz 
Spring 2017 BA Seminar: Schönheitsideale im TV [Body Images on TV]  
with Dominique S. Wirz 
Fall 2016 MA Lecture: Multivariate Analyseverfahren [Multivariate Statistics]  
with Werner Wirth and Dominique S. Wirz 
Spring 2016 BA Seminar: Schönheitsideale im TV [Body Images on TV]  
with Dominique S. Wirz 
Fall 2015 MA Lecture: Multivariate Analyseverfahren [Multivariate Statistics] 
with Werner Wirth 
Spring 2015 BA Research Seminar: Durch welche Brille schaust du? Die verzerrte 
Wahrnehmung von Medieninhalten II [Media Bias Perceptions]  
with Katharina Sommer 
Fall 2014 BA Research Seminar: Durch welche Brille schaust du? Die verzerrte 
Wahrnehmung von Medieninhalten I [Media Bias Perceptions]  
with Katharina Sommer 
 
Supervised Bachelor Theses  
at the Department of Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich, Switzerland  
 
13.  Caduff, M. (2015). Reden oder Schweigen? Wie sich Isolationsfurcht und Schüchternheit allgemein und bei einem 
feindlich wahrgenommenen Meinungsklima auf die Redebereitschaft auswirken.  
 
12.  Hauri, A. & Signer, E. (2015). Das Schweigen der Skeptiker:  Medienskeptizismus und die Redebereitschaft 
in der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchung anhand des HME, des IPMI und der Schweigespirale.  
 
11.  Erdal, B. & Holenstein, J. (2015). Der Einfluss des affektiven Involvements auf den Hostile-Media-Effekt. 
Rolle und Relevanz von Emotionen in der feindlichen Wahrnehmung von Medieninhalten.  
 
10. Lareida, L. (2015). Hostile Media Effekt am Beispiel Islam in der Schweiz. Eine empirische Studie über den 
Einfluss der eigenen Meinung und dem Medienskeptizismus auf die feindliche Medienwahrnehmung.  
 
9.  Cuk, M. & Marfurt, J. (2015). Dico, ergo sum. Weshalb, wann und wo wir sprechen.  
 
  
 
8.  Milz, V. (2015). Schweigespirale & Offenheit. Der Einfluss von Offenheit für neue Erfahrungen auf den Prozess 
der Schweigespirale.  
 
7.  Rubeli, D. (2015). Der Einfluss des Third-Person-Effekt in der Schweigespirale: Eine empirische Untersuchung 
der Berichterstattungswahrnehmung über den Islam in der Schweiz.  
 
6.  Strahm, E. (2015). Der Hostile Media Effekt. Der Einfluss von Involvement, Reichweite und 
Glaubwürdigkeit.  
 
5.  Betschart, L. & Thürlemann, M. (2015). Medienmeinung oder Peer-Group Meinung? Ein Test der Einflüsse 
auf die Redebereitschaft.  
 
4.  Wegner, J. & Witzig, S. (2015). Reden oder Schweigen? Wie sich Selbstbewusstsein und Introversion auf die 
Redebereitschaft bei einem feindlich wahrgenommenen Meinungsklima auswirken.  
 
3.  Furrer, C. & Wepfer, J. (2015). Die Rolle von Involvement bei der Wahrnehmung der 
öffentlichen Meinung. 
 
2.  Britschgi, N. & Willi, R. (2015). Die Relevanz des affektiven Involvements innerhalb des Hostile-Media-
Effekts.  
 
1.  Müller, A. & Zurbuchen, A. (2015). Der Hostile Media Effekt in Verbindung mit Gruppenidentifikation 
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